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Summary of Essays on the Impact of Renegotiating Trade
Agreements by Oliver Exton
This thesis explores the impact of the renegotiation of trade agreements when there is a threat
that trade barriers could increase. The thesis addresses the following questions:
1. What is the impact on firm exporting decisions of the trade policy uncertainty generated by
the renegotiation of trade agreements?
2. What is the role of a customer base in export dynamics, and does an exporter customer base
respond to the renegotiation of trade agreements?
3. How do industries restructure in response to changing economic competition driven by trade
agreements?
4. What is the impact of exchange rate movements (driven by the renegotiation of a trade
agreement) on exporter prices and quantities, and are the effects heterogeneous across firms?
5. How important are firms that trade goods internationally for the UK economy and how could
these firms respond to the future renegotiation of trade agreements following Brexit?
The second chapter (joint with Meredith Crowley and Lu Han) introduces the concept that the
renegotiation of a trade agreement introduces uncertainty into the economic environment. In June
2016 the British electorate unexpectedly voted to leave the European Union, introducing a new
era in which the UK and EU began to renegotiate the terms of the UK-EU trading relationship.
We exploit this natural experiment to estimate the impact of uncertainty associated with trade
agreement re-negotiation on the export participation decision of firms in the UK. Starting from
a model of exporting under trade policy uncertainty, we derive testable predictions of firm entry
into and exit from a foreign market under an uncertain ‘renegotiation regime’. Empirically, we
develop measures of the trade policy uncertainty facing firms exporting from the UK to the EU
after June 2016. Using the universe of UK export transactions at the firm and product level and
cross-sectional variation in ‘threat point’ tariffs, we estimate that entry in 2016 would have been
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5.0% higher and exit 6.1% lower if firms exporting from the UK to the EU had not faced increased
trade policy uncertainty after June 2016.
In the third chapter (joint with Davide Rigo) we investigate the role of customer base in ex-
port market dynamics. First, we provide evidence that exporters grow in a foreign market by
accumulating customer base. Second, we show that customer base can explain up to 30% of the
growth in a destination market. Third, we explore potential mechanisms and find no evidence
that exporters use customer specific price dynamics to attract new customers or expand existing
customer relationships. Fourth, we explore how exporters adjust customer base in response to
changes in market access by exploiting the trade policy uncertainty associated with the renegoti-
ation of the UK-EU trade relationship and Sterling depreciation following the Brexit referendum.
We show that French exporters in 2016-2017 were less likely to enter into exporting to the UK and
incumbent exporters acquired a lower number of new buyers in the UK compared with the other
European countries. Overall our results indicate that customer base is an important margin for
export market growth and provides another margin that firms may adjust in response to changing
market conditions.
The fourth chapter shows that the rise in import competition from China following China’s ac-
cession to the World Trade Organization contributed to the decline in UK manufacturing activity
post 2000. A significant proportion of this decline in manufacturing activity is driven by firms
switching their industrial activity out of manufacturing production and towards services. In par-
ticular, firms switch into business services such as research and development and wholesale and
retail. This paper also shows that the speed of the transition across industries is fast, with the
majority of the employment and turnover effects occurring in the first few years. This is primar-
ily driven by the largest firms, as the switching effect on the number of firms is substantially smaller.
The final chapter explores why the value of UK goods exports increased following depreciation
of Sterling after the Brexit referendum. This paper shows that most of the response was initially
4
driven by an increase in prices, although export quantities did also increase. The largest exporters
were most responsive to the depreciation, increasing both quantities and prices more than smaller
exporters. The paper also provides new facts on the importance of firms engaged in international
trade in goods for the UK economy. Only 3% of UK firms are engaged in international trade in
goods, yet these firms account for over 30% of employment and over 50% of UK turnover. The
top 1% of goods exporters are pivotal in shaping UK export patterns as they account for 70% of
exports, 5% of employment, and 12% of turnover.
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1. Introduction
The prominence of trade policy in the global economy has been transformed in recent years. In
June 2016 the British public voted to leave the European Union, the economic and political bloc
with the world’s largest customs territory. At the end of 2016, the United States elected President
Trump, who withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, threatened to with-
draw the United States from the North American Free Trade Agreement, and instigated a new era
of Trade Wars with retaliatory rounds of tariffs imposed between the United States and China.
Until the political events of the past few years, it was commonly perceived that renegotiations of
trade agreements would lead to more liberal trading relationships, and that tariffs would be kept
at existing levels if negotiations were to collapse. Recent events have shown that this is no longer
the case, and this thesis explores the impact of the renegotiation of trade agreements when there
is a threat that trade barriers could increase.
Numerous studies have quantified the importance of preferential trade agreements in increas-
ing trade and economic welfare. Trade agreements significantly increase the value of trade flows
between partner countries as trade agreements reduce both tariff and non-tariff barriers. Trade
agreements also increase trade between signatories by reducing uncertainty over future tariff sched-
ules, as they provide binding commitments that prevent future tariff increases. There is however
little evidence of the impact of economic dis-integration, when barriers to trade between partners
increase, as almost all trade agreements seek to lower trade barriers between partners.
This thesis exploits the unique natural experiment of the Brexit vote of 23 June 2016, where
the UK electorate voted to leave the European Union, to investigate the impact of renegotiating
trade agreements where the future trading relationship may be less liberal than the status quo.
The vote to leave ensured that the UK has the opportunity to leave the EU Customs Union and
to renegotiate the UK and EU trading relationship. The Brexit vote initiated a ‘renegotiation
regime’ – a period of heightened uncertainty about future trade policy between the UK and EU.
The uncertainty arises from the arrival of different future scenarios: for example a ‘Deal’ scenario
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in which the UK would retain tariff free access to the EU Customs Union and a ‘No Deal’ scenario
the UK would trade with the EU under the EU’s WTO tariff schedule.
Following this motivation, this thesis addresses issues on the impact of renegotiating trade agree-
ments:
1. What is the impact on firm exporting decisions of the trade policy uncertainty generated by
the renegotiation of trade agreements?
2. What is the role of a customer base in export dynamics, and does an exporter customer base
respond to the renegotiation of trade agreements?
3. How do industries restructure in response to changing economic competition driven by trade
agreements?
4. What is the impact of exchange rate movements (driven by the renegotiation of a trade
agreement) on exporter prices and quantities, and are the effects heterogeneous across firms?
5. How important are firms that trade goods internationally for the UK economy and how could
these firms respond to the future renegotiation of trade agreements following Brexit?
1.1. Renegotiation of Trade Agreements and Firm Exporting Deci-
sions
The second chapter Renegotiation of Trade Agreements and Firm Exporting Decisions: Evidence
from the Impact of Brexit on UK Exports (joint with Meredith Crowley and Lu Han) examines
how firm participation in foreign markets changes under the renegotiation of an existing trade
agreement. Among countries that are already in a free trade agreement or customs union, the
switch to a ‘renegotiation regime’ creates uncertainty about the level of tariffs in the future and
a non-zero risk of tariff increases. In a model of exporting under trade policy uncertainty, during
a renegotiation in which tariff hikes are possible, two forces act upon a firm’s entry decision: an
increase in uncertainty about future tariff rates generates a pure risk effect which raises the real
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option value of waiting to enter foreign markets while the non-zero probability that higher ‘threat
point’ tariffs could materialize if negotiations breakdown raises the mathematical expectation of
future tariffs which, in turn, lowers the expected returns to entry.
The chapter presents new evidence of the impact of a switch to a renegotiation regime in the
context of Brexit, when the British public unexpectedly voted to leave the European Union in a
referendum on 23rd June 2016. The chapter uses the EU’s WTO schedule of tariff commitments
to compile granular ‘threat point’ trade policies that British firms exporting to the EU would face
if the renegotiation were to break down. The empirical specification implements a generalized
difference-in-difference strategy and uses information on the universe of UK exports from customs
declarations provided by HMRC. The chapter estimates the impact of a switch into a renegotia-
tion regime on the growth in the number of UK firms entering and exiting the EU market in 2016
relative to 2015 with different 8-digit products that face different threat point trade policies during
the renegotiation period.
The results show that the switch to a renegotiation regime decreased firm entry into and increased
firm exit from exporting to the EU for UK-based firms. The impact was largest for products facing
as threat points (i) higher ad valorem tariffs, (ii) tariff rate quotas, and (iii) specific duties, sug-
gesting that UK firms placed positive probability on the likelihood that negotiations could break
down and leave some firms facing substantially higher barriers in exporting to the EU. On average,
the threat of a 1 percentage point increase in the ad valorem tariff decreased the growth rate of
entry by 1.1 percentage point and increased the growth rate of entry by 0.5 percentage point. The
responses are assessed at a more granular level with discrete categories of ad valorem tariffs and
other trade policies. The results fine that ‘extreme’ ad valorem tariffs of more than 15% ad valorem
were associated with a 22.4 percentage point decline in the growth rate of entry, ‘high’ ad valorem
tariffs from 10% up to 15% were associated with a 13.2 percentage point decline, tariff rate quotas
were associated with a 16.9 percentage point decline, and specific duties were associated with a
18.9 percentage point decline.
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The chapter conducts a partial equilibrium aggregation exercise to calculate the number of miss-
ing entrants into and exiters from the EU as a result of the heightened trade policy uncertainty
post-Brexit. This exercise estimates that 5,344 firms did not enter into exporting new products to
the EU in 2016, whilst 5,437 firms exited from exporting products to the EU in 2016, in response
to the uncertainty and tariff risk associated with renegotiation of the UK-EU trade agreement.
Overall, entry into the EU would have been 5.0% higher and exit from the EU 6.1% lower in 2016
relative to a counterfactual of zero tariffs on all products and no uncertainty about future tariff
rates.
The results show that trade policy uncertainty matters for firm exporting decisions and signif-
icantly reduces entry into exporting. However, as entrants are small in terms of value, the large
change in the number of firms entering into and exiting from exporting generated only a moderate
impact on aggregate exports in 2016. Specifically, the decline in entry and induced exit reduced
the value of exports by between £394 million and £3.0 billion in 2016, a modest amount relative
to total value of UK exports to the EU in 2016 of £139 billion.
1.2. The Role of Customer Base in Exporter Dynamics
The third chapter The Role of Customer Base in Exporter Dynamics (joint with Davide Rigo)
provides evidence on how firms accumulate customers over their life cycle, and whether firms ac-
tively adjust their customer base in response to changing market conditions. This chapter uses
rich customs data from France to shed light on the role of customer base in exporter dynamics
and provides an empirical contribution through testing the predictions of models of customer base.
The chapter then builds on the preceding chapter by investigating whether exporting firms adjust
their customer base within a market in response to the renegotiation of a trade agreement.
First, the chapter describes the dynamics of customer base over the life cycle of an exporter
in a destination, and decomposes the contribution of customer base in the value of exports. This
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exercise then decomposes the contribution of customer base in a firm’s total value of exports to a
destination market, and shows that customer base can explain up to 30% of the growth in a des-
tination market. Further, the contribution of customer base remains constant throughout the life
cycle, providing evidence of the importance of continued investment by firms in their customer base.
The chapter then explores the mechanisms through which firms grow in export markets by analysing
the evolution of price dynamics to test the competing models of marketing costs and pricing activ-
ities in theories of customer markets. These results provide evidence of very little to no dynamics
in pricing through the life cycle of an exporter in a destination market, as well as through the life
cycle of specific customer relationships. These findings lend support to the theoretical models in
which firms use non-price activities, such as advertising and marketing, to accumulate customer
base, and call into question theories of customer markets that emphasize dynamic pricing activities.
The chapter also investigates how exporters adjust their ‘portfolio’ of customers in response to
changes in market access. The empirical strategy exploits the natural experiment of the result of
the 2016 Brexit Referendum in a difference in difference strategy to estimate how French firms ad-
justed their customer base in response to changing demand conditions as a result of the increased
uncertainty over the future UK-EU trading relationship. The empirical specification estimates the
impact of the heightened trade policy uncertainty facing French exporters to the UK relative to
other markets before and after the referendum result. The results show that French exporters
reduced their number of customers in response to changes in market access. French exporters were
less likely to add new customers in the period of heightened trade policy uncertainty following
the Brexit referendum, with a reduction in the probability of a firm adding a new buyer of 2.3%.
French firms were also more likely to stop exporting to a given customer in a market in the period
of heightened uncertainty. These findings show that firms actively adjust their customer base in
response to changes in the access to destination markets and lends further support to theories that
emphasize the importance of customer base for exporter growth.
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1.3. Import competition and the Reallocation of Manufacturing Ac-
tivity
The fourth chapter Import competition and the Reallocation of Manufacturing Activity: Evidence
from the impact of the China Shock on UK Manufacturing shows that the rise in import com-
petition from China following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization contributed to
the decline in UK manufacturing activity post 2000, with a significant proportion of this decline
in manufacturing activity driven by firms switching their industrial activity out of manufacturing
production and towards services. This chapter provides evidence that UK firms reorientated activ-
ity away from production activities and towards both research and development and wholesale and
retail activities in response to increased low wage import competition following China’s accession
to the World Trade Organization in 2001. The chapter uses detailed microlevel data on the uni-
verse of UK firms over the 1998-2015 period to estimate the direction and magnitude of structural
change in response to increased import competition from China. The main finding is that 42% of
the decline in manufacturing employment in response to increased import competition occurred
through firms which were initially in manufacturing and which switched out of this sector. These
firms move into business services such as research and development, or into wholesale and retail.
The chapter estimates the direction and magnitude of the UK firm response to increased im-
port competition. The chapter decomposes the change in manufacturing employment along the
intensive margins (expansion and contraction of incumbent firms), extensive margins (entry and
exit of firms), and industry switching (incumbent firms who switch into or out of exposed indus-
tries). A significant proportion (42%) of the decline in manufacturing employment in response to
increased import competition occurred through firms switching out of manufacturing. Exploring
the industries which firms switch to, firms react by reclassifying into business services such as
research and development (15% of all manufacturing employment), or into wholesale and retail
(26% of all manufacturing employment).
The chapter then explores the timing of the structural change of firms out of manufacturing
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and into business services. It estimates the predicted impact of Chinese import competition on
each of the firms’ margins for each year between 2001 and 2015. Rapid and large estimates of
the effects of switching out of manufacturing for employment and turnover occur in the first few
years following China’s accession to the WTO. Exploring which firms drive the reallocation, much
smaller effects are found for the number of firms switching out of manufacturing, indicating that
the large employment effects are driven by the largest manufacturing firms.
The results of this chapter provide empirical evidence that increased international competition
can stimulate increases in research effort which can enhance economic welfare if it boosts the rate
of technological progress. However, the results also highlight that a significant proportion of eco-
nomic activity moves out of manufacturing production into wholesale and retail, which would not
stimulate technological progress.
1.4. Large Depreciations and Export Booms
The fifth chapter Do Large Depreciations Lead to Export Booms? Facts on UK Firms in In-
ternational Trade and Evidence on Exchange Rate Elasticities from the Brexit Depreciation was
conducted whilst the author was at the Bank of England. This paper estimates the elasticity of UK
exports to the large depreciation of sterling around the Brexit Referendum and the heterogeneity
of responses across UK exporters of different sizes. The paper uses transaction level administra-
tive customs data for the UK sourced from HMRC to identify how each UK exporter changes its
prices and quantities of exports of detailed products in a given destination in response to bilateral
exchange rate movements.
This paper finds that the 20% increase in the value of UK goods exports following the Brexit
Referendum was driven primarily by higher sterling prices, rather than by larger quantities sold.
Decomposing the firm-product-destination level response into price versus quantity channels, this
paper finds that the response was mainly driven by increases in the price of exports in the initial
period, followed later in 2017 by a smaller increase in the quantity of exports. Across all export
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destinations, a 10% depreciation results in a 5.4% increase in export prices and just a 1.2% increase
in export quantities.
The largest exporters are shown to be the most responsive to the depreciation, increasing both
quantities and prices more than smaller exporters. Since large exporters account for the lion’s
share of the value of exports, their response to exchange rate movements will drive the aggregate
response. Importantly, this effect is not just driven by differences in the elasticity of exports to
the exchange rate across industries, as the results are robust to ranking exporters within industry.
This paper also utilises a new dataset linking the UK Business Register and Customs Data to
document the importance of UK firms in international trade as a share of economic activity.
Trade in goods is concentrated in a small number of firms that account for the lion’s share of
exports and imports. Only 3% of UK firms are engaged in international trade in goods yet these
firms account for over 30% of employment and over 50% of UK turnover. The response of the
largest firms to trade shocks are pivotal in shaping UK export patterns, with the top 1% of goods
exporters accounting for 70% of exports, 5% of employment, and 12% of turnover. This indicates
that there could be significant implications for economic activity if the largest exporting firms were
to exit the UK after Brexit.
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2. Renegotiation of Trade Agreements and Firm Export-
ing Decisions: Evidence from the Impact of Brexit on
UK Exports (joint with Meredith Crowley and Lu Han)
2.1. Introduction
Nearly all global trade – 98.2% in 2016 – takes place under the import tariff commitments of the
World Trade Organization (WTO). Regional trade agreements such as the European Union (EU)
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) establish even more stringent tariff
commitments which govern the 63% of EU exports to other EU members and the 50% of NAFTA
exports to other NAFTA members.1 While numerous studies have quantified the importance of
multilateral and regional trade agreements in increasing trade,2 more recent theoretical and em-
pirical contributions (Limão and Maggi (2015), Handley and Limão (2015), Handley and Limão
(2017), and Crowley, Meng, and Song (2018)) have emphasized that trade agreements increase
trade between signatories not only by lowering tariffs but also by reducing uncertainty over future
tariff schedules.
Although countries commit to future tariff rates when they sign trade agreements, renegotia-
tions of tariff and other commitments have been routine over the last 60-70 years (Hoda, 2001). A
common thread in post-war renegotiations has been that the threat point or fall back position is
the status quo – tariffs would be kept at existing levels if negotiations were to collapse.3 However,
recent renegotiations including the Korea-US FTA in Spring 2018, the NAFTA renegotiation of
2017-2018, and the UK-EU post-Brexit trade relationship start from the position that tariffs could
increase to levels above existing commitments if negotiations break down.
1Source: World Trade Statistical Review WTO (2017).
2See for example Rose (2004) and Subramanian and Wei (2007) on the WTO; Baier and Bergstrand (2007),
Egger, Larch, Staub, and Winkelmann (2011) and Limão (2016) on Free and Preferential Trade Agreements; and
Head, Mayer, and Ries (2010) on colonial linkages.
3 The theory of the optimal trade agreement design embeds this as an assumption (See Maggi and Staiger
(2015)).
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In this paper, we examine how firm participation in foreign markets changes under the renegotia-
tion of an existing trade agreement. Among countries that are already in a free trade agreement or
customs union, the switch to a ‘renegotiation regime’ creates uncertainty about the level of tariffs
in the future and a non-zero risk of tariff increases.4 In the Handley and Limão (2017) model of
exporting under trade policy uncertainty, during a renegotiation in which tariff hikes are possible,
two forces act upon a firm’s entry decision: an increase in uncertainty about future tariff rates
generates a pure risk effect which raises the real option value of waiting to enter foreign markets,
while the non-zero probability that higher ‘threat point’ tariffs could materialize if negotiations
breakdown raises the mathematical expectation of future tariffs which, in turn, lowers the expected
returns to entry.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyse how firm entry into and exit from foreign markets
changes when existing tariff-free trading rights could be revoked under a trade agreement renegoti-
ation. We present new evidence of the impact of a switch to a renegotiation regime in the context
of Brexit, when the British public unexpectedly voted to leave the European Union in a referendum
on 23rd June 2016. Using the EU’s World Trade Organization schedule of tariff commitments,
we compile granular ‘threat point’ tariffs that British firms exporting to the EU would face if the
renegotiation were to break down. We implement a generalized difference-in-difference strategy
to estimate the impact of a switch into a renegotiation regime on the growth in the number of
UK firms entering (exiting) the EU market in 2016 relative to 2015 (first difference) with different
products (second difference) that face different threat point tariffs during the renegotiation period.5
Our results show that the switch to a renegotiation regime, characterized by substantial threat
point tariffs for some products, decreases firm entry into and increases firm exit from exporting to
the EU. The impact is largest for products facing higher threat point tariffs, suggesting that UK
4A literature on contract incompleteness in trade agreements (Horn, Maggi, and Staiger (2010)) has explored
long-term incentives for parties, showing that institutional design can inhibit parties from reneging on commitments
(Maggi and Staiger (2011)) and that renegotiation tends toward liberalization rather than protectionism (Maggi
and Staiger (2015)) under a wide range of parameters.
5We apply the same methodology to half-year entry, comparing the growth of entry/exit in the second half of
2015 to entry/exit in the second half of 2016, in order to more precisely capture the timing of the switch into a
renegotiation regime.
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firms placed positive probability on the likelihood that negotiations could collapse and leave some
firms facing substantially higher tariffs on exports to the EU. On average, across all products, a 1
percentage point increase in the threat point tariff decreases (increases) the growth rate of entry
(exit) by 1.1 percentage point (0.5 percentage point). We explore responses with discrete categories
of threat point tariffs and find that ‘extreme’ threat point tariffs of more than 15% ad valorem are
associated with a 22.4 percentage point decline in the growth rate of entry while products with
‘high’ threat point tariffs from 10% up to 15% experience a decline in the growth rate of entry
of 13.2 percentage point. We conduct a partial equilibrium aggregation exercise to calculate the
number of missing entrants into (exiters from) the EU as a result of the switch to the renegotia-
tion regime post-Brexit. This exercise estimates that 5344 firms did not enter into exporting new
products to the EU in 2016, whilst 5437 firms exited from exporting products to the EU in 2016,
in response to the uncertainty and tariff risk associated with renegotiation of the UK-EU trade
agreement. Overall, entry into (exit from) the EU would have been 5.0% higher (6.1% lower) in
2016 relative to a counterfactual of zero tariffs on all products and no uncertainty about future
tariff rates. While previous research has examined trade policy uncertainty (Handley and Limão
(2015), Handley and Limão (2017), Pierce and Schott (2016), Crowley et al. (2018)), ours provides
the first empirical evidence on increased uncertainty from renegotiation of an agreement between
freely trading partners. With declining support for globalization among many groups in society,
more countries face the prospect of trade agreement renegotiations and the uncertainty over policy
that they bring.
We further show that our findings are the result of the switch to the renegotiation regime and
are not driven by product-specific global demand shocks or supply chain disruption. We imple-
ment a generalized triple difference comparing entry and exit to the EU in 2016 relative to 2015
(first difference) across products (second difference) relative to non-EU countries (third difference).
The triple difference provides evidence that the impacts of the switch in trade policy regime are
causally driven by the risk of future tariff increases. Estimates of the decline in the growth rate of
entry for products with higher ‘threat point’ tariffs are larger in the triple difference specification
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relative to our baseline difference in difference over time and across products. This suggests that
the phenomenon of trade deflection (Bown and Crowley, 2007) – in which firms shift export sales
from destinations that have raised tariffs to those which have not – extends to the extensive margin
with firms shying away from entry into destinations that might raise tariffs in favour of markets
with more stable trade policy.
2.1.1. Related literature
This paper contributes to the growing empirical literature on the impacts of trade policy uncer-
tainty on firm exporting decisions (Handley (2014), Handley and Limão (2015), Handley and Limão
(2017), Pierce and Schott (2016), Crowley et al. (2018)). Handley and Limão (2015) develop a
dynamic model of firm entry into export markets under trade policy uncertainty6 and apply their
model to Portugal’s accession to the European Community in 1986. They show that the reduction
in uncertainty accounted for a large proportion of the growth in Portuguese exporters’ entry and
sales. Handley and Limão (2017) extend their model to incorporate investment for technological
upgrading and general equilibrium effects in both the exporting and importing country. They use
this model to show that the resolution of trade policy uncertainty when China acceded to the
WTO in 2001 can explain one-third of Chinese export growth to the United States between 2002
and 2010. Pierce and Schott (2016) show this same reduction in trade policy uncertainty between
China and the US led to declines in US manufacturing employment. Crowley et al. (2018) is
the first paper to examine how an increase in trade policy uncertainty affects firm entry dynam-
ics, using a panel of idiosyncratic product-level tariff scares facing Chinese exporters to identify
a substantial decline in entry into foreign markets associated with the threat of tariff hikes. An
analysis of UK and EU trade in the year prior to the Brexit referendum (Handley and Limão, 2018)
complements our post-Brexit analysis in finding that greater uncertainty corresponds to reduced
trading activity.
6 This model builds upon an earlier macro literature on the impacts of uncertainty (Bernanke, 1983; Dixit, 1989;
Bloom, Bond, and Van Reenen, 2007; Bloom, 2009).
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2.1.2. Outline
Our paper is structured as follows: subsection 2 describes the institutional framework of the Brexit
referendum and the theoretical model; subsection 3 outlines the empirical models; subsection
4 introduces the data and describes the measurement of firm exporting decisions; subsection 5
presents the empirical results; and subsection 6 concludes.
2.2. Renegotiation of the terms of UK-EU trade
Changes to the level of tariffs or the likelihood that a country’s tariff schedule will persist into the
future represent a switch in the trade policy regime. The Brexit vote of 23 June 2016 initiated a
‘renegotiation regime’ – a period of heightened uncertainty about future trade policy between the
UK and EU characterized by a change in the probabilities over the sets of possible future tariff
schedules. The decision by the British electorate to end its long-standing participation in the Eu-
ropean Union in favour of a new to-be-negotiated relationship surprised many – betting markets
had placed the likelihood of a ‘leave’ outcome at around 30% for most of the preceding year (See
Figure 1.) After June 2016, firms exporting from the UK to the EU faced two possible future trade
policies with clearly defined tariff schedules: in the most liberal possible trade policy scenario the
UK would retain tariff free access to the EU Customs Union; in the most restrictive, or ‘threat
point’, trade policy scenario the UK would trade with the EU under the EU’s WTO tariff schedule.
We use the model developed by Handley and Limão (2017) as the main theoretical framework
for our analysis. In this subsection, we briefly outline the necessary components of this model
and derive our key empirical predictions. The subsection first outlines the static per period model
and then states the dynamic Bellman equation. As it does not specify the full dynamic stochastic
optimal control problem it should be viewed as illustrative rather than definitive.
2.2.1. Firm entry into exporting under a renegotiation regime
The representative consumer in each country spends a fixed share of income on a homogeneous
good and the remaining on a continuum of differentiated products, all of which are freely traded on
13
world markets. For each differentiated product h, there is a continuum of monopolistically compet-
itive firms each producing a variety v ∈ Ωh, where Ωh represents the set of varieties of product h.
Consumers have constant elasticity of substitution preferences over varieties v within each differen-
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1−σ is the price index of product h. Consumer prices pv
include an ad valorem tariff τh ≥ 1, such that foreign exporters receive pv/τh per unit of good sold,
whilst domestic producers face no taxes.
In what follows, we focus on the export decisions of firms in the home country to a foreign desti-
nation under uncertainty of different tariff states τh(s). Firms producing the same good h differ
in their marginal cost of production, cv, drawn from an inverse Pareto distribution. Upon entry in
each state s, a firm set its optimal price pv(s) to maximize operating profit taking the aggregate
market conditions as given. The operating profit of an exporting firm selling variety v of product
h is state contingent:
π[τh(s),Mh(s), cv] = [τh(s)]
−σc1−σv Mh(s) (1)
where Mh(s) = [(σ − 1)/σPh(s)]σDh(s) is an aggregate demand shifter of product h. We assume
that Britain is a small exporting country to the European Union and British exporters do not inter-
nalize their impact on price and demand in the destination country, such that Mh(s) = Mh for any
s.7 Under this assumption, the profit under state s can be written as π[τh(s),Mh, cv] = πh[τh(s), cv].
Firms enter into exporting if the expected operating profit of entry outweighs the sunk entry
cost, Kh. Firms discount the future profits at the rate β = (1 − δ)(1 + r) < 1, which depends
on the probability of an exogenous death shock δ and the real interest rate r. When future trade
policy is certain and given by τh, the cost threshold of product h under which a firm enters the
7Handley and Limão (2017) highlight that this assumption is not necessary for the qualitative nature of the
empirical predictions, but simplifies the theoretical framework.
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where Mh = [(σ − 1)/σPh]σDh.
Following Handley and Limão (2017), we consider a world in which there are three possible
policy states: free trade (s = FT ), renegotiation (s = R), and non-zero tariffs in at least some
sectors (s = WTO). Both the free trade and WTO tariff states are absorbing states; this captures
the idea that any agreements governing policy in these states are fully credible. Future trade
policy in state R is uncertain; in this state, under on-going renegotiation, the current policy is
zero tariffs in all sectors. However, in every period, with probability γ, the renegotiation will
conclude and result in one of two possible outcomes. In the first possible outcome, free trade, the
UK secures continued tariff free access to the EU market. This outcome occurs with probability
λFT . The other possible outcome, WTO rules, is characterized by a collapse of negotiations be-
tween the UK and EU which results in UK exporters facing non-zero tariffs to export to the EU,
specifically, the EU’s WTO tariff schedule. This outcome occurs with probability λWTO = 1−λFT .
During the uncertain renegotiation regime, firms face the decision of whether to enter and ob-
tain the expected profits Πe,h(τh(R), c), or to wait and obtain the expected profits Πw,h(τh(R), c).
The value of starting to export in the renegotiation state, R, for a firm with cost c exporting a
product h is:





λWTOΠe,h(τh(WTO), c) + (1− λWTO)Πe,h(τh(FT ), c)
]
+ (1− γ)Πe,h(τh(R), c)
}
(3)
where the first term on the right hand side is the per-period profit from exporting during the
current period and the second term is the discounted value of being an exporter in the renegoti-
ation state. The second term is a probability weighted average of the value of being an exporter
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if renegotiation (and the associated tariff-free access) continues (which occurs with a probability
(1 − γ)) and the value of being an exporter if the negotiations conclude (which occurs with a
probability γ). If negotiations conclude in the next period, the value of being an exporter is given
by Πe,h(τh(WTO), c) if the final result is no deal on tariffs (occurring with probability λWTO) and
is given by Πe,h(τh(FT ), c) if the negotiations result in an agreement for continued free trade. The
key concern of an exporter during the renegotiation state is that there is a γλWTO probability that
tariffs will be raised in the next period to a permanently higher level, τWTO.
The value of waiting during the renegotiation state R is:






+ (1− λWTO) max {Πe,h(τh(FT ), c)−K,Πw,h(τh(FT ), c)}
)
+ (1− γ)Πw,h(τh(R), c)
]
(4)
where the first term on the right hand side captures the zero profits obtained in the current period
by not entering into exporting (because the firm does not export in the current period) and the
second term is the discounted value of waiting to export during renegotiation. Similar to (3), the
second term in square brackets can be broken down into the final term, Πw,h(τh(R), c), which is the
value of waiting if renegotiation continues (occurring with probability 1 − γ) and the discounted
value of waiting if negotiations terminate in the next period. There are two possibilities if the
renegotiation concludes. With a probability of λWTO, no deal is agreed and the firm receives the
value of waiting given WTO tariffs are imposed, Πw,h(τh(WTO), c). Alternatively, with a prob-
ability of 1 − λWTO, the negotiations conclude with an agreement for tariff-free trade and the
firm receives the larger of the value of exporting less the fixed cost of entering given free trade,
Πe,h(τh(FT ), c)−Kh, and tha value of waiting given free trade, Πw,h(τh(FT ), c).
In this model, for a given state s, there is a threshold value of the marginal cost, cUh (s), such
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that the marginal firm with this cost is indifferent between entering and waiting. The thresh-




h (R)) = Πe,h(τh(R), c
U
h (R))−Kh. (5)
The key testable implications of the effect of renegotiation of a trade agreement on firm entry
into (and exit from) exporting relate to (1) the magnitude of the ‘threat point tariffs’ that exporters
would face under the no deal WTO outcome, (2) the probability the renegotiation will conclude
(γ), and (3) the probability that renegotiation will terminate without an agreement to trade freely
(λWTO).
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1. Threat point tariffs: If the renegotiation breaks down, the EU’s WTO tariff schedule provides
the ‘threat point’ tariffs that UK exporters would face. A higher threat point tariff τh(WTO),
holding other parameters constant, is associated with a lower expected return to exporting if
the state s = WTO is realized; this implies a larger real option value of waiting and a lower
cost cutoff for entry. Cross-sectionally, products facing higher threat point tariffs will have
lower cost cutoffs than products facing low or zero tariffs. Thus, among firms facing higher
threat point tariffs, only the most productive will enter.
2. Probability of concluding the renegotiation: An increase in the probability of concluding the
renegotiation, γ, holding other parameters constant, increases the option value of waiting
and thus lowers the cost cut-off for entry. Hence an increase in this probability reduces entry
by higher cost firms.
3. Probability of terminating the renegotiation with no deal: An increase in the probability
8Handley and Limão (2017) show that there is a distinct cutoff cUh (s) for each τh(s) that determines whether
a firm enters into exporting. The cutoff in the uncertain renegotiation state, cUh (R), is proportional to the cutoff
in a certain policy state with the same applied tariffs as the renegotiation state, ccertainh , by an uncertainty factor











where ωh = (τh(WTO)/τh(R))
−σ is the ratio of operating profits in the high tariff state relative to the uncertain
state, and u(γ) = γλWTOβ/(1− β) is the expected spell in the high tariff state.
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of the renegotiation breaking down and terminating with no deal, λWTO, holding other
parameters constant, increases the option value of waiting and thus lowers the cost cutoff
for entry. Hence an increase in the probability of terminating with no deal reduces entry by
higher cost firms.
Firms will also exit from exporting in response to an increase in trade policy uncertainty. Firms
that experience the exogenous death shock with probability δ exit, but have the opportunity to
re-enter. A change in exit will be observed during the renegotiation state as firms hit with a death
shock whose costs lie between the new and old cutoffs choose not to re-enter.
2.2.2. Empirical predictions
The vote by the British public to leave the European Union was unexpected by forecasters and
the markets. Figure 1 shows the market implied probability that the British public would vote to
‘leave’ the EU in the year leading up to the Brexit referendum on 23rd June 2016.9 The market
implied probability that Britain would vote to leave the European Union averaged 30.5% and did
not exceed 40% in the year leading up to the referendum, and implied that there was just a 12%
chance that the British public would vote to leave on the day of the referendum. The market
implied probability that Britain would vote to leave the EU is not available for after the 23rd June
2016, as the betting markets suspended these odds. This suspension implies that markets believed
with 100% certainty that the UK would renegotiate its trade relationship with the EU.
9The market implied probability takes the odds provided by Betfair and converts them to the market implied
probability. We would like to thank Oliver Wood from the Bank of England for providing us with the time series
of these odds and market implied probability.
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Brexit referendum 23rd June 2016
The commencement of renegotiation between the UK and EU implies changes in behaviour by
UK firms:
Prediction 1. Firm-product entry: Products facing higher threat point tariffs will experience de-
creased entry relative to products facing lower threat point tariffs.
Products facing larger threat point tariffs will experience greater declines in firm entry into ex-
porting. The increased trade policy uncertainty lowers the entry cutoff in product h from cUh (R) in
the pre-referendum period to cU
′
h (R) during the renegotiation period, with c
U ′
h (R) < c
U
h (R). This
is driven by two effects working in the same direction: the renegotiation regime raises the expected
mean level of future tariffs facing exporters; and the increased uncertainty generates a pure risk
effect by raising the real option value of waiting to enter.10 All products are covered in the rene-
10The pure risk effect would be the only effect in the renegotiation state if the level of tariffs in the renegotiation
state were equal to the expected mean of the future tariff (τh(R) = (1 − λWTO)τh(FT ) + λWTOτh(WTO)); the
increase in trade policy uncertainty would just be an mean-preserving increase in the variance of tariffs. However,
for Britain, both effects are relevant as tariffs remain at zero during the renegotiation with the EU.
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gotiation and each product would face its respective threat point tariff if no trade agreement were
concluded. The expected mean and pure risk effects lower the expected returns to entry more for
products facing higher threat point tariffs and therefore lower the cost cutoffs for entry by a greater
magnitude for these products.11
Prediction 2. Firm-product exit: Products facing higher threat point tariffs will experience in-
creased exit relative to products facing lower threat point tariffs.
Firms will exit in response to the increase in trade policy uncertainty, with greater exit in products
facing higher threat point tariffs. Firms do not make an endogenous exit decision in the model,
but firms hit by an exogenous death shock face a re-entry decision.12 Firms can (re)pay the sunk
cost of entry into exporting and immediately re-enter, but as the cost cutoff for (re-)entry falls
following a switch to a renegotiation regime, incumbent firms with cU
′
h (R) < c ≤ cUh (R) will not
re-enter. The fall in the cost cutoff is greater for products facing higher threat point tariffs, which
will therefore experience a greater increase in exit following the switch to a renegotiation regime.
Prediction 3. Firm-product participation: Products facing higher threat point tariffs will expe-
rience a fall in the stock of exporters relative to products facing lower threat point tariffs.
The empirical predictions for firm entry (Prediction 1) and firm exit (Prediction 2) are both
derived, directly and indirectly, from the change in the entry cutoff. These two predictions impact
the total number of exporters in the same direction, implying that the total number of exporters
of products with relatively higher threat point tariffs will fall by more.
11Handley and Limão (2017) show that entry in the uncertain state is lower than if policy is deterministic,
cUh (R) < c
certain
h if and only if tariff increases are possible, τh(WTO) > τh(R) and u(γ) > 0.
12An example of such an exogenous death shock would be the closure of a firm’s distributor in a foreign country.
When firms enter into exporting they pay the sunk cost of entry to set up distribution networks. If a firm’s
distributor closes, firms are faced with the choice of exiting from exporting, or to repay the sunk cost to find a new
distributor in their foreign market.
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2.3. Empirical model
We employ difference-in-difference models to assess the impact of trade policy uncertainty. We
first implement a generalized difference-in-difference strategy by regressing the growth in exporters
(entrants, exiters) of a disaggregated CN08 product to the EU in 2016 relative to 2015 (first
difference) on the CN08 product’s threat point tariff (second difference). We then present the
triple difference model in which we add a comparison of firms exporting to the EU relative to
non-EU markets (third difference).
2.3.1. Difference-in-difference model
We estimate the impact of the increased trade policy uncertainty across CN08 products on the
extensive margin response of firms exporting from the UK to the EU in 2016 relative to 2015. We
estimate the following regression:
∆Yht = b0 + b1 τ
threat point
h + ηht (7)
where ∆Yht represents the growth rate in the outcome variable Y (number of firm-product ex-
porters, firm-product entrants, firm-product exiters) in product h in time t. The independent
variable τ threat pointh,t is the threat point tariff faced by each product h, measured by the EU’s WTO
tariff for each product h.13 The coefficient of interest b1 is assumed to apply equally across all
industries and therefore only captures the average effect of uncertainty across the products h
and sectors k. Restrictions in sample size prevented assessment of heterogeneous results across
sectors.14
2.3.2. Controlling for exchange rate pass through sensitivity
The Brexit referendum did not just increase the probability of tariff increases and raise the level of
trade policy uncertainty facing exporters from the UK. The immediate impact of the referendum
13We accept (Bartels, 2016)’s arguments that the UK will be able to maintain its membership of the WTO if it
leaves the EU Customs Union.
14Additional sensitivity analysis was conducted removing different HS sections and results remained similar for
each set of results. These results are not presented in this thesis.
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was a depreciation in the value of sterling which fell by 15% against a trade weighted basket
of currencies. This depreciation might have provided a boost to firms exporting from the UK
through either increased competitiveness in international markets if firms adjust prices, or through
increased profits if firms did not fully adjust prices and, instead, increased mark-ups. This raises a
potential identification problem with (7) if the results capture product-specific responsiveness to the
exchange rate movements, rather than the cross-subsectional variation in trade policy uncertainty.
To control for the potential impact of exchange rate sensitivity we implement a two stage procedure.













where k stands for the 2-digit HS sector; h, f, d, and t represent product, firm, destination country
in the EU, and time period (year), respectively; uvkhfdt represents the unit value denominated in
sterling15; edt is the sterling-destination country exchange rate where an increase of edt means an
appreciation of the destination country currency; and Xdt is a vector of aggregate-level control
variables including CPI. All variables enter our estimation equation in logarithms and ∆z|hfd de-
notes the z-period difference at the product-firm-destination level.16
Estimates are based on the universe of UK exports to EU countries during the period 2012–
2015 for exporters meeting the HMRC reporting threshold. Separately estimating (8) for each
sector gives k coefficients that measure the sectoral level sensitivity to exchange rate shocks. Our
estimates suggest significant heterogeneity in the degree of exchange rate pass through across sec-
tors as commonly found in the literature.
Second, we control for sensitivity to the exchange rate by including estimated values of αke in
15HMRC reports the value of transactions denominated in sterling and two quantity measures (net mass and
quantity) on a monthly basis. We aggregate the total quantity and value for sales by a firm of a CN08 product to
a destination country within a year and calculate the unit value as total value divided by quantity in unit-quantity
measures (e.g. units, pairs) whenever available and in kilos otherwise.
16The z-period difference in estimating exchange rate pass through follows Gopinath and Rigobon (2008).
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our estimating equation on firm entry and exit:
∆Y EUht = b0 + b1 τ
threat point
h + b2 α̂
k
e + ηht. (9)
Industries more sensitive to fluctuations in the exchange rate should benefit more from the large
depreciation following the announcement of the Brexit referendum result, shown by a positive
(negative) b2 coefficient in the exporter and entry (exit) specifications.
2.3.3. Triple difference model
The observed cross-subsectional variation in UK firms’ exporting decisions could be driven by
product-specific supply chain or global product-specific demand shocks, rather than trade policy
uncertainty. To address this concern, we refine the identification of the trade policy uncertainty
effect with a triple difference model. Products produced in the UK that require imported inputs
could have experienced a cost shock in their upstream supply chain following the Brexit vote. Al-
ternatively, the observed changes in firm exporting decisions across products could represent global
product demand changes between 2015 and 2016, or expectations of greater domestic protection
at the product level in UK markets post-Brexit.
To ensure that we have not captured these potentially confounding effects, we use a generalized
triple difference specification where we compare the change in exporting decisions before and after
the Brexit vote (first difference) by firms in the UK into the different CN08 EU product markets
(second difference) with the change in exporting decisions by UK firms into non-EU markets (third
difference). Supply chain shocks and global product demand shocks will be common for products
exported to both the EU and non-EU countries. Therefore the triple difference specification re-
moves these confounding factors in the regression:
∆Y EUht −∆Y non−EUht = b0 + b1 τ
threat point
h + ηht (10)
where ∆Y EUht and ∆Y
non−EU
ht are the growth in the number of exporters, entrants, or exiters to EU
markets and non-EU markets, respectively, between 2015 and 2016.
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2.4. Data and measurement
The empirical analysis is conducted on a confidential microdataset of the universe of foreign trans-
actions from Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) Overseas Trade Statistics (HMRC,
2017) which incorporates tariff data at the 8 digit level from the WTO’s Tariff Analysis Online
(WTO, 2018) and bilateral exchange rate data from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA,
2017).
2.4.1. UK customs data
HMRC Overseas Trade Statistics (OTS) reports exports at the product level for individual firms in
two distinct datasets: the OTS EU Dispatches dataset and the OTS non-EU Exports dataset. The
EU dispatches data includes monthly records of export value and quantity at the firm-product-
destination-time level for UK firms whose exports to the EU exceed £250,000 in a given calendar
year.17 The non-EU exports dataset includes transaction level records of export value and quan-
tity at the firm-product-destination-time level for all trade between the UK and non-EU foreign
markets. We ensure a consistent concordance across the CN08 products over the sample period
following Pierce and Schott (2012) and Van Beveren, Bernard, and Vandenbussche (2012) and
remove the HS98 and HS99 special trade categories to match to the tariff data.
2.4.2. UK firm entry and exit into foreign markets
The focus of our analysis is on participation of UK firms in foreign markets. We divide the world
into two destinations d, the EU and non-EU, and construct relevant statistics on participation
in both of these destinations. For each time period, destination, and CN08 product category, we
calculate the number of UK firms engaged in exporting to the destination, the number of UK firms
newly entering a destination, and the number of UK firms exiting a destination.18 We define a
firm f as exporting to destination d with a product h if the firm has a positive value of exports
17The requirement to report exports at the detailed product level applies to firms whose total value of exports
exceeds the Intrastat reporting threshold. Since 2009 the nominal value of the threshold for dispatches has remained
fixed at £250,000 and therefore is constant over the time period of the analysis in this paper.
18The baseline analysis in this paper is conducted at the annual frequency. In tables 5 and 6, we reproduce our
analysis at the half-yearly frequency.
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in time period t to any country in destination d.19 We define new entry by a firm with a product
h to destination d in a year t in which a positive value for product h exports in t is recorded to
destination d and the firm did not export the same product h to destination d in the previous
year t − 1 (at least a 1 year break from exporting).20 Similarly, exit by a firm f of product h to
destination d is defined in year t if a firm recorded zero value of exports for product h to destination
d in time t after recording a positive export value in t− 1 to destination d of product h.
In Table 1 we present descriptive statistics on the stock of exporters and flow of entrants and
exiters of firm-products from the UK to the EU over 2013-2016 from the OTS data.21 The number
of firm-product exporters from the UK to the EU has increased over the period from 337,072 in
2013 to 383,669 in 2016. There is considerable churn with around 100,000 firm-product entrants
and around 85,000 firm product exiters in each year.








2013 146 21,263 337,072 96,328 87,407
2014 142 20,884 350,259 98,180 84,993
2015 129 21,092 367,107 102,002 85,154
2016 139 21,074 383,669 105,862 89,300
Source: Calculations based on HMRC administrative datasets.
2.4.3. Growth rate of exporters, entrants, and exiters
We use the percentage point change in the growth rate of foreign market participation, new en-
trants, and exiters as our dependent variable, where our calculation of growth rates follows Davis
and Haltiwanger (1992):
19Information on the country of destination is available to create firm-product-destination measures of exporting
within the EU Customs Union. However, products are able to move freely within the Customs Union and this
destination may not reflect the true market in which the good is sold. As the trade policy uncertainty shock of the
Brexit referendum affected all of the markets within the Customs Union equally, we define all the countries within
the EU Customs Union as one market.
20We present results using alternative definitions of firm-product entry based on 2 year and 3 year breaks in
exporting in table 7 of Appendix A.
21Table 1 accounts for the majority of value of UK-EU exports. Whilst the legal requirement for the Intrastat
reporting threshold is that 93% of the value of trade must be recorded, comparisons with official statistics indicate






where ∆Yht is the growth in Y ∈ {exporters, entrants, exiters} for product h in time t. This
measure of growth lies in the interval [-2, 2].22
2.4.4. Exposure to trade policy uncertainty
We initially measure the level of trade policy uncertainty facing firms in each CN08 product cat-
egory as the difference between the tariff a UK product would face if exported under WTO rules
and the zero tariff it would face under continued free trade.
We next create a set of discrete measures of trade policy uncertainty based upon the level of
the WTO tariffs. These discrete measures can capture any potential non-linear effects of increased
tariff exposure. Products facing a zero tariff face ‘zero’ exposure; products facing ad valorem tariff
rates of greater than zero, but less than or equal to 5%, face ‘low’ levels of uncertainty; prod-
ucts facing tariff rates of greater than 5%, but less than or equal to 10%, face ‘medium’ levels of
uncertainty; products facing tariff rates of greater than 10%, but less than or equal to 15%, face
‘high’ levels of uncertainty; products facing tariff rates of greater than 15% face ‘extreme’ levels of
uncertainty. We separately classify products facing ‘specific duties’ (e.g., duties defined as euros
per tonne)23 and products that would face ‘quotas’ (i.e. products with tariff rate quotas reported
in the EU’s WTO schedule in the WTO’s Tariff Analysis Online facility) if the UK were to trade
with the EU under WTO rules.
These tariff categories are mutually exclusive categories - each product h is in one, and only
one, of specific duties, quota or the continuous or discrete ad valorem tariffs. If a product has a
compound structure (a mix of ad valorem tariffs and specific tariffs) then the product was classified
22This measure is preferred to the log growth rate for studying entry and exit when the variable of interest often
takes a zero value in one of the two periods (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992). Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) show
that the estimates from the log growth rate and the Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) growth measure are equivalent
for small growth rates. Results based on the log growth rate are similar and are available upon request.
23Products in this group include products facing specific duties as well as products facing compound tariffs with
both an ad valorem and specific component, e.g., an ad valorem tariff plus a euros per tonne charge.
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as specific. If a product was subject to a WTO TRQ then the product was classified as quota
and not also classified based on its MFN tariff structure. This mutually exclusive categorisation
ensured that the more restrictive specific component did not contaminate the ad valorem assess-
ment. Ad valorem equivalents were not used due to their uncertainty around which prices to use
in their calculation that may not have accurately reflected UK trade with the EU.
2.4.5. Distribution of UK-EU exporters across industries
The exposure of UK exporters to EU trade policy uncertainty is distributed across industries. Fig-
ure 2 shows the count of products within firms exported to the EU and the total value of exports,
by broad industry and trade policy uncertainty, in 2015. Figure 2 shows that a significant num-
ber and trade value of exporters face threat point tariffs or quotas. Of the 367,107 firm-product
exporters to the EU in 2015, under renegotiation 1.8% would face ‘quotas’, 3.1% would face ‘spe-
cific duties’, 1.8% would face ‘extreme’ tariffs, 12.0% would face ‘high’ tariffs, 21.4% would face
‘medium’ tariffs, 39.4% would face ‘low’ tariffs, and 20.0% would face ‘zero’ tariffs.
Figure 3 presents bar charts of the number of entrants and exiters at the level of a product
within a firm in 2015. This figure documents significant churning in firm export dynamics, with
high gross flows of entry and exit across all industries and tariff exposure categories. Across the
product categories facing increased tariff risk, 102,002 (85,154) firm-products enter into (exit from)
exporting to the EU in 2015, accounting for 27.8% (23.2%) of the total number of firm-products
exporting to the EU in 2015.
2.5. Results
We estimate the impact of the trade policy uncertainty shock arising from the Brexit referendum
on the extensive margin of UK firms. The strategy exploits cross-subsectional variation in exposure
to trade policy uncertainty across products arising because of the different WTO tariff rates these
British products would face in the EU in the event that the UK and EU are unable to negotiate
a new tariff-free trading arrangement post-Brexit. The main specification compares the annual
27
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outcomes for 2016 and 2015. Because the referendum took place on 23 June 2016, we also compare
entry and exit in second half of 2016 to the second half of 2015 to more precisely target the timing
of the uncertainty shock while controlling for any seasonal factors.
2.5.1. Impact of Trade Policy Uncertainty
Table 2: Trade policy uncertainty and growth of exporters, entrants, and exiters, UK to the EU
(1) (2) (3)
Firm-product exporters Firm-product entrants Firm-product exiters
Panel A
Tariff rate -0.00344*** -0.0105*** 0.00459**
(0.00127) (0.00238) (0.00217)
Quota -0.0770** -0.169*** 0.189***
(0.0303) (0.0651) (0.0612)
Specific duty -0.0538** -0.204*** 0.0451
(0.0244) (0.0494) (0.0488)
Constant 0.0519*** 0.0813*** -0.00160
(0.00815) (0.0155) (0.0144)
Observations 8,804 8,464 8,140
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.002
Panel B
Extreme threat point tariffs -0.0720** -0.224*** 0.0987
(0.0328) (0.0698) (0.0673)
High threat point tariffs -0.0277 -0.132*** 0.102***
(0.0181) (0.0360) (0.0341)
Medium threat point tariffs 0.00431 -0.0137 0.0251
(0.0147) (0.0303) (0.0295)
Low threat point tariffs -0.0120 -0.0515* 0.0605**
(0.0145) (0.0285) (0.0267)
Quota -0.0695** -0.162** 0.208***
(0.0314) (0.0673) (0.0633)
Specific duty -0.0464* -0.198*** 0.0640
(0.0258) (0.0523) (0.0515)
Constant 0.0444*** 0.0747*** -0.0205
(0.0116) (0.0230) (0.0217)
Observations 8,804 8,464 8,140
R-squared 0.002 0.005 0.003
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimated parameter is
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates from HMRC administrative
datasets.
We find that products exposed to increased trade policy uncertainty experienced decreased
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growth in entry and increased exit. Table 2 presents the main results. Products facing exposure to
higher threat point ad valorem tariffs, specific duties and quotas experienced a greater decrease in
the growth rate of the number of firms exporting to the EU (column 1), a decrease in the growth
rate of entry into exporting to the EU (column 2), and an increase in the growth rate of exit from
exporting to the EU (column 3) between 2016 and 2015.
These results validate the model’s prediction that higher trade policy uncertainty lowers the num-
ber of firms entering into exporting, where the point estimate indicates that a 1 percentage point
rise in the threat point tariff reduces the growth rate of firm-product entrants by 1.1 percentage
points (Panel A column 2). Higher trade policy uncertainty induces exit from the EU; exit growth
increases by 0.5 percentage point for each 1 percentage point rise in the threat point tariff (Panel
A column 3). Altogether, a 1 percentage point increase in the tariff lowers the growth rate of the
number of firms exporting that product by 0.3 percentage point (Panel A column 1). Panel A
also presents results for products that would face specific duties and quotas under a breakdown of
negotiations. We find that exposure to specific duties reduced the growth of entry by 20.4 percent-
age points and risk of a quota reduced the growth rate of entry by 16.9 percentage points, relative
to the predicted baseline of zero trade policy uncertainty. We also find that exposure to quotas
increased the growth rate of exit by 18.9 percentage points. Overall, exposure to specific duties
and quotas reduced the number of exporters to the EU in 2016 relative to 2015. The magnitude
of these non-ad valorem measures is large, indicating that UK firms perceive specific duties and
quotas as significant barriers to export.
Results based on the five discrete categories of ad valorem tariff risk are presented in table 2
Panel B. Products exposed to increasingly severe tariffs experience a larger decline in the growth
of exporters (column 1), a larger decline in the growth of entry (column 2), and a larger increase
in exit (column 3) relative to products facing no risk of a tariff increase. Exposure to higher
threat point tariffs, categorized as high or extreme tariffs, generates the largest effects. Exposure
to extreme threat point tariffs of over 15% is associated with a 22.4 percentage point fall in the
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growth rate of entrants (column 2) relative to products that face no risk of tariff increases. Expo-
sure to high threat point tariffs, between 10% and 15%, generates a smaller, yet substantial 13.2
percentage point fall in the growth rate of entry and a 10.2 percentage point higher growth rate
of exit relative to products facing no risk of tariff hikes.
In Panel B in table 2, we also present results for products that are exposed to specific duties
and quotas; findings consistent with Panel A. Exposure to specific duties (quotas) reduced the
growth of entry by 19.8 (16.2) percentage points, relative to the zero threat point tariff baseline in
Panel B. We also find that exposure to quotas increased the growth rate of exit by 20.8 percentage
points. The magnitude of the estimates of the impact on entry for specific duties and quotas are
comparable to the impact of high and extreme threat point tariffs. The estimates for the impact
of quotas on exit is significantly larger than the ad valorem estimates of the impact of exit.
Interestingly, the Brexit referendum only introduced trade policy uncertainty for some products.
Products facing no trade policy uncertainty experienced a significant growth of 4.4% in the number
of firms exporting to the EU in 2016 relative to 2015 (the constant in Panel B column 1). This was
driven by entry growth that was 7.5% higher (column 2) for products that will continue to enjoy
duty free treatment in the EU post-Brexit. This heterogeneity across products offers some insight
into why aggregate statistics did not show a decline in aggregate export value or the number of
exporters in 2016, despite the heightened trade policy uncertainty. The products which face no
trade policy uncertainty grew significantly, which counterbalanced the negative impact that the
heightened uncertainty had on firm entry and exit in products exposed to the high and extreme
threat point tariffs. One possible reason for the rapid growth rate for entrants and fall in the
growth rate of exiters is the large depreciation of sterling in 2016, which we explore further in
subsection 2.5.3.
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2.5.2. Quantifying the impact of trade policy uncertainty
How important is uncertainty associated with the renegotiation of a trade agreement for current
trade activity? We use the estimates from table 2 to quantify the ‘missing trade’ following the
Brexit vote in a partial equilibrium exercise. If UK exporters had been convinced that the EU
would guarantee continued free trade in a post-Brexit agreement, we estimate that entry into
exporting to EU markets would have been 5.0% higher in 2016 than the observed level of entry,
whilst exit would have been 6.1% lower.
We use the estimates from panel B of table 2 and the count of firm-products in each of the
discrete tariff risk categories in 2015 in our calculations. For each non-zero tariff exposure cate-
gory (quotas, specific duties, extreme, high, medium and low) we multiply the count of entrants
(exiters) in the relevant category in 2015 with the associated tariff risk parameter to quantify the
model predicted impact of trade policy uncertainty relative to a counterfactual in which there was
no risk of tariff increases. We then sum the model predicted number of missing entrants (exiters)
in each tariff exposure category to obtain an estimate that there were 5344 missing firm-product
entrants in 2016. As 105,862 firm-products actually entered into exporting to the EU in 2016, this
implies that if firms exporting from the UK to the EU had not faced increased trade policy uncer-
tainty, firm-product entry would have been 5.0% higher in 2016. We also estimate the induced exit
resulting from the trade policy uncertainty, where we estimate that 5437 exporters more exporters
exited from exporting to the EU than the counterfactual, accounting for 6.1% of exit in 2016.
We also provide an estimate of the export value that was lost as a result of the reduced entry
into exporting to EU markets. We assume that each missing entrant in the exercise above would
have exported the average value for firm-products serving the EU market. When we use the av-
erage value of entrants in 2015 in each tariff exposure category, we estimate that the reduced
entry accounts for a £201 million loss of export value from the UK to the EU in 2016. If we use
the average value of exports for all firm-product exporters in each exposure category, we find a
significantly larger impact of missing entrants with a loss of export value from the UK to the EU
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of £1.5 billion in 2016. The missing trade value from the increase in exiters is only £193 million
when we use the average value of exiters, whilst the missing value of trade is £1.4 billion when
we use the average value of exporters. Thus, the total value of ‘missing exports’ associated with
reduced entry and induced exit ranges from a low of £394 million to a high of £3.0 billion.
2.5.3. Uncertainty and exchange rate sensitivity
How might an industry’s sensitivity to exchange rate movements impact its response to trade pol-
icy uncertainty? If the trade policy uncertainty that varies across industries were systematically
correlated with the price responsiveness of an industry to exchange rate fluctuations, then our es-
timated impact of trade policy uncertainty might be confounded with changes driven by the large
sterling depreciation in 2016. To address this, we extend our empirical model to include controls for
industry level exchange rate sensitivity. Table 3 presents the results for the difference-in-difference
specification in which we add controls for exchange rate sensitivity at the HS02 industry level.
Results on the effect of trade policy uncertainty on entrants, exiters and the total number of
firms are largely unchanged by the addition of the exchange rate sensitivity control, suggesting
that the two forces – policy uncertainty and exchange rate variability – exert different influences
on firm behaviour. We do observe an impact of exchange rate sensitivity on exporting decisions.
In panels A and B in table 3, we see that firms in industries whose export prices are more re-
sponsive to bilateral exchange rate movements were more likely to enter and less likely to exit in
2016, following the depreciation of sterling. In the case of the large depreciation, industries with
more elastic export prices (in sterling) could have captured some of the depreciation as a markup
increase (in sterling) without having to pass on this increase to their foreign consumers (in foreign
currency). This implies continued operation to the EU market offered profit-making opportunities
to these firms. The net result was greater entry and lower exit.
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Table 3: Trade policy uncertainty and sensitivity to exchange rate movements
(1) (2) (3)
Firm-product exporters Firm-product entrants Firm-product exiters
Panel A
Tariff rate -0.00319** -0.00964*** 0.00379*
(0.00127) (0.00216) (0.00222)
Quota -0.0840*** -0.195*** 0.214***
(0.0297) (0.0696) (0.0680)
Specific duty -0.0569** -0.213*** 0.0539
(0.0265) (0.0464) (0.0502)
Sensitivity to exchange rate 0.0347 0.120** -0.114**
(0.0282) (0.0485) (0.0454)
Constant 0.0450*** 0.0577*** 0.0207
(0.00988) (0.0173) (0.0161)
Observations 8,804 8,464 8,140
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.003
Panel B
Extreme threat point tariffs -0.0665** -0.205*** 0.0819
(0.0331) (0.0646) (0.0673)
High threat point tariffs -0.0244 -0.122*** 0.0931***
(0.0167) (0.0338) (0.0319)
Medium threat point tariffs 0.00484 -0.0123 0.0237
(0.0135) (0.0322) (0.0308)
Low threat point tariffs -0.0107 -0.0474 0.0570**
(0.0142) (0.0291) (0.0257)
Quota -0.0767** -0.189** 0.232***
(0.0304) (0.0736) (0.0705)
Specific duty -0.0496* -0.207*** 0.0731
(0.0276) (0.0501) (0.0529)
Sensitivity to exchange rate 0.0352 0.119** -0.111**
(0.0281) (0.0487) (0.0455)
Constant 0.0376*** 0.0519** 0.000619
(0.0127) (0.0255) (0.0216)
Observations 8,804 8,464 8,140
R-squared 0.002 0.006 0.003
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimated
parameter is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates from HMRC
administrative datasets.
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2.5.4. Controlling for product-specific shocks
Could our results on trade policy uncertainty be driven by product-specific supply chain or global
demand shocks? We estimate a triple difference model to control for product-level shocks and find
results for exporters and entrants are, if anything, slightly larger in magnitude. This suggests that
some firms in the UK may have switched from exporting to EU markets, to exporting to non-EU
markets in response to the rise in trade policy uncertainty in EU markets.
Table 4 presents the results for the triple difference specification. The impact of trade policy
uncertainty on the growth in the number of firm-products exported to the EU relative to non-EU
markets between 2015 and 2016 is shown in column 1 of Panel A, where a 1 percentage point rise
in threat point tariffs reduces the number of firms exporting to the EU relative to non-EU by 1.3
percentage points. The large magnitude of this effect (relative to the main difference-in-difference
specification) results from the large decrease in the growth of entrants (shown in Panel A, column
2 in Table 4). The magnitude of the negative effect of trade policy uncertainty from quotas and
specific duties on the entry and exporting decisions of exporters also increases in the triple differ-
ence specification. The results on entry and the total number of exporters for the discrete measure
of trade policy uncertainty are also robust to the triple difference specification presented in Panel
B in Table 4.24
2.5.5. Half year estimates post-referendum
The Brexit referendum occurred on the 23rd June 2016, with the results announced on the 24th
June. The level of trade policy uncertainty therefore differed across the two halves of 2016 (H1
– January to June and H2 – July to December). Separate estimation of the pre-referendum pe-
riod of 2016 (when the market implied probability of a leave vote and hence the probability of a
renegotiation averaged 30.5% as shown in Figure 1) and the post-referendum period (when the
24The number of products included as observations falls relative to the main difference in difference specification
as not all products are exported to both the EU and non-EU destinations, or products do not have positive numbers
of entrants and/or exiters in at least one year of 2015 or 2016 for both EU and non-EU markets. Results using a
consistent sample size across both the main difference in difference and triple difference specifications give similar
effects in sign, magnitude and significance.
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Table 4: Trade policy uncertainty and export participation in the EU versus non-EU markets
(1) (2) (3)
Firm-product exporters Firm-product entrants Firm-product exiters
Panel A
Tariff rate -0.00591*** -0.0128*** 0.00383
(0.00201) (0.00323) (0.00291)
Quota -0.148** -0.304*** 0.105
(0.0614) (0.0950) (0.0950)
Specific duty -0.174*** -0.316*** -0.00677
(0.0417) (0.0679) (0.0688)
Constant 0.0440*** 0.0736*** -0.00874
(0.0115) (0.0190) (0.0176)
Observations 8,341 8,027 7,445
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.001
Panel B
Extreme threat point tariffs -0.128* -0.251** 0.0856
(0.0674) (0.109) (0.0992)
High threat point tariffs -0.0753** -0.198*** 0.0703
(0.0302) (0.0470) (0.0439)
Medium threat point tariffs -0.0338 -0.0728* 0.0427
(0.0227) (0.0380) (0.0357)
Low threat point tariffs -0.0359* -0.0920*** 0.0562*
(0.0205) (0.0339) (0.0315)
Quota -0.154** -0.323*** 0.127
(0.0627) (0.0971) (0.0968)
Specific duty -0.180*** -0.335*** 0.0159
(0.0435) (0.0708) (0.0713)
Constant 0.0496*** 0.0929*** -0.0314
(0.0169) (0.0275) (0.0258)
Observations 8,341 8,027 7,445
R-squared 0.005 0.007 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimated parameter is
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates from HMRC administrative
datasets.
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Table 5: Trade policy uncertainty and export participation, H2 2016 vs. H2 2015
(1) (2) (3)
Firm-product exporters Firm-product entrants Firm-product exiters
Panel A
Tariff rate -0.00191 -0.0102*** 0.00151
(0.00135) (0.00253) (0.00236)
Quota -0.0754** -0.278*** -0.0647
(0.0295) (0.0666) (0.0672)
Specific duty -0.0372 -0.173*** -0.166***
(0.0248) (0.0517) (0.0510)
Constant 0.0571*** 0.113*** 0.0197
(0.00872) (0.0164) (0.0156)
Observations 8,653 8,283 7,906
R-squared 0.001 0.005 0.002
Panel B
Extreme threat point tariffs -0.00266 -0.198*** -0.0904
(0.0346) (0.0717) (0.0703)
High threat point tariffs -0.0252 -0.139*** 0.158***
(0.0188) (0.0378) (0.0382)
Medium threat point tariffs 0.000827 -0.0369 0.0912***
(0.0162) (0.0323) (0.0316)
Low threat point tariffs -0.0145 -0.0657** 0.109***
(0.0155) (0.0301) (0.0290)
Quota -0.0734** -0.283*** -0.000284
(0.0308) (0.0690) (0.0695)
Specific duty -0.0351 -0.178*** -0.102*
(0.0264) (0.0547) (0.0540)
Constant 0.0551*** 0.118*** -0.0447*
(0.0126) (0.0243) (0.0235)
Observations 8,653 8,283 7,906
R-squared 0.001 0.005 0.006
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimated parameter is
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates from HMRC administrative
datasets.
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Table 6: Trade policy uncertainty and export participation, Placebo test: H1 2016 vs. H1 2015
(1) (2) (3)
Firm-product exporters Firm-product entrants Firm-product exiters
Panel A
Tariff rate -0.00105 -0.00354 0.00157
(0.00121) (0.00245) (0.00238)
Quota -0.0360 -0.0406 0.173***
(0.0328) (0.0676) (0.0661)
Specific duty -0.0573** -0.164*** 0.0112
(0.0247) (0.0520) (0.0515)
Constant 0.0274*** 0.0182 0.0360**
(0.00824) (0.0162) (0.0155)
Observations 8,644 8,252 7,880
R-squared 0.001 0.002 0.001
Panel B
Extreme threat point tariffs -0.0605* -0.0941 0.0550
(0.0357) (0.0713) (0.0718)
High threat point tariffs 0.0179 -0.0591 0.0277
(0.0199) (0.0384) (0.0368)
Medium threat point tariffs 0.0181 0.00924 0.0171
(0.0155) (0.0320) (0.0312)
Low threat point tariffs 0.00494 -0.0242 0.0483*
(0.0154) (0.0297) (0.0284)
Quota -0.0259 -0.0392 0.191***
(0.0340) (0.0698) (0.0683)
Specific duty -0.0472* -0.163*** 0.0296
(0.0263) (0.0549) (0.0542)
Constant 0.0173 0.0168 0.0177
(0.0122) (0.0239) (0.0229)
Observations 8,644 8,252 7,880
R-squared 0.002 0.002 0.002
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimated parameter is
statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates from HMRC administrative
datasets.
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probability of the UK renegotiating with the EU increased to 100%) should give different estimates
of the impact of trade policy uncertainty. More precisely, because the likelihood of a renegotiation
remained low in the first half of 2016, we would expect uncertainty to have a much smaller, if any,
effect on firm behaviour.To consistently estimate the effects pre and post referendum without bias
from seasonal trends, we split the universe of customs transactions into H1 and H2 samples.25 In
the H1 sample, we discard all customs transactions conducted in H2 of every year and re-calculate
entry and exit only based upon firm-product observations in the first six months of every year.
We perform an equivalent strategy to create the H2 sample, discarding all information on customs
transactions in H1 of every year, and re-calculating entry and exit. This approach controls for
seasonal demand effects which might otherwise suggest that firm-products may not have entered
or exited, when in fact there were seasonal fluctuations.
Table 5 presents the results for the H2 July to December samples. In the period after the refer-
endum, when the UK had begun renegotiating with the EU, there is a significant impact on firm
exporting decisions. The results for H2 2016 relative to H2 2015 are consistent in magnitude and
significance with the results found for the full year specification (7) presented in Table 2. The
continuous measure of threat point tariffs shows that the growth of firm-product entrants is slower
in products facing higher levels of threat point tariffs, where a 1 percentage point increase in the
threat point tariff decreases the growth rate in firm entry by 1.0 percentage point. We also find
that in the second half of 2016 the trade policy uncertainty induced by quotas and specific duties
generates large negative effects on the entry decision of UK exporters, with specific duties also
inducing exit.
In Panel B, the discrete measure of trade policy uncertainty uncertainty again shows that ex-
posure to high and extreme tariffs generates larger and more significant reductions in the growth
rate of the number of exporters and growth rate in the number of entrants. Exposure to high
tariffs also generates an increase in the growth of firm exiters.
25As the half year samples differ, the regression coefficients are not directly comparable with the full year results.
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Table 6 presents results for the H1 samples, our placebo test. The results show that when trade
policy uncertainty was low in the first half of 2016, there was almost no impact on firm exporting
decisions across almost all of the ad valorem tariff measures.
2.6. Conclusion
The last few years have been remarkable with many trading partners around the world reassessing
their existing free trade arrangements. In this paper, we have shown that uncertainty over future
trade policy brought about by the renegotiation of a trade agreement can reduce current export
activity. Products facing trade policy uncertainty experience a significant decline in the number
of entrants into exporting to the EU, a significant increase in the number of firms exiting from
exporting to the EU, and hence a decline in the overall number of firms exporting to the EU. We
estimate that if firms exporting from the UK to the EU had not faced an increase in trade policy
uncertainty, then 5.0% more firms would have entered into exporting to the EU in 2016, whilst
6.1% fewer firms would have exited from exporting to the EU.
The paper considers the importance of the extensive margin in driving aggregate export growth.
We document that there is significant churn in the flows of entrants and exiters across all industries
exporting from the UK to the EU as has been found in other countries (Albornoz, Calvo-Pardo,
Corcos, and Ornelas, 2012). Trade policy uncertainty significantly reduces the gross extensive
margin flows, especially entry into exporting. However, as entrants are small in terms of value, a
large change in the number of firms entering into and exiting from exporting does not generate a
large aggregate impact on the value of exports in the first year following a change in trade policy.
Specifically, we estimate that the decline in entry and induced exit reduced the value of exports
by between £394 million and £3.0 billion in 2016, a small total value relative to total exports to
the EU in 2016 of £139 billion.
The magnitudes of the extensive margin responses to trade policy uncertainty are economically
large. The magnitudes of the gross entry margin response to extreme and high threat point tariffs
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are a similar magnitude to the gross entry margin response of French exports during the Great
Trade Collapse of 2008-9 (Bricongne, Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni, and Vicard, 2012). We also find
a novel response on the gross exit margin of exports, with a significant increase in firm-product
exit in products exposed to higher threat point tariffs. Previous studies have found this gross
exit margin to be resilient to (temporary) trade and economic shocks (Bricongne et al., 2012 and
Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott, 2009). Our results show that the extensive margin re-
sponse is more elastic to a small probability of a large tariff hike and the associated uncertainty
than earlier estimates of trade elasticities would suggest.
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2.7. Appendix
A Refining the definition of entry
In our analysis, entry into a foreign market occurs if we observe a product sale this year, but
did not observe the firm selling that product last year. One criticism of this definition is that
it classifies firms that merely take a one year break from export activity as entrants when they
are more accurately described as repeat exporters. We consider the robustness of our results to
more stringent definitions of entry. In addition to the baseline definition in which entry occurs
if we observe no sales in the previous period, we analyse entry for firms that had no observed
sales in the previous two years as well as the previous 3 years. As the number of years increases,
the definition of an entrant becomes increasingly strict and moves towards a measure of initial
entry, rather than re-entry. The results across the three definitions show that as the definition
become increasingly strict, the estimated coefficients on the measures of trade policy uncertainty
become more negative. This suggests that trade policy uncertainty is more important for firms
making initial entry decisions, who face potentially higher sunk costs of entry, than firms who are
re-entering.
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Table 7: Trade policy uncertainty and entry
(1) (2) (3)
Entrants (1 year) Entrants (2 year) Entrants (3 year)
Panel A
Tariff rate -0.0105*** -0.0112*** -0.0110***
(0.00238) (0.00252) (0.00257)
Quota -0.169*** -0.190*** -0.224***
(0.0651) (0.0659) (0.0664)
Specific duty -0.204*** -0.210*** -0.231***
(0.0494) (0.0509) (0.0512)
Constant 0.0813*** 0.0813*** 0.0834***
(0.0155) (0.0164) (0.0168)
Observations 8,464 8,357 8,281
R-squared 0.005 0.005 0.005
Panel B
Extreme threat point tariffs -0.224*** -0.268*** -0.263***
(0.0698) (0.0743) (0.0758)
High threat point tariffs -0.132*** -0.139*** -0.131***
(0.0360) (0.0378) (0.0392)
Medium threat point tariffs -0.0137 -0.00813 -0.00642
(0.0303) (0.0320) (0.0330)
Low threat point tariffs -0.0515* -0.0453 -0.0457
(0.0285) (0.0301) (0.0308)
Quota -0.162** -0.179*** -0.213***
(0.0673) (0.0683) (0.0689)
Specific duty -0.198*** -0.199*** -0.220***
(0.0523) (0.0539) (0.0544)
Constant 0.0747*** 0.0704*** 0.0726***
(0.0230) (0.0241) (0.0248)
Observations 8,464 8,357 8,281
R-squared 0.005 0.006 0.006
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses with ***, **, and * indicating that the estimated
parameter is statistically different from zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. All estimates
from HMRC administrative datasets.
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3. The Role of Customer Base in Exporter Dynamics (joint
with Davide Rigo)
3.1. Introduction
Almost all economic transactions require both a supplier and a customer for a good or service.
The number of customers that a firm serves − the firm’s customer base − is important in ex-
plaining many economic phenomena. International trade is unique in that the distance, cultural
and language barriers make the matching of the two sides of the relationship even more difficult.
Customer base is central to explaining why so many exporters remain small, as exporters find
it increasingly costly to reach more customers (Arkolakis, 2010). Firm-to-firm relationships are
also important for understanding relative international price movements as exporters build market
shares (Drozd and Nosal, 2012) and exploit relationship specific investments (Heise, 2015). The
role of customer base also appears central to understanding how firms respond to different shocks
with implications for the international elasticity puzzle (Fitzgerald and Haller, 2018). Despite the
growing importance of customer base in these literatures, there is little direct evidence on how
firms accumulate customers over their life cycle, nor whether firms actively adjust their customer
base in response to changing market conditions.
This paper uses rich customs data from France to shed light on the role of customer base in
exporter dynamics. The paper provides an empirical contribution through testing the predictions
of models of customer base. First, we show the dynamics of customer base in the life cycle of ex-
porters in a destination, and decompose the contribution of customer base in the value of exports.
Second, we provide a direct test of competing theories of customer dynamics, and find no evidence
of pricing dynamics in markets or customer relationships. This provides support for models where
customer base is accumulated through non-price activities, such as marketing and advertising.
Third, we hypothesise that customer base is an active margin through which exporters respond to
changes in market access. We show that French exporters disengaged from exporting to the UK
market and reduced their customer base within the UK in response to the increase in trade policy
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uncertainty and sterling depreciation following the Brexit referendum in 2016.
We provide direct evidence for the role of customer base in export dynamics. Arkolakis (2010) de-
velops a theory of marketing costs to explain the existence of a large number of small exporters in
each destination market. Within each market, firms invest in marketing to reach more customers,
but the cost of attracting each additional customer increases with the number of customers reached.
Firms therefore do not serve the market in its entirety, and it is possible for less productive ex-
porters to enter a market but reach relatively few customers. Fitzgerald, Haller, and Yedid-Levi
(2016a) incorporate the customer accumulation of Arkolakis (2010) in a dynamic setting to ex-
plain how exporters grow. We show empirically that customer base is an important driver in firm
export dynamics, with firms accumulating customers as they grow in the early years of an export
spell, and dropping customers in the final years of an export market spell. We decompose the
contribution of customer base in a firm’s total value of exports to a destination market, and show
that customer base can explain up to 30% of the growth in a destination market. Further, the
contribution of customer base remains constant throughout the life cycle, providing evidence of
the importance of continued investment by firms in customer base.
We explore the mechanisms through which firms grow in export markets by analysing the evolution
of price dynamics to test the competing models of marketing costs and pricing activities in theories
of customer markets. The theory of marketing costs to attract customer base purports that firms
grow in a market through non-price activities such as investing in marketing and advertising,26
which contrasts to customer markets models of firm dynamics, which model the accumulation of
customers through explicit pricing strategies.27 We find no evidence of pricing dynamics through
the life cycle of an exporter in a destination market,28 nor through the life cycle of specific cus-
tomer relationships. These findings contrast to the role of dynamic pricing activities in theories
26In Arkolakis (2010) and Fitzgerald et al. (2016a) the elasticity of demand is independent of customer base, and
which therefore no pricing dynamics in their models.
27In the seminal work of Phelps and Winter (1970) and Bils (1989), pricing decisions are a form of investment,
when consumer base is sticky, as lower initial prices build customer base. Firms can then price with higher markups
once customers are locked in. This therefore would suggest clear patterns in pricing dynamics over the life of a
relationship.
28Fitzgerald et al. (2016a) find the same dynamics looking at Irish exporters.
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of customer markets, and instead support theories of non-price mechanisms of firm growth, with
activities such as advertising and marketing, to accumulate customer base.
Finally, we investigate how exporters adjust their ‘portfolio’ of customers in response to changes
in market access. Arkolakis (2010) introduces the margin of customer base which exporters can
adjust in response to shocks and shows that it is the most important quantitatively for the response
of export values to small changes in trade costs. We exploit the natural experiment of the result
of the 2016 Brexit Referendum in a difference in difference strategy to estimate how French firms
adjusted their customer base before and after the Brexit referendum (first difference) in the UK
relative to other EU countries (second difference). We estimate the impact of the heightened trade
policy uncertainty and reduction in competitiveness following sterling’s depreciation against the
Euro facing French exporters to the UK. We find that French exporters reduced their number of
customers in response to changes in market access.29 We find that French exporters were less likely
to add new customers in the period of heightened trade policy uncertainty following the Brexit
referendum, with a reduction in the probability of a firm adding a new buyer of 0.2% and 0.5%
more likely to drop customers. These findings show that firms actively adjust their customer base
in response to changes in the access to destination markets and lend further support to the models
of customer base.
3.1.1. Related literature
Our paper serves as a direct empirical test of models of customer base in export dynamics. Arko-
lakis (2010) was the first to theorize that exporters reach individual consumers rather than the
market in its entirety and so investing in marketing and advertising would allow firms to reach
an increasing number of consumers in a country. Fitzgerald et al. (2016a) extend the theory of
customer base in a dynamic model and using customs data for Ireland calibrate a model where
firms accumulate their customer base through marketing and advertising to match the evolution of
firms’ export revenue in a destination market. We show that French exporters accumulate foreign
29The alternative channel is that British customers of French suppliers decide to switch sourcing away from
imports and towards domestic suppliers as uncertainty about the UKs trade policy increased.
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buyers over their life cycle and decompose the role of customer base in export market dynamics.30
Our findings that customer accumulation plays a significant contribution to export dynamics sup-
ports the explicit modelling of customer base in models of international trade.
Recent literature has increasingly focussed on firm-to-firm relationships in international trade,
which is reviewed by Bernard, Bler, and Dhingra (2018a). Eaton, Eslava, Krizan, Kugler, and Ty-
bout (2014) use information on Colombian exporters and their US importers to develop a model
where exporters search for importers and learn about relationships to explain patterns of entry and
survival. Bernard, Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018d) develop a model with relationship-specific
costs and firm heterogeneity to match empirical findings based on Norwegian importer-exporter
data. Also using the French customs data, Lenoir, Martin, and Mejean (2019) study how search
frictions, captured empirically by stocks of migrants, distort competition by preventing buyers from
identifying the most productive sellers. Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2015a) develop a model of
firm-to-firm trade where buyers connect randomly with sellers, which generates predictions that
are consistent with the data for French manufacturers and customers within the European Union.
Other papers have focussed on the implications of firm-to-firm relationships to switching costs
(Monarch, 2018), relationship stickiness (Martin, Mejean, and Parenti, 2018) and the division of
the gains from trade (Bernard and Dhingra, 2016).
A recent body of empirical research investigates the role of firm-to-firm relationships in response
to shocks. Monarch and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2016) highlight the importance of long-lasting rela-
tionships for US importers and their suppliers abroad, with long-term relationships being more
resilient in the 2008-09 financial crisis. Heise (2015) shows the effects that firm-to-firm relation-
ships have on price rigidity and exchange rate pass-through. Martin et al. (2018) reveal significant
heterogeneity in the duration of individual relationships and show that macroeconomic uncertainty
30We also contribute to a wider literature understanding how firms grow as our findings on firm-to-firm relation-
ships are not unique to exporters. This literature documents that firms grow by adding new products (Argente, Lee,
and Moreira, 2018) or through the intensive margins by adjusting their prices (Piveteau, 2019; Bastos, Dias, and
Timoshenko, 2018; Berman, Rebeyrol, and Vicard, 2019). However, some recent works predicts that firms mainly
grow by adding new customers through non-price activities (Fitzgerald and Priolo, 2018; Hottman, Redding, and
Weinstein, 2016; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson, 2016).
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in destination markets can affect trade patterns by impeding the creation of new business rela-
tionships. We complement this literature by showing that French exporters actively adjust their
customer base in response to changes in market access by exploiting the natural experiment of
the reduction in market access resulting from the increase in trade policy uncertainty and sterling
depreciation following the unexpected result of the Brexit referendum. Our paper is the first to
investigate the dynamics of customer accumulation and the contribution to firm growth within a
market.
3.1.2. Outline
This paper is organized as follows: subsection 2 describes our data; subsection 3 documents the
accumulation of customer base in export markets and decomposes the contribution for firm export
market dynamics; subsection 4 outlines our empirical strategy and presents results of our analysis
of how exporters adjust customer base in response to a shock to market access in the context of
the Brexit referendum; subsection 5 concludes.
3.2. Data
The empirical analysis is conducted using detailed export data covering the universe of French
firms.31 Our working data set covers all transactions that involve a French exporter and an im-
porting firm located in the European Union in the 1996-2017 period. The data are based on records
of cross-border transactions collected by the French customs. Each transaction shows the identifier
of the exporting firm, the anonymised version of the VAT identifier of the importer, the date of
transaction (month and year), the product category (at the 8-digit level of the combined nomen-
clature), the country of destination and the value (in Euro)32 and quantity (in kg) of the shipment
for firms above the customs reporting threshold. French firms have a legal obligation to submit
a full declaration of their intra-EU exports if their total foreign sales were above 250,000 French
Franc in 1996-2000, above 100,000 Euro in 2001-2006, above 150,000 Euro in 2007-2010 and above
31For more information on the data see Bergounhon, Lenoir, and Mejean (2018).
32For all destination countries the trade data is specified in French franc for the period before France joined the
euro, or euro after as the data is from French administrative sources. Trade date prior to the euro is converted
using the official exchange rates used to convert the currencies to euro.
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460,000 Euro since 2011. Otherwise, they have to submit a simplified declaration including all the
variables listed before, expect for the product category. For our analysis, we define an exporter
at the firm-CN08 product level, leading to the exclusion of all exporters not reaching in a year
export value above the reporting threshold.33 To define exporters at the firm-CN08 product level,
we ensure a consistent concordance across the CN08 products over the sample period following
Pierce and Schott (2012) and Van Beveren, Bernard, and Vandenbussche (2012).
Given the quality of the data, little cleaning is necessary to construct the final data set. We
only deal with the cases in which the physical trade flow may not be geographically confounded
with the financial trade flow. For instance, when a French firm ships a good to a plant in Germany
of a UK VAT registered firm. These trade flows are dropped to avoid any confounding factors in
our analysis. The number of observations excluded is however small, 3 per cent of total transactions
representing 5 per cent of the total value of exports in 2017.
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics
In 2017, there are more than 278,000 exporter-products and 500,000 importers, combining into
more than 3.2 million exporter-importer-product relationships.34 Exporters selling to multiple
customers account for a disproportionate share of export sales in a destination, with at least 50%
of French export value accounted for by exporters serving at least 2 customers in each destination
country (Figure 4). While, on average, each French exporter sells to 2.2 buyers in a destination
market in 2017, the distribution of the number of buyers is highly skewed, with more than 70%
per cent of French exporters selling to one buyer only. As whilst 90% of firms connect with fewer
than 3 businesses in a destination, some firms sell to over 100 businesses in a destination.35
33One potential concern is that the exclusion of these below threshold transactions may create selection bias in
our results. We thus replicate our key findings using the whole universe of French exporters by aggregating over
the product dimension and defining an exporter at the firm level, as we have information on the total value of firm
level exports for firms below the reporting threshold. The results are qualitatively unchanged and consistent with
our main conclusions, downplaying the role of selection bias in affecting our results. Full regression output tables
are available upon request.
34Tables in the Appendix show descriptive statistics on the number of French exporters, EU importers and
exporters-importers relationships across destination countries.
35There is also heterogeneity in the number of customers that French exporters serve in each destination even
within narrowly defined product categories.
50




























1 2 5 10 25 50 75
# of buyers per firm-product
Share in exports Share in no. of exporters
Average across destination markets
We have shown that French exporters selling to multiple buyers make up for around half of
French exports. However, there is significant heterogeneity in the average number of customers
each exporter serves across markets, with French exporters having an average of 6.3 Italian im-
porters and only 1.3 Latvian buyers. Figure 5 shows the share in exports of single-buyer exporters
for each European market. Single-buyer exporters account for a small fraction of exports in large
and close economies, such as Germany, Belgium, UK, Italy and Spain.
The fact that exporters have few partners per national market has also been established in the
growing literature on firm to firm relationships in international trade. Eaton, Kortum, Kramarz,
et al. (2015b) also find that the number of buyers for each French exporter is low with the median
number of buyers per French exporter is 1 in smaller economies and 2 in larger economies, whilst
the mean number of buyers ranges from 1 in some countries to 10 in larger countries. Bernard,
Moxnes, and Ulltveit-Moe (2018e) also show that the distribution of buyers per exporter is char-
acterized by many exporters having a small number of buyers, and a small number of exporters
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having a large number of buyers. Bernard et al. (2018e) also find similar patterns on the importing
side, which has also been established for the US (Monarch, 2014).
Fig. 5. Firm-product-market customers distribution
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To investigate further the determinants of the distribution of buyers across destination markets,
we estimate a gravity model for the years 1996 to 2015.36
Table 8 summarises the results - as there is no exogenous variation these results should be not be
interpreted as necessarily causal. Column (1) shows that the number of buyers in a destination
market is associated with the size of the bilateral trade relationship between a French exporters and
the destination country. Market tenure in a destination market also associated with the number of
buyers, suggesting that French exporters may accumulate buyers over time. Column (2) and (3)
show the results including several gravity variables. The number of buyers is also associated with
36The gravity variables are taken from the CEPII database and are available until the year 2015. The dependent
variable takes the log of the number of buyers for each firm in each destination. This leads to a potential issue
of missing values for the values that take a value of zero and are missing from the data. The results should
therefore be interpreted cautiously as associations of the intensive margin only as no account is taken of the
underlying latent relationship of the extensive margin. For further information on any of the variables please
see the detailed descriptions at: http : //www.cepii.fr/cepii/en/bddmodele/bdd.asp. GDP is nominal in dollar
(converted using market exchange rates) and not deflated to make them consistent with the trade data that is not
deflated. GDPs and populations come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). Variables
related to bilateral distance, contiguity and common language come from the CEPII GeoDist database (http :
//www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm).
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the geographical proximity to France, with higher number of buyers in closer and bigger destination
markets and in countries using the Euro. However, wealthier destination markets are negatively
associated with the number of buyers, suggesting that richer countries are more concentrated in
terms of number of buyers.
Table 8: Gravity model, 1996 - 2015
(1) (2) (3)
Dep. Var. (log) # buyers # buyers # buyers
Export (log) 0.170*** 0.170*** 0.171***
(0.000475) (0.000475) (0.000476)
Market tenure 0.0294*** 0.0292*** 0.0299***
(0.000313) (0.000309) (0.000300)
GDP (log) 0.428*** 0.0931***
(0.0118) (0.000673)










Observations 15,313,488 15,313,488 15,313,488
R-squared 0.570 0.570 0.568
FE fpt-dt fpt-d fpt
Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of buyers in a
destination market in a year. Export(log) is firm-product’s ex-
port value to a destination; Market tenure is the number of
years that a firm-product has been continuously exporting to a
destination; Distance (log) is the log of the weighted distance
between France and the destination market; GDP (log) is the
log of the destination’s GDP; GDP per capita (log) is the log
GDP per capita in the destination. Column (1) includes firm-
product-year and market-year fixed effects; column (2) includes
firm-product-year and market fixed effects; column (3) includes
firm-product-year fixed effects. Stata command used is reghdfe.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. The p-values read as fol-
low: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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3.3. Role of customer base in export market growth
In this subsection we exploit the unique information on the identity of customers in the French
export data to decompose the role of customer base accumulation for the growth of firm exports,
and then explore potential mechanisms in the dynamics of specific customer relationships.
3.3.1. Empirical strategy
There are two main elements of our empirical strategy to identify the dynamics of export market
growth: (i) We control for variation in export market performance driven by supply side or com-
mon demand shocks across products; (ii) We separately identify the dynamic life cycle contribution
of market tenure from selection effects in different spell lengths.37
We isolate the dynamics over the firm life cycle in the market from supply-side or common demand
shocks through the inclusion of comprehensive firm-product-time fixed effects. These fixed effects
absorb all of the common variation of a firm-product export performance across markets in a given
time period. For instance, we may be concerned that shocks to the productivity of firms could
lower the cost of producing a good and hence improve the export competitiveness and therefore
the export performance of the firms, leading to fluctuations in the export value and number of
customers served. However, as these supply side shocks will likely occur at the firm(-product)
level, they will be common across markets and therefore the inclusion of firm-product-time fixed
effects will allow us to isolate the effect of market dynamics.
We address issues of selection by separating dynamics over the market tenure of an exporter from
the performance of firms with different spell lengths. If we do not condition on the spell length
of an exporter then we could incorrectly capture dynamics over the length of time an exporter
operates in a market. For example, if exporters are more likely to exit from markets where there
is a low demand. Then by pooling across all export episodes, we would observe that the number
37This methodology was introduced by Fitzgerald et al. (2016a) to study Irish exporters’ growth trajectories in a
destination market. We build on this method to look at customer accumulation within a market, and also growth
trajectories within each exporter-importer relationship.
54
of buyers would increase over the duration in a market, even if there are no dynamics within each
export episode. Separately estimating the dynamics of each export episode by their eventual spell
length allows us to identify the effects of selection, as well as identifying different dynamics across
export episodes of different spell lengths.
Table 9 provides an illustration of how our measures of market tenure and spell length are con-
structed. We define Tenure as the length of time that a firm has been exporting to a given
destination within each spell. We set Tenure equal to 1 in the first year a firm exports to a given
market after not exporting in the previous period. We are not able to retrieve this measure of mar-
ket tenure when we do not observe a firm’s entry in a market (in Table 9 we show this in Markets
A and E). For instance, since our period of analysis starts in 1996, we do not know if firms were
or not exporting to a destination market in the year 1995. These observations are control for in
our analysis using a dummy variable Cens. The variable Tenure is then incremented by 1 in each
subsequent year of continuous participation. If the firm exits a market for some period, Tenure is
reset to 1 when the exporter re-enters (e.g. Market C in Time 4). We define the Spell length of
the relationship as the total number of years that a firm exports to a given market continuously.
We top-code both Tenure and Spell length at 10 years in our baseline specification.38 To ensure
a correct assignment of spell lengths, we exclude spells still active in the final year of the panel
and whose length is right-censored at a level below the top-code (these observations are identified
using a dummy variable Cens and in Table 9 we show this in Market D). We analogously define
the relationship Tenure and relationship Spell length for export episodes at the exporter-customer
level. The relationship Spell length is the total number of years that a French exporter will sell to
a specific customer in a foreign market. The relationship Tenure is the number of years that an
exporter has sold to a specific customer.
Throughout we treat markets as wholly independent. On the one hand this may be a reasonable
assumption due to differences in language and national regulations. This assumption is also stan-
dard in the trade literature on both gravity (Head et al., 2010) and export dynamics (Fitzgerald,
38The top-coding is necessary given the limited capacity of our computing machine. Our key results are consistent
with top-coding our measures for higher levels and are available in the Appendix - subsection B.
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Haller, and Yedid-Levi, 2016b). On the other hand distinct patterns in export destinations have
been established (Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz, 2011). If established firms in one market are also
more likely to have more buyers when they enter a subsequent market then this would imply that
that the results presented here are an underestimate of the number of buyers. If on the other hand
firms treat the EU market as a single market then the results could represent an underestimate
for the number of buyers when a firm first enters a market. We tested the sensitivity of the results
to treating the EU as a single market and find similar results to the results treating each market
as independent. These results are not presented in this thesis.
Table 9: Market tenure and spell length variables
Time 1 2 3 4 5 6
Market Participation
A X X X X X X
B X X X
C X X
D X X X
E X
Market Market Tenure
A cens cens cens cens cens cens
B 1 2 3
C 1 1
D 1 2 3
E cens
Market Spell Length
A cens cens cens cens cens cens
B 3 3 3
C 1 1
D cens cens cens
E cens
3.3.2. Exporter dynamics in destination markets
The relationship between firm tenure in a market and the number of buyers captures both a
potential selection effect as well as an accumulation effect. We isolate the dynamics of different
export outcomes over the life cycle through including the interaction terms between Tenure and
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Spell length in the regression specification:39
log(Yidt) = β
′(Tenureidt ⊗ Spell lengthidt) + γCensidt + ηit + δd + εidt, (12)
where Yidt ∈ {number of buyers, value, quantity, price} are measures of exporter i’s outcomes in
destination market d in time period t. Tenureidt is a vector of dummy variables for seller i’s tenure
in destination market d, Spell lengthidt is the spell length of seller i to destination country d, ⊗
denotes the Kronecker product of these two terms. Censidt is a dummy variable accounting for
censored observations. We control for supply side factors that affect a firm’s performance in any
given time period using firm-product-year fixed effects ηit and we control for destination specific
factors using destination market fixed effects δd.
40 The vector β includes our coefficients of interest
which will capture the effects of selection in the base values of each spell length and the life cycle
dynamics in the evolution of each outcome over the tenure for each spell length.
3.3.3. Exporter dynamics within customer relationships
We also investigate the evolution of exports with each customer over the tenure of the relationship.
This analysis provides information on two additional aspects of exporter dynamics. First, it shows
how the size of each customer relationship changes through the life cycle providing evidence on
how exporters grow within a relationship. Second, the dynamics on pricing within a customer
relationship reveal information on the mechanisms for exporter growth. In particular, we will use
the evidence on the evolution of relationship specific component on prices to provide a direct test
of theories of customer markets, where firms actively adjust customer prices to accumulate market
share by acquiring new customers or growing existing relationships. We estimate the regression
specification:
log(Yijdt) = β
′(Tenureijdt ⊗ Spell lengthijdt) + γCensijdt + ηidt + δj + εijdt, (13)
39The subfix p for product category is dropped for clarity.
40Our empirical strategy is identified by French exporters selling to multiple countries. As a result, exporters
selling to only one country are dropped from the analysis. These exporters represent a minority, with French
exporters selling to multiple countries accounting for 95% of export value in 2017.
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where Yijdt ∈ {value, quantity, price} are measures of exporter i’s outcomes with customer j
in destination market d in time period t. Tenureijdt vector of dummy variables for seller i’s
tenure with customer j in destination market d, Spell lengthijdt is the final spell length of the
relationship between seller i and customer j in destination country d, ⊗ denotes the Kronecker
product of these two terms. Censidt is a dummy variable accounting for censored observations.
We control for supply side factors that affect a firm’s performance in any given time period within
a destination using seller-destination-year fixed effects ηidt and we control for customer specific
factors using customer fixed effects δj. The vector β are our coefficients of interest which will
capture the effects of selection in the base values of each spell length and the life cycle dynamics
in the evolution of each customer outcome over the tenure for each spell length.
3.3.4. Customer base dynamics in destinations
In this subsection we present results which identify the role of customer base in exporter market
dynamics and explore mechanisms for these dynamics. The results presented in Figure 6 (and
corresponding tables in the appendix) show evidence of both selection effects across different spell
lengths and evidence of life cycle dynamics. For each regression the omitted category is that of
spells of exactly one year, where the dependent variable of these 1 year spells is normalized to 0
and all other coefficients are relative to the 1 year spell. We plot the results in Figure 6 by taking
the exponential of the relevant coefficient and so each data point represents the difference in the
number of buyers by spell and market tenure with the one-year spell average number of buyers.
We present two new results on the dynamics of customer base in export markets: (1) There
is a pattern of selection where firms that will serve a market for a longer duration have more
customers when they first enter the market; (2) across all spell lengths, French exporters exhibit
a life cycle pattern, accumulating customers at the start and dropping customers towards the end
of an export spell.
We now theorize on potential mechanisms that could be driving the shape of these relationships.
In models of customer base, firms grow through reaching increasing numbers of customers through
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Market tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of number of buyers at the firm-product-market
level with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Tra-
jectories are conditional on firm-product-year and market effects. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted.
non-price activities such as advertising and marketing (later in this subsection we provide evidence
that suggests that firms do not engage in pricing activities to grow customer base), where each
additional investment in advertising allows the firm to reach and increasing number of customers,
but at a diminishing rate (Arkolakis, 2010). The process of reaching additional customers could
take time (unlike the static model of (Arkolakis, 2010)), generating the increase in the number
of customers at a diminishing rate in the first few years of a firm’s lifecycle. The decline in the
number of customers could be driven by another force generating the separation of relationships.
This could arise if customer preferences change over time, or if customers shut down to generate
an exogenous death shock for the exporter. As the effectiveness of advertising diminishes with the
extent of advertising, the separation forces start to dominate generating the decline in number of
customer relationships in the final years of a firm lifecycle in a market.
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3.3.5. Exporter dynamics in destinations
We also show results for value and quantity (in kg) in Figure 7 and 8, respectively. Similarly to
Fitzgerald et al. (2016a), exporters exhibit both selection effects with higher initial values and
quantities predicting longer export spells, and life cycle dynamics with significant export growth
in the initial years of an export spell, and a decline in exports values and quantities near to the
end of a spell period.






















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Market tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of export values at the firm-product-market level
with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajec-
tories are conditional on firm-product-year and market effects. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted.
3.3.6. Decomposition of the role of customer base in export dynamics
The results presented above show that exporters accumulate buyers in a destination market over
their life cycle. However, how much does the buyer margin account in the firm’s growth in a
destination market? We decompose the value of exports into the number of buyers and the average
value per buyer, with results presented in Table 10.41 The results show that customer base accounts
for an increasing proportion of the higher export value in longer spell lengths, contributing around
41V alueidt = number of customers ∗ avg value per customer
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Market tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of quantities (in kg) at the firm-product-market
level with market tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Tra-
jectories are conditional on firm-product-year and market effects. 95% confidence
intervals are plotted.
18% for the higher value of 2 year spells and 28% of the higher value of the longest length spells.
The contribution of customer base to the trajectory of the value of exports over the life cycle is
also constant with tenure in the market across all spell lengths. The fact that the contribution of
customer base remains constant throughout the life cycle suggests the possibility that firms have
to continuously invest in their customer base.
3.3.7. Mechanisms
We now test for several mechanisms that may explain how exporters accumulate customers in a
destination market. The results in Figures 9 show the trajectory of a firm-product’s price (as
measured in unit values) in a destination market by spell length and market tenure. We find
no evidence of market specific price dynamics within a destination.42 The initial price does not
predict how long an exporter will stay in a destination market, with no economically or statistically
significant differences in the initial prices across different spell lengths for an exporter. We find
42These results are consistent with the pricing dynamics of Irish exporters shown by Fitzgerald et al. (2016a),
who also find that initial prices do not predict the spell length of an export episode, and no dynamics for prices
over the tenure of an export market spell.
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Table 10: Contribution of customer base to export values
Spell length 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Market tenure
1 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.27
2 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26
3 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.26
4 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27
5 0.25 0.23 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.27
6 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27
7 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.27
8 0.27 0.26 0.27
9 0.29 0.28
10 0.28
no evidence that firms actively use market specific prices to accumulate demand over their tenure
in a market. This contrasts with theories of customer markets, where firms may use lower prices
in the initial years following market entry to attract demand before increasing prices in the later
years.





























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Market tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of prices at the firm-product-market level with market tenure,
allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-product-
year and market effects. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
The previous results may be driven by French exporters’ price discrimination strategies, i.e.
exporters charging customers different prices for the same product. To test for this prediction, we
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present results on the evolution of specific customer relationships. Our two main findings are: (1)
higher initial prices predict longer total spell length of a relationship; (2) there are no relationship
specific price dynamics over the duration of specific customer relationships.
Figure 10 shows that there is significant heterogeneity in the relationship specific prices charged
across customers. Higher initial prices predict longer lasting relationships, with relationships that
will last 2 years having prices that are 1.8% higher than relationships that last only 1 year, whilst
relationships that will last 7 years have prices that are over 3.5% more expensive. These differences
in prices across the different lengths of relationships could represent differences in the products
exported, with higher quality or more relationship specific investments helping to sustain more
long lasting relationships, but also being associated with higher priced goods.
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Seller-buyer tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of prices at the firm-product-buyer level with market tenure, al-
lowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-product-
market-year and buyer effects. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
Relationship specific prices do not exhibit significant dynamics over the duration of firm to firm
relationships. For spell lengths of 2 years up to spell lengths of 6 years the average relationship
specific component of the price does not differ significantly from the initial price. For successful
export spells of 7 years or more, relationship specific prices rise by around 1% by the sixth year
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of the export spell.43 The evidence that there are little or no dynamics in relationship specific
prices over the duration of a customer relationship sheds light on possible firm pricing strategies:
(i) if we were to assume that the products sold to each buyer in a destination have the same
changes to marginal costs, then firms do not adjust relationship specific markups on average over
the course of a specific relationship, or (ii) if relationship specific costs do change over the duration
of a customer relationship, then exporters are not passing through these cost changes and instead
adjusting relationship specific markups.
The role of the accumulation of customer base in export market growth, and the absence of
price dynamics in customer relationships has implications for theories of customer markets, which
posit that firms initially charge low prices to attract new customers and demand, before increasing
prices in established relationships. We find no evidence that firms are actively using relationship
specific pricing to increase their market share, either through attracting new customers or size of
existing relationships. These findings are consistent with Arkolakis (2010) and Fitzgerald et al.
(2016a) where demand depends on customer base, which firms acquire through non-price activities
such as marketing and advertising.
3.3.8. Size dynamics within customer relationships
Finally, we present results with the size of the relationship measured by value and quantity (in kg).
The main finding is that the size of specific customer relationships grows with the duration of the
relationship. We present the results in Figure 11 with the size of the relationship measured by value
in Euros and in Figure 12 by quantity (in kg). The size of exports to a specific customer exhibits
a similar life cycle profile as the dynamics at the destination level. The value of a customer
relationship increases in the initial years of the relationship and falls in the latter years of the
relationship for all spell lengths. As with destination specific exports, there is also a selection
effect with a higher value of initial exports predicting longer spell lengths of the relationship.
43This small dynamic is likely to be driven by long-lasting relationships and should disappear once interacting
with longer spell lengths. However, we are not able to top-code our measures for higher levels due to limited capacity
in computing power.
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Seller-buyer tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of export values at the firm-product-buyer level with market tenure,
allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-product-
market-year and buyer effects. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
























1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Seller-buyer tenure in years
Notes: Figure shows evolution of quantities (in kg) at the firm-product-buyer level with market
tenure, allowing trajectories to differ by export spell length. Trajectories are conditional on firm-
product-market-year and buyer effects. 95% confidence intervals are plotted.
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3.4. Customer base in response to shocks
In this subsection we test whether firms adjust their customer base in response to shocks affecting
their access to export markets. Investments to accumulate or maintain customer base provides
a new margin of adjustment where firms choose not only which markets to operate in, but how
many and which consumers to serve. We exploit the natural experiment of the result of the 2016
Brexit Referendum to test how firms adjust their customer base in the UK in response to an
unexpected increase in trade policy uncertainty and a concurrent depreciation of sterling, both
reducing competitiveness and market access for French exporters to the UK.
3.4.1. Predicted response of French exporters to the Brexit referendum
The decision for the UK to leave the European Union, following the Brexit referendum on 23rd
June 2016, meant that the UK entered into a renegotiation period to determine the new trading
relationship with the EU. The renegotiation of a trade agreement can introduce a period of height-
ened uncertainty if there is a possibility that the future tariff rates or barriers could increase in
the future. The renegotiation period introduced trade policy uncertainty into the trading envi-
ronment between the UK and all of the EU trading partners, with the possibility that the future
trading relationship could include tariff barriers (if, for example, no Free Trade Agreement was
agreed between the UK and EU) and the possibility of non-tariff barriers including changes in
regulations and increased delays arising from customs procedures.44 The Brexit referendum result
also initiated a significant depreciation of sterling which makes French exports less competitive in
the UK market.45 The combined effects of the trade policy uncertainty and currency movements
equate to a loss of competitiveness and reduction in market access for French exporters to the UK
44The UK government announced immediately following the referendum that the UK intended to leave the EU
Customs Union and renegotiate a new trade agreement with the EU. The outside option, or threat point, tariffs for
UK exporters to the EU were clearly defined by the EU’s WTO commitments if negotiations were to break down
and the UK were to leave with no trade agreement in place, as the UK would revert to trading with the EU as a
WTO member. However, the threat point tariffs for EU (including French) exporters to the UK in such a scenario
are less clearly defined, as the UK would have the option of creating its own WTO tariff commitments as a member
of the WTO. Indeed in March 2019 the UK published its ‘No Deal’ tariff schedule which significantly departed from
the EU’s applied MFN tariffs.
45sterling fell by 10% against the Euro on 24th June 2016 when the result of the Brexit referendum was announced.
This will have impacted French exporters by making French exports less competitive in the UK market (either
by mechanically increasing the sterling cost of Euro denominated exports or lowering the Euro value of sterling
denominated exports), and by increasing UK inflation.
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and we explore how they respond to these trade shocks.
In Arkolakis (2010) and Fitzgerald et al. (2016a) firms choose which markets to enter and how
much customer base to accumulate through advertising and marketing activities. The increase in
trade policy uncertainty following the Brexit referendum acts as a market access shock for French
exporters. In response to an adverse market access shock, where the current or future cost to
export to a market may increase, firms will optimally readjust their market penetration strategies
by not entering, being more likely to exit and reducing their customer base in markets facing an
increase in uncertainty and less favourable market conditions.
3.4.2. Empirical strategy
The result of the Brexit referendum on the 23rd June 2016 was unexpected by forecasters and the
markets, with betting markets predicting only a 30% chance of a leave vote on average in the year
running up to the Brexit referendum, a probability which had even dropped to just 12% on the
day of the referendum itself. We exploit this unexpected change in the market access for French
exporters to the UK in a difference in difference strategy to investigate how French firms adjust
their customer base in response to changing demand conditions. We estimate the impact of the
heightened trade policy facing French exporters to the UK before and after the referendum result
(first difference) relative to other EU markets (second difference).
We estimate the impact of the reduction in market access facing French exporters to the UK
relative to other markets before and after the referendum result. We define an indicator for the
heightened trade policy uncertainty arising from the Brexit referendum Brexitdt that takes a value
of 1 for French exporters to the UK in the period after the Brexit Referendum (June 2016), and
a value of zero for all other destinations and time periods. This analysis is based on the quarterly
export data to correctly measure the pre- and post- referendum period. We then estimate a linear
probability model for the period 2011-17:
Yidt = β1Brexitdt + αid + αt + εidt (14)
67
where Yidt ∈ {Export, Entry, Exit, Add buyer, Drop buyer} are binary dependent variables for firm
i in destination d at time t (which are quarterly frequency). We also include a full set of time and
firm-destinations fixed effects. We are therefore able to separate out the effects of the Brexit Refer-
endum from the general economic conditions facing French exporters through the time fixed effects.
We now describe how the dependent variables are constructed. Export takes a value of 1 in
periods t when a firm i exports to destination d and 0 otherwise. Entry takes a value of 1 in
periods t when firm i exports to destination d, when firm i did not export to destination d in the
previous 4 quarters,46 entry takes a value of 0 in periods before a firm enters the market and is
missing for periods when a firm is an incumbent in the market. Exit takes a value of 1 in period t
when a firm i does not export to destination d, having exported to destination d in quarter t− 1.
Add buyer captures the customer accumulation of firms that are already incumbents in a market
and takes a value of 1 if firm i exports to more customers in destination d in time t than firm i
exported to in quarter t−1. Add buyer takes a value of 0 in all periods when a firm is an incumbent
in destination d, but does not add a new customer. Drop buyer captures a continuing firm i in a
market d reducing the number of customers in time t, relative to the number of customers that
firm i exported to in destination market d in period t− 1.
3.4.3. Results of Brexit uncertainty and French exporter dynamics
We estimate the response of firms along the customer margin in response to the reduction in mar-
ket access for French exporters into the UK market induced by the decision of the UK to leave the
EU using a difference in difference model. We exploit variation arising from the heightened trade
policy uncertainty for French exports to the UK following the leave vote of the Brexit referendum
relative to the periods before the referendum (first difference) relative to other export destinations
within the EU (second difference). In the next subsection, we present the main results showing
the impact of the destination specific uncertainty on French exporter dynamics.
46Our results hold using other definitions of market entry including entry relative to 1 quarter before and 8
quarters before. Results available upon request.
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We find that French exporters significantly disengaged from exporting to the UK in response
to the increase in trade policy uncertainty following the Brexit referendum relative to other EU
markets. Table 11 presents the results of the difference in difference research design estimated
using a linear probability model of firm exporting decisions and customer base accumulation. The
results in Column 1 show that French exporters were 0.3% less likely to export to the UK in
the period following the Brexit referendum, relative to the period before the referendum. This
extensive margin effect was driven by an increase in exit of French exporters to the UK, shown
in Column 3, with French exporters being 0.3% more likely to exit the UK market following the
Brexit referendum. French exporters were also less likely to enter into exporting to the UK in the
period post-Brexit referendum with a 0.2% decline in the probability of entry.
We also present evidence that continuing firms adjust their customer base in response to the
reduction in market access. Column 4 shows that continuing French exporters were less likely to
add new customers following the Brexit referendum, with a reduction in the probability of a firm
adding a new buyer of 0.2%. We also find that firms are 0.5% more likely to drop customers in a
market as shown by the results in Column 5. This suggests that firms may adjust their portfolio
of buyers in response to a negative shock.
Table 11: Extensive margin response to Brexit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exporter entrant exiter add buyer drop buyer
Brexit -0.00276*** -0.00163*** 0.00253*** -0.00201*** 0.00499***
(0.000355) (0.000247) (0.000618) (0.000748) (0.000758)
Observations 76,027,560 59,059,696 21,323,484 16,503,031 16,503,031
R-squared 0.432 0.030 0.265 0.220 0.222
FE fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t
SE Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
3.4.4. Results of separating trade policy uncertainty and exchange rate
We attempt to separate the effects of the sterling depreciation and trade policy uncertainty gen-
erated by the Brexit referendum in Table 12. We include the logarithm of the bilateral exchange
69
rate between the Euro and destination market currency as an additional independent variable.47
We find that a depreciation of sterling, an increase in the dependent variable, is associated with
an increase in entry and adding additional customers, and decrease in exit. This is expected as
a depreciation increases the competitiveness of French exporters. However we do find opposite
results for exporting and drop buyer. After controlling for the movements in the exchange rate,
we find that the coefficients on the dummy variable for periods after the Brexit referendum in the
UK, which captures the remaining trade policy uncertainty, remain robust for exporting, entry
and drop buyer.
Table 12: Extensive margin response to Brexit (separating exchange rate)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exporter entrant exiter add buyer drop buyer
Brexit -0.00333*** -0.000957*** 0.000142 -0.000744 0.0101***
(0.000379) (0.000263) (0.000681) (0.000826) (0.000837)
Exchange rate -0.00830*** 0.00946*** -0.0672*** 0.0151*** 0.0614***
(0.00190) (0.00130) (0.00343) (0.00418) (0.00423)
Observations 76,027,560 59,059,696 21,323,484 16,503,031 16,503,031
R-squared 0.432 0.030 0.265 0.220 0.222
FE fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t
SE Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
3.5. Conclusions
In this paper we provide an empirical test of the importance of customer base accumulation for the
dynamics of market growth in foreign markets. We make three main contributions: (i) We show
that customer base plays a prominent role in export market growth, accounting for 30% of the
growth in export value; (ii) We find no evidence of price dynamics over the duration of a market or
customer spell suggesting that firms accumulate customer base through non-price activities such as
advertising and marketing; (iii) We find that firms actively adjust customer base within a market
in response to adverse shocks to market access.
47As most EU countries use the Euro, this exchange rate is fixed, providing a good control against movements in
sterling.
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We provide direct evidence that firms accumulate customers over their tenure in a destination
market. The more customers that an exporter sells to upon initially entering a market makes it
more likely that the exporter will survive for more years in that market. Firms also accumulate
customers over their tenure in a destination market, with firms that survive for 10 or more years
doubling their customer base by their tenth year in a market. This increase in customer base
accounts for 30% of the growth in export value, with the remainder driven by firms increasing
the average size of each relationship. These results lend weight to models of international trade
which actively model the accumulation of customer base to explain the rate of entry across export
markets (Arkolakis, 2010) and how exporters grow (Fitzgerald et al., 2016a).
We also explore the potential mechanisms through which firms accumulate customer base. We
find no evidence of pricing dynamics over the life cycle within EU markets for French exporters,
as found in Fitzgerald et al. (2016a). This suggests that firms are not exploiting rising market
share to increase their prices in a given market. Interestingly, we also find no evidence of pricing
dynamics within a given relationship, furthering rejecting the idea that firms may offer low prices
to initially attract customers before then later increasing the price as the specificity of the relation-
ship locks consumers in. The absence of pricing dynamics rejects conventional models of market
penetration and instead suggests that firms likely grow market share through non-price activities
such as marketing and advertising (Arkolakis, 2010; Fitzgerald et al., 2016a).
Customer base does not just play an important role in explaining exporter growth in a market, but
also how exporters respond to market access shocks. In the context of Brexit, which represents an
adverse (potential) shock to future market access, we show that French exporters have not only
been more likely to exit and less likely to enter the UK relative to other EU markets, but also that
French exporters continuing to export to the UK have been more likely to drop existing customers
and less likely to add new customers. In a world of complex global value chains, this evidence





We find evidence that French exporters respond to the potential tariff risk associated with the
tariff schedule defined under the EU’s WTO commitments. The results of the specifications are
presented across the five outcome variables in Columns 1-5 in Table 16. We find that the impact
of aggregate trade policy uncertainty is related to measures of tariff and non-tariff barriers. We
find evidence that French exporters are discouraged from exporting to the UK in products with
exposure to higher potential tariffs if the UK were to implement the EU’s WTO commitments on
French exporters. The results show that for exporters selling products facing higher ad valorem
tariffs are more likely to exit from the UK relative to other EU markets in the period following
the Brexit referendum. There is also evidence that potential exposure to quotas or specific duties
affects the exporting decisions of French exporters as found in Crowley, Exton, and Han (2019) for
UK exporters to the EU following the Brexit referendum. For products that face potential specific
duties, we find that French exporters are less likely to enter and add buyers in the UK market in
the post Brexit referendum period.
A surprising result is that in products with higher tariffs, see an increase in French exporters
adding buyers. However we note that there is still a (much larger) negative result on the Brexit
dummy indicating that exporters may be more responsive to the aggregate uncertainty around
the future UK-EU relationship with uncertainty over potential customs checks and differences in
regulation appear to be more important and consistent in determining changes in French exporting
patterns to the UK in the period following the Brexit referendum.
The results of the potential tariff uncertainty suggests that French exporters may have perceive
the existing EU WTO tariff schedule as future potential tariff rates if negotiations between the
UK and EU were to break down. This is not surprising as although the UK had flexibility as an
independent member of the WTO to set its own MFN applied tariff rates upon leaving the EU
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Custom’s Union, French exporters may have expected similar tariff rates to the existing EU MFN
applied tariffs (especially as the UK set the same bound commitments as the EU).
Table 13: Linear Probability Model extensive margin response to Brexit and EU WTO commit-
ments
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES exporter entrant exiter add buyer drop buyer
Brexit 0.00147** 0.000367 -0.00173 -0.00298** 0.000792
(0.000690) (0.000480) (0.00120) (0.00145) (0.00147)
Brexit*Quota -0.00777*** -0.00357** 0.000252 -0.00888* 0.00688
(0.00241) (0.00174) (0.00385) (0.00455) (0.00462)
Brexit*Specific -0.00219 -0.00571*** 0.00487 -0.00128 0.00146
(0.00213) (0.00153) (0.00343) (0.00404) (0.00410)
Brexit*Tariff -0.000756*** -0.000260*** 0.000823*** 0.000452** 0.000955***
(8.93e-05) (6.14e-05) (0.000161) (0.000197) (0.000199)
Observations 53,888,072 41,966,616 15,019,668 11,589,886 11,589,886
R-squared 0.428 0.030 0.263 0.220 0.224
FE fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t fpd-t
SE Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
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B Tables
Table 14: French sellers and EU buyers, 2017
Number of
Exporters-Product Importers Exporter-Importers-Product
All 333,487 582,552 4,448,717
AT 35,709 16,580 109,926
BE 160,275 75,748 807,969
BG 16,958 3,943 25,255
CY 11,106 1,558 14,191
CZ 37,489 9,216 69,352
DE 128,753 118,641 726,766
DK 30,893 9,068 71,891
EE 11,944 2,168 17,511
ES 119,893 70,577 570,055
FI 21,913 6,202 46,397
GB 91,916 47,432 331,894
HR 11,617 2,582 16,696
HU 25,099 6,140 41,828
IE 22,169 5,971 44,524
IT 109,731 91,477 697,524
LT 13,470 2,832 19,529
LU 57,448 7,596 116,921
LV 10,812 2,029 14,844
MT 9,296 1,215 11,770
NL 73,271 37,008 245,203
PL 51,652 18,240 109,574
PT 55,970 20,088 154,472
RO 32,113 7,632 53,676
SE 34,771 11,560 80,684
SI 15,295 3,291 24,170
SK 16,429 3,758 26,095
74
Table 15: Dynamics of number of buyers, value, quantity and price: firm-product-market
Dep. var. (ln) No. buyers No. buyers Value Quantity Price
Spell length Market tenure coef se coef se coef se coef se coef se
2 years 1 year 0.0637*** (0.000968) 0.00654*** (0.000921) 0.351*** (0.00266) 0.349*** (0.00269) 0.00222* (0.00117)
2 years 2 years 0.0591*** (0.000969) 0.00640*** (0.000925) 0.324*** (0.00271) 0.322*** (0.00274) 0.00254** (0.00120)
3 years 1 year 0.113*** (0.00138) 0.0227*** (0.00131) 0.557*** (0.00363) 0.549*** (0.00369) 0.00738*** (0.00153)
3 years 2 years 0.165*** (0.00139) 0.0287*** (0.00132) 0.835*** (0.00356) 0.826*** (0.00361) 0.00846*** (0.00148)
3 years 3 years 0.103*** (0.00136) 0.0232*** (0.00129) 0.489*** (0.00369) 0.483*** (0.00374) 0.00685*** (0.00158)
4 years 1 year 0.159*** (0.00184) 0.0460*** (0.00173) 0.697*** (0.00465) 0.693*** (0.00473) 0.00412** (0.00190)
4 years 2 years 0.241*** (0.00186) 0.0622*** (0.00176) 1.100*** (0.00451) 1.094*** (0.00458) 0.00583*** (0.00180)
4 years 3 years 0.230*** (0.00183) 0.0590*** (0.00174) 1.051*** (0.00451) 1.049*** (0.00458) 0.00269 (0.00182)
4 years 4 years 0.146*** (0.00178) 0.0442*** (0.00169) 0.623*** (0.00471) 0.617*** (0.00478) 0.00549*** (0.00197)
5 years 1 year 0.197*** (0.00230) 0.0692*** (0.00217) 0.784*** (0.00570) 0.775*** (0.00579) 0.00914*** (0.00228)
5 years 2 years 0.299*** (0.00235) 0.0913*** (0.00222) 1.279*** (0.00545) 1.276*** (0.00554) 0.00348* (0.00212)
5 years 3 years 0.309*** (0.00234) 0.0915*** (0.00221) 1.338*** (0.00546) 1.330*** (0.00555) 0.00782*** (0.00212)
5 years 4 years 0.278*** (0.00229) 0.0825*** (0.00216) 1.203*** (0.00549) 1.196*** (0.00557) 0.00720*** (0.00215)
5 years 5 years 0.180*** (0.00223) 0.0642*** (0.00210) 0.714*** (0.00581) 0.712*** (0.00587) 0.00281 (0.00236)
6 years 1 year 0.222*** (0.00288) 0.0797*** (0.00272) 0.877*** (0.00688) 0.869*** (0.00703) 0.00773*** (0.00271)
6 years 2 years 0.340*** (0.00295) 0.110*** (0.00279) 1.411*** (0.00654) 1.404*** (0.00669) 0.00659*** (0.00249)
6 years 3 years 0.374*** (0.00294) 0.125*** (0.00278) 1.530*** (0.00651) 1.522*** (0.00665) 0.00769*** (0.00247)
6 years 4 years 0.361*** (0.00290) 0.116*** (0.00274) 1.504*** (0.00653) 1.494*** (0.00665) 0.0103*** (0.00249)
6 years 5 years 0.316*** (0.00284) 0.0986*** (0.00268) 1.335*** (0.00660) 1.331*** (0.00672) 0.00372 (0.00256)
6 years 6 years 0.208*** (0.00273) 0.0795*** (0.00258) 0.789*** (0.00696) 0.781*** (0.00706) 0.00817*** (0.00278)
7 years 1 year 0.257*** (0.00355) 0.104*** (0.00334) 0.943*** (0.00819) 0.937*** (0.00836) 0.00609* (0.00314)
7 years 2 years 0.388*** (0.00365) 0.139*** (0.00344) 1.531*** (0.00774) 1.527*** (0.00794) 0.00405 (0.00289)
7 years 3 years 0.433*** (0.00365) 0.160*** (0.00345) 1.682*** (0.00759) 1.677*** (0.00777) 0.00424 (0.00282)
7 years 4 years 0.435*** (0.00362) 0.160*** (0.00342) 1.691*** (0.00759) 1.690*** (0.00774) 0.000977 (0.00282)
7 years 5 years 0.413*** (0.00356) 0.148*** (0.00336) 1.631*** (0.00769) 1.630*** (0.00783) 0.00123 (0.00290)
7 years 6 years 0.366*** (0.00349) 0.134*** (0.00328) 1.425*** (0.00782) 1.425*** (0.00795) -0.000572 (0.00294)
7 years 7 years 0.249*** (0.00334) 0.106*** (0.00315) 0.878*** (0.00832) 0.878*** (0.00844) 0.000634 (0.00322)
8 years 1 year 0.269*** (0.00416) 0.103*** (0.00392) 1.022*** (0.00975) 1.007*** (0.00995) 0.0148*** (0.00361)
8 years 2 years 0.413*** (0.00432) 0.149*** (0.00408) 1.623*** (0.00911) 1.621*** (0.00932) 0.00128 (0.00336)
8 years 3 years 0.459*** (0.00432) 0.165*** (0.00408) 1.807*** (0.00888) 1.804*** (0.00910) 0.00279 (0.00323)
8 years 4 years 0.481*** (0.00430) 0.178*** (0.00407) 1.862*** (0.00886) 1.862*** (0.00905) 0.000158 (0.00321)
8 years 5 years 0.477*** (0.00424) 0.177*** (0.00401) 1.839*** (0.00893) 1.835*** (0.00910) 0.00359 (0.00326)
8 years 6 years 0.448*** (0.00417) 0.167*** (0.00393) 1.727*** (0.00901) 1.717*** (0.00916) 0.00993*** (0.00330)
8 years 7 years 0.384*** (0.00406) 0.139*** (0.00383) 1.509*** (0.00924) 1.508*** (0.00939) 0.00158 (0.00341)
8 years 8 years 0.263*** (0.00386) 0.106*** (0.00363) 0.965*** (0.00987) 0.955*** (0.00997) 0.00990*** (0.00378)
9 years 1 year 0.301*** (0.00501) 0.126*** (0.00466) 1.074*** (0.0116) 1.063*** (0.0118) 0.0115*** (0.00431)
9 years 2 years 0.452*** (0.00518) 0.173*** (0.00486) 1.713*** (0.0109) 1.706*** (0.0111) 0.00698* (0.00397)
9 years 3 years 0.508*** (0.00520) 0.199*** (0.00488) 1.901*** (0.0107) 1.895*** (0.0109) 0.00640 (0.00395)
9 years 4 years 0.526*** (0.00521) 0.205*** (0.00490) 1.978*** (0.0105) 1.970*** (0.0107) 0.00838** (0.00382)
9 years 5 years 0.531*** (0.00514) 0.209*** (0.00484) 1.978*** (0.0105) 1.968*** (0.0107) 0.0101*** (0.00388)
9 years 6 years 0.513*** (0.00508) 0.201*** (0.00478) 1.917*** (0.0105) 1.910*** (0.0107) 0.00686* (0.00386)
9 years 7 years 0.481*** (0.00503) 0.187*** (0.00471) 1.811*** (0.0108) 1.804*** (0.0110) 0.00704* (0.00398)
9 years 8 years 0.417*** (0.00483) 0.159*** (0.00454) 1.583*** (0.0111) 1.579*** (0.0113) 0.00404 (0.00416)
9 years 9 years 0.305*** (0.00458) 0.134*** (0.00430) 1.051*** (0.0118) 1.050*** (0.0119) 0.000556 (0.00456)
10 years 1 year 0.327*** (0.00208) 0.134*** (0.00197) 1.184*** (0.00497) 1.175*** (0.00510) 0.00883*** (0.00188)
10 years 2 years 0.492*** (0.00212) 0.186*** (0.00201) 1.881*** (0.00462) 1.877*** (0.00473) 0.00399** (0.00172)
10 years 3 years 0.571*** (0.00215) 0.221*** (0.00204) 2.150*** (0.00450) 2.148*** (0.00462) 0.00178 (0.00168)
10 years 4 years 0.612*** (0.00217) 0.238*** (0.00206) 2.295*** (0.00445) 2.294*** (0.00456) 0.00162 (0.00166)
10 years 5 years 0.642*** (0.00218) 0.253*** (0.00208) 2.393*** (0.00441) 2.389*** (0.00452) 0.00332** (0.00165)
10 years 6 years 0.657*** (0.00218) 0.262*** (0.00208) 2.429*** (0.00441) 2.424*** (0.00451) 0.00519*** (0.00164)
10 years 7 years 0.663*** (0.00219) 0.265*** (0.00209) 2.446*** (0.00444) 2.440*** (0.00453) 0.00545*** (0.00164)
10 years 8 years 0.661*** (0.00221) 0.264*** (0.00210) 2.440*** (0.00450) 2.435*** (0.00459) 0.00437*** (0.00165)
10 years 9 years 0.653*** (0.00226) 0.265*** (0.00214) 2.384*** (0.00464) 2.381*** (0.00473) 0.00289* (0.00169)
10 years 10 years 0.691*** (0.00151) 0.289*** (0.00145) 2.471*** (0.00334) 2.466*** (0.00339) 0.00522*** (0.00127)
cens 0.787*** (0.00109) 0.347*** (0.00106) 2.707*** (0.00266) 2.726*** (0.00273) -0.0189*** (0.00103)
Export (log) 0.163*** (0.000149)
Observations 13,915,664 13,915,644 13,915,644 13,915,664 13,915,644
R-squared 0.524 0.583 0.774 0.830 0.907
FE fpt-d fpt-d fpt-d fpt-d fpt-d
SE Robust Robust Robust Robust Robust
Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of buyers, log value, log quantity and log price in a destination
market in a year. All specifications include firm-product-year and market fixed effects. Omitted category is spells
that last one year. Stata command used is reghdfe. Robust standard errors are not reported for clarity. The
p-values read as follow: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 16: Dynamics of value, quantity and price: firm-product-buyer
Dep. var. (ln) Value Quantity Price
Spell length Market tenure coef se coef se coef se
2 years 1 year 0.317*** (0.000816) 0.300*** (0.000810) 0.0169*** (0.000407)
2 years 2 years 0.280*** (0.000830) 0.263*** (0.000822) 0.0174*** (0.000414)
3 years 1 year 0.478*** (0.00124) 0.454*** (0.00124) 0.0237*** (0.000589)
3 years 2 years 0.724*** (0.00124) 0.699*** (0.00124) 0.0246*** (0.000573)
3 years 3 years 0.399*** (0.00125) 0.377*** (0.00125) 0.0229*** (0.000603)
4 years 1 year 0.593*** (0.00172) 0.566*** (0.00173) 0.0276*** (0.000788)
4 years 2 years 0.949*** (0.00170) 0.922*** (0.00172) 0.0274*** (0.000755)
4 years 3 years 0.891*** (0.00170) 0.863*** (0.00172) 0.0286*** (0.000760)
4 years 4 years 0.496*** (0.00174) 0.469*** (0.00175) 0.0264*** (0.000816)
5 years 1 year 0.670*** (0.00228) 0.639*** (0.00231) 0.0310*** (0.00102)
5 years 2 years 1.093*** (0.00223) 1.063*** (0.00227) 0.0298*** (0.000961)
5 years 3 years 1.113*** (0.00222) 1.082*** (0.00226) 0.0311*** (0.000961)
5 years 4 years 1.011*** (0.00225) 0.981*** (0.00228) 0.0306*** (0.000983)
5 years 5 years 0.576*** (0.00231) 0.548*** (0.00233) 0.0289*** (0.00105)
6 years 1 year 0.735*** (0.00293) 0.700*** (0.00298) 0.0347*** (0.00129)
6 years 2 years 1.217*** (0.00283) 1.183*** (0.00289) 0.0342*** (0.00119)
6 years 3 years 1.281*** (0.00281) 1.247*** (0.00287) 0.0344*** (0.00119)
6 years 4 years 1.248*** (0.00283) 1.210*** (0.00288) 0.0381*** (0.00121)
6 years 5 years 1.119*** (0.00288) 1.084*** (0.00293) 0.0351*** (0.00124)
6 years 6 years 0.651*** (0.00298) 0.618*** (0.00301) 0.0328*** (0.00133)
7 years 1 year 0.860*** (0.00200) 0.825*** (0.00203) 0.0345*** (0.000883)
7 years 2 years 1.448*** (0.00189) 1.414*** (0.00193) 0.0341*** (0.000822)
7 years 3 years 1.592*** (0.00186) 1.554*** (0.00190) 0.0377*** (0.000803)
7 years 4 years 1.658*** (0.00185) 1.618*** (0.00189) 0.0407*** (0.000801)
7 years 5 years 1.673*** (0.00187) 1.628*** (0.00190) 0.0445*** (0.000806)
7 years 6 years 1.638*** (0.00191) 1.591*** (0.00194) 0.0468*** (0.000820)
7 years 7 years 1.594*** (0.00150) 1.555*** (0.00153) 0.0389*** (0.000644)
cens 1.469*** (0.00172) 1.457*** (0.00176) 0.0120*** (0.000639)
Observations 42,043,511 42,044,649 42,043,511
R-squared 0.807 0.874 0.905
FE fpdt-b fpdt-b fpdt-b
SE Robust Robust Robust
Notes: Dependent variable is the log number of buyers, log value, log quantity and log price in a destination
market in a year. All specifications include firm-product-year and market fixed effects. Omitted category is spells
that last one year. Stata command used is reghdfe. Robust standard errors are not reported for clarity. The
p-values read as follow: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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4. Import competition and the Reallocation of Manufac-
turing Activity: Evidence from the impact of the China
Shock on UK Manufacturing
4.1. Introduction
Import competition increases the competitive environment facing firms and is associated with sig-
nificant industrial change. One of the most significant developments for the global economy since
the start of the 21st Century has been China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001
and China’s subsequent rise as a global manufacturing superpower. Firms in advanced countries
respond to increased import competition from low wage countries by shutting down (Pierce and
Schott, 2016; Asquith, Goswami, Neumark, and Rodriguez-Lopez, 2019), switching into less com-
petitive manufacturing industries (Bernard, Jensen, and Schott, 2006) , engaging in research and
development (Bloom, Draca, and Van Reenen, 2016), and engaging in increased offshoring activ-
ities (Bernard, Fort, Smeets, and Warzynski, 2018b). The long run welfare effects of offshoring
in response to import competition depends on the reallocation of resources away from production
activities and towards research and development (Rodŕıguez-Clare, 2010; Bloom, Romer, Terry,
and Van Reenen, 2013). Despite the critical importance of the impacts of import competition on
the magnitude and speed of structural change, there is a dearth of micro level evidence on the
transition away from production and towards research and development.
This paper provides evidence that UK firms reorientated activity away from production activi-
ties and towards both research and development and wholesale and retail activities in response
to increased low wage import competition following China’s accession to the World Trade Or-
ganization in 2001.48 The paper uses detailed microlevel data on the universe of UK firms over
the 1998-2015 period to estimate the direction and magnitude of structural change in response to
increased import competition from China. The main finding is that 42% of the decline in manu-
48Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2016) provide a comprehensive review of China’s rise as a global manufacturing
superpower and the wide reaching implications for the competition on manufacturing employment.
77
facturing employment in response to increased import competition occurred through firms which
were initially in manufacturing and which switched out of this sector. Firms which switch move
into business services such as research and development, or into wholesale and retail.
The direction of structural change in response to import competition is important for assessing the
welfare implications. A significant proportion of the increase in Chinese exports following acces-
sion to the WTO in 2001 was driven by foreign firms offshoring their manufacturing production to
China (Pierce and Schott, 2016) in line with the theoretical predictions of models of fragmentation
(Antràs, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). Rodŕıguez-
Clare (2010) shows in a Ricardian model that the welfare consequences of offshoring for advanced
nations, such as the UK, are negative in the short run as a negative terms of trade effect dominates
the positive productivity and efficiency effects of offshoring. In the long run, offshoring can be
welfare improving for advanced nations if there is a reallocation of resources away from production
towards research and development which can increase the growth rate of technological progress.
The importance of the reallocation of resources away from production towards research and devel-
opment within firm is also emphasized by Bloom et al. (2013) in increasing the gains from trade
liberalisation.
The paper makes three main contributions. First, the paper estimates the direction and mag-
nitude of the UK firm response to increased import competition. The paper decomposes the
change in manufacturing employment along the intensive margins (expansion and contraction of
incumbent firms), extensive margins (entry and exit of firms), and industry switching (incumbent
firms who switch into or out of exposed industries). A significant proportion (42%) of the decline
in manufacturing employment in response to increased import competition occurred through firms
switching out of manufacturing. Exploring the industries which firms switch to, firms react by
reclassifying into business services such as research and development (15% of all manufacturing
employment), or into wholesale and retail (26% of all manufacturing employment). The results
indicate that there was a significant transformation of manufacturing production firms towards
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research and development. The structural transformation was so large that these manufacturing
firms reclassified from manufacturing to business service firms. This suggests that the increased
international competition may have stimulated offshoring and the welfare improving increase in
research effort emphasized by Rodŕıguez-Clare (2010). However, the results also highlight that a
significant proportion of economic activity moves out of manufacturing production into wholesale
and retail, which would not provide the welfare enhancing boost to technological progress.
Second, the paper explores the timing of the structural change out of manufacturing and into
business services. The paper estimates the predicted impact of Chinese import competition on
each of the firms’ margins for each year between 2001 and 2015. The paper finds rapid and large
estimates of the effects of switching out of manufacturing for employment and turnover occurring
in the first few years following China’s accession to the WTO. In the light of the theoretical find-
ings of Rodŕıguez-Clare (2010), the implications of these empirical findings are that the welfare
benefits of the switch to research effort are realised quickly, an important criteria for the long run
welfare benefits of offshoring to exceed the negative short term welfare losses. Exploring which
firms drive the reallocation, much smaller effects for the number of firms switching out of manufac-
turing, indicating that the large employment effects are driven by the largest manufacturing firms.
If large firms reorganize their global production to take advantage of the international offshoring,
this opens the possibility that firms could increase their overall level of research effort to comple-
ment the lower cost of other inputs created using lower wage input in line with the theoretical
predictions of Bloom et al. (2013).
The third contribution shows the impact of industry switching on firm level outcomes. Using
firm level analysis, the paper estimates the change in firm outcomes in response to the change in
industry import penetration. The results on the indicators of firm switching behaviour show that
firms in any industry that switch out of manufacturing into other sectors reduce their employment
and turnover. This effect is not found to be stronger in industries more exposed to import com-
petition, with little evidence that in industries initially more exposed to import competition firms
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which switch out of manufacturing into other, wholesale and administrative industries have more
negative effects than firms initially in industries initially less exposed to import competition.
4.1.1. Related literature
This paper develops empirical evidence of the response of UK firms to increased international
competition. A significant literature has documented the negative impact of increased low wage
import competition on employment outcomes of exposed industries (Revenga (1992), Bernard
et al. (2006), Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Song (2014), Acemoglu, Autor, Dorn, Hanson, and Price
(2016)). In particular, the literature has highlighted the role of firm and plant exit in line with
theoretical trade models such as Melitz (2003) in driving the response to low wage competition
back to the 1970s (Bernard et al. (2006)) and more recently in response to increased import com-
petition following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in the early 2000s (Pierce
and Schott (2016), Pessoa (2016), Asquith et al. (2019)). This paper builds on this evidence of firm
dynamics in response to import competition, but further emphasizes the dynamic response that
can be identified using detailed microdata in firms switching out of manufacturing industry. This
switching out of manufacturing is an even greater adjustment than suggested by theoretical and
empirical papers investigating product switching behaviour in response to increased competition
(Eckle and Neary, 2010, Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2011, Impullitti and Licandro, 2010 and
Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006).
In line with the research of this paper, an emerging literature has begun to investigate how import
competition stimulates within firm structural change. Bernard et al. (2006) was the first paper
to document that firms switch their industry of production into more capital intensive industries
in response to the low wage import competition of the 1970s and 1980s. Looking at the more
recent waves of globalization, the nature of structural change has moved from firms switching their
product mix, to completely reorganizing their sector of activity in developed countries. Magyari
et al. (2017) finds that in the US, the increase in firm non-production staff more than compensated
for the loss of production staff in response to increased Chinese import competition. Bloom, Han-
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dley, Kurmann, and Luck (2019) finds significant heterogeneity in the response of firms to Chinese
competition across regions in the US with manufacturing job losses in high-human capital areas
coming from establishments switching to services, whereas in the low human-capital areas firms
closed plants without increasing service employment. Increased import competition has also been
shown to increase the incentives for firms to increase their volume of innovation and stimulate
technical change through patenting, IT and R&D (Bloom et al. (2016)), although the aggregate
level of industry investment falls as firms exit (Pierce and Schott (2018), Autor et al (2017)).
Bernard et al. (2018b) find that Danish firms reorganized activity in response to increased off-
shoring opportunities and increased R&D investment. Breinlich, Soderbery, and Wright (2018)
find evidence of within firm shift from manufacturing goods to provision of services in response
to trade liberalization of UK reductions in tariffs with implementation of Uruguay Round. This
paper builds on this literature by focussing on the role of industry switching and the speed of
firm transition from production to services activities. The paper therefore provides initial evidence
towards the potential long run welfare implications for advanced nations in response to the import
competition and offshoring opportunities.
Finally, the paper contributes to the burgeoning literature on the effects of China’s accession
to the World Trade Organization. The labour market effects of the China Shock are summarised
in Autor et al. (2016) with evidence that increased Chinese import competition has led to manu-
facturing job losses at the worker and firm level (Autor et al. (2014); Pierce and Schott (2016)),
local labour market level (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013)), and spread to affect upstream in-
dustries and non-manufacturing industries (Acemoglu et al. (2016)). This paper extends that
literature first by highlighting how the response of the UK manufacturing industry to the China
shock manifested through the different margins of firm response. These results show that whilst
manufacturing employment declined mechanically due to these firms exiting exposed industries,
this is not necessarily a negative shock for firms who are optimally taking advantage of new global
possibilities. The paper also illustrates that only comparing the change in manufacturing employ-
ment across different industries may overstate the aggregate employment change as many firms
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switched out of manufacturing, without necessarily firing workers.
4.2. Data
This subsection outlines the datasets used to construct and measure the industry and firm level
outcomes, and the measure of import competition using the China shock. The firm outcomes are
constructed with the confidential and secure access Business Structure Database (BSD) sourced
from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and UK Data Service (Office for National Statistics,
2017) which covers the universe of UK manufacturing firms. The measure of import competition
is constructed using trade data is sourced from bilateral product level trade flows from the UN
COMTRADE/ BACI CEPII database (Gaulier and Zignago, 2010).
4.2.1. UK manufacturing industries and firms
Firm outcomes are provided by the ONS Business Structure Database (BSD) which provides
detailed data on the universe of UK firms. The Business Structure Database (BSD) contains
annual data on the universe of UK firms and plants between 1997 and 2016. It is derived from
the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) collected by the Office for National Statistics
and HM Revenue and Customs from any company with VAT49 or Pay As You Earn (PAYE)
records. Additional enterprise information is added from the Business Register from Companies
House. It therefore contains data on firms that account for over 99% of economic activity in the
UK, with only very small business, such as the self-employed, not in the register. The dataset
contains approximately 4 million firms and 5.5 million plants each year as a panel dataset. The
BSD provides detailed information on firms including revenue, legal status, foreign ownership,
birth date and death date.
In the BSD the main UKSIC industry of a firm is recorded which captures the administrative
main activity of single unit enterprises, and the dominant activity in terms of employment for
multiple unit enterprises. The 4 digit UKSIC industry codes is concorded to the ISIC3 codes to
match to the HS6 product level trade flows. This produces a final industry set of 117 4 digit ISIC3
49The VAT eligibility threshold for firms is currently £82,000 annual revenue.
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manufacturing industries covering all UK manufacturing firms.50
The allocation of industry classifications is a critical element of this paper to identify whether
firms switch industry in response to import competition. In the underlying Inter-departmental
Business Registry (IDBR) of which the BSD is an annual snapshot, industrial classification infor-
mation is obtained from administrative sources supplemented with survey information collected by
ONS. These sources in priority order of information are i) ONS Surveys, ii) HMRC Value Added
Tax, iii) Companies House information, and iv) HMRC Pay As You Earn. The allocation of an
enterprise to an industry depends on its structure. For enterprises that have only a single local
unit the classification comes directly from the administrative data source in priority order listed
above. When an enterprise has multiple local units, the industry classification is determined by the
dominant industry in terms of employment across local units. The ONS methodology considers
units based on their SIC sector, then works down to the 2, 3, 4 and 5 digit level.
There are multiple ways in which an enterprise could change its industry classification. First,
The enterprise could change the SIC classification of its local units. Second, the enterprise could
change the level of employment across local units of different SIC industries. Finally an enterprise
could open or close (or take over) local units. This highlights that the change in industry classifi-
cation could be driven by fundamental changes in the sector of the business through changing the
activity of the majority of local units, or by closing local units in one industry and/or opening local
units in other industries. However, industry classification changes at the enterprise level could also
be driven by more marginal changes in the composition of employment across local units. Whilst
the estimates of industry switching in this paper could be interpreted as an upper bound, by fo-
cussing on sector switching from manufacturing industries to services industries, the incidence of
marginal industry switching would be smaller than if looking at switching within manufacturing.
Multiple industry level controls are included to account for possible confounding factors that
could also drive the changes in industry outcomes during the period. In particular, there are
50The concordance available for UKSIC classification aggregates to fewer industries than used in studies for the
US due to the availability of different classification systems.
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concerns that the rapid rise of information technology and automation during the period could
have driven the observed changes in UK manufacturing employment. The regressions therefore
include industry controls for the capital share of GVA and investment in computers at the industry
level in 1998 sourced from the ONS Annual Respondents Database (Office for National Statistics).
The empirical specification also controls for the industry employment structure at the beginning of
the period to capture any heterogeneous impacts of general employment trends such as automation.
The regressions include controls for the industry average wage and industry share of production
workers in 1998 sourced from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (Office for National
Statistics, 2018).
4.2.2. Trade data
Trade data to measure the increase in industry competition arising from increased Chinese import
penetration into the UK is taken from the BACI dataset from CEPII which cleans trade flow
data from UN COMTRADE. The BACI dataset uses disaggregated product level data from UN
COMTRADE to the six-digit harmonized system (HS) level, and reconciles the declarations from
both exporters and importers to create a consistent database of disaggregated trade flows between
countries. Product level trade flows can then be mapped to industry classifications, in which
firm and industry level outcomes are reported. This paper uses the 4-digit international standard
industrial classification revision 3 (ISIC3) as this provides a concordance with the UK SIC which
defines industry classification in the BSD (Pessoa, 2016).
4.2.3. Motivating charts
Figures (13 a, b, c) shows the dramatic structural shift in UK manufacturing, which has seen the
numbers of manufacturing firms and workers fall sharply since the start of the 21st Century. The
number of UK manufacturing firms fell from almost 190,000 in 1998 to under 150,000 in 2015,
whilst UK manufacturing employment fell from around 4.6 million in 1997 to 3.2 million in 2009,
then crashed in the Great Recession period to 2.6 million in 2011, a level which has remained
constant through to 2015. Turnover in UK manufacturing firms has also fallen considerably over
84
the same period, from £490 billion in 1997 to a low of £373 billion in 2011, although aggregate
UK manufacturing turnover had picked up again to £446 billion in 2015.
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4.2.4. Identification of import competition: China shock
China’s accession to the World Trade Organization represented a significant renegotiation of
China’s trading relationship with the Rest of the World. Although the applied rates imposed
by the World’s two major trading blocks, the US and EU did not change, the trade costs facing
exports from China were significantly reduced. The US and EU both granted China full MFN
tariff access even before China acceded to the WTO. However, in the case of the US this was
reviewed annually with the threat that higher tariffs would be removed if China lost this special
‘Normal Trading Relations’ access. This uncertainty significantly reduced Chinese exports to the
US and discouraged mutlinational organizations from establishing production facilities for export
in China. The resolution of this uncertainty upon acceding to the WTO stimulated the rapid rise
in Chinese exports and multinational investment during the 2000s (Pierce and Schott, 2016; Han-
dley and Limao, 2017). Second, China lowered input tariffs to meet the WTO requirement, which
lowered tariffs on intermediate inputs and made firms exporting from China more competitive in
global markets (Amiti, Dai, Feenstra, and Romalis (2017)). Therefore the increase in Chinese
import competition following China’s accession to the WTO reflects many similarities to bilateral
renegotiations of trade agreements.
Exposure to import competition in all specifications is measured by the change in Chinese im-
port penetration over the relevant period t following (Autor et al., 2014 and Acemoglu et al.,
2016). Import competition is measured using industry import penetration for UK manufacturing
industry j, ∆IIPj,t, over the period 1998-2015 defined as:
∆IIPj,t =
∆MUCj,t
Yj,0 +Mj,0 − Aj,0
(15)
where for industry j, ∆MUCjt is the change in imports to the UK from China C. Yj,0 +Mj,0 −Aj,0
is the initial industry absorption, consisting of industry output plus industry imports, Yj,0 +Mj,0,
minus industry exports, Aj,0 at the start period t = 0. 1998 is chosen as the first year of observa-
tion as this precedes the rapid rise in Chinese imports in anticipation of China’s accession to the
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WTO in 2001.51 There is a possible limitation in the UK context for defining the China shock in
terms of the import penetration of the UK market, given that around half of UK manufacturing
is exported. Similar results are also produced when using just the change in imports rather than
import penetration, suggesting that the impact of this concern is limited. Those results are not
presented in this thesis.
The main identification concern of using changes in import penetration as a a measure of compe-
tition is that this might be a response to changes in UK domestic industry outcomes. This reverse
causality is most likely from two possible channels. First, increased imports may be a response to
reductions in domestic supply caused by poor productivity growth or negative shocks to particular
UK industries. This would cause downwards bias on the estimated coefficients. Second, both
imports and domestic production may rise in response to idiosyncratic industry demand shocks
caused by taste and preference changes. This would cause upwards bias in the OLS coefficients.
This paper also follows the Autor et al. (2014) instrumental variables methodology to control
for the potential endogeneity between changes in Chinese import penetration and industry de-
mand shocks in the UK. This paper instruments for each of ∆IIPj,t using the import penetration
observed in other similar developed countries, giving instruments that can be defined as
∆IIPOj,t =
∆MOCj,t
Yj,0 +Mj,0 − Aj,0
(16)
where ∆MOCjt is the realized change in imports to the other selected countries O from China
C. The industry instruments ∆IIPOj,t use initial industry absorption levels Yj,0 + Mj,0 − Aj,0
to capture the pre-shock industry demand. The instrument is relevant if changes in UK import
penetration and changes in import penetration in the selected other countries are driven by the
same underlying supply shock. The motivation for this common supply shock is the rapid rise in
Chinese manufacturing capability driven by the supply side reforms in the 1990s, and the reduced
trade policy uncertainty from the accession of China into the WTO.
51Although this is a later initial date than equivalent papers for the US, which have an initial period of 1991,
it still identifies the health of British industry at the start of the period of China’s rapid rise, prior to China’s
accession to the WTO and the most rapid phase of Chinese import penetration.
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The selection of other countries to generate the instrument chooses countries with a similar in-
come per capita, with the final instrument set consisting of Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland. This paper follows a similar selection process as
outlined in Dauth, Findeisen, and Suedekum (2014) for Germany and which differs slightly to
the instrument set for the US, used in the Autor et al. (2013) literature, due to membership of a
common EU customs union and the role of the US in the global economy. Countries which share
the same trade policy through membership of the EU and Common External Tariff are included
(such as the Germany and France). This assumes that changes to import competition don’t lead
to changes in European trade policy, as this would have a direct impact on UK regions and violate
the exclusion restriction. The US is excluded due to its importance to the world economy, and
therefore import competition shocks to the US could propagate to impact UK outcomes directly,
violating the exclusion restriction.
The validity of the instrumental variable comes from the fact that the instrument, changes in
Chinese trade flows to third countries, is only related to the outcome variable, change in industry
outcomes, through the endogenous variable, the change in Chinese import competition in the UK.
The instrumental variable assumes that the instrument is driven by the underlying variation of
interest, the increased Chinese competitiveness and reduce uncertainty arising from joining the
WTO. However there is a risk that the underlying variation that could cause the reverse causality
in the relationship between UK industry outcomes and Chinese trade with the UK could also be
present in the instrument in trade data between China and the selected other partner countries.
For example if the rise in Chinese exports to the UK was driven by a global demand shock, such
as the growth of the telecommunications industry, this would also increase Chinese exports to all
partner countries. This would exacerbate the impact of the bias and would be a concern for the
results.
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4.2.5. Descriptive evidence of impact of import penetration
This subsection presents descriptive evidence of the impact of changes in import competition on
industry level outcomes across different sectors. Figures 14 a, b and c present scatter plots of
changes in industry outcomes (number of active firms, employment and turnover) against changes
in industry exposure to Chinese import competition for the periods 1998-2015. Each point repre-
sents an industry, with different manufacturing sectors presented in different symbols. The scatter
plot results show that industries exposed to increased import competition from China experience a
greater contraction in the number of active firms and more negative falls in employment and slower
growth of turnover. The figures show that the sectors most exposed to increases in Chinese im-
port competition were textiles and machinery, and that the industries in these sectors experienced
slower growth of the number of firms, employment and turnover between 1998 and 2015.
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The main aim of this paper is to understand how firms have responded to increased product
market competition associated with the rise in Chinese import competition over the period 1998-
2015. The rise of China as a global manufacturing power over this period was unprecedented in
terms of its magnitude and speed (Autor et al., 2016). This paper follows Autor et al. (2013) in
using the China shock to identify the impact of import competition to exploit the unique natural
experiment of an economically large and supply driven import shock.
4.3.1. Effect of import competition on industry outcomes
This subsection begins by presenting results for the impact of trade competition on aggregate
industry outcomes including the number of active firms, employment and aggregate turnover. The
analysis presents aggregate industry changes over the time periods of interest across the 117 4 digit
ISIC industries. Two time periods are selected, the first covers outcomes from 1998 to 2007 and
the second covers a longer period from 1998 to 2015. The start date is restricted by the availability
of firm level outcomes in the BSD and the end dates for the two periods are chosen to cover the
period before the Great Recession and the full available period of data respectively. For clarity, the
regressions have the change in outcomes over the given period as the dependent variable and the
change in Chinese import penetration as the independent variable, they are not panel regressions
with outcomes for each year included.
The impacts of Chinese import competition is first estimated at the national industry level. The
industry level model regresses the change industry outcomes yjt on the change in industry import
penetration, weighted by the initial level of industry outcome. The regressions are estimated over
the pre-crisis (1998-2007) and full period (1998-2015) using a first difference approach. Growth








The main specification is identified using the industry instrument ∆IIPOj,t outlined above:
yjt = αt + β1∆IIPjt +X
′
jtγj + εjt (18)
where yjt is the annualized change in industry j employment, turnover, number of active firms
and plants over the period t. In the industry level regressions, each outcome is weighted by the
start-of-period industry outcome, so the regression of the change in annualized employment growth
is weighted by industry employment in 1998.52 The analysis compares industries which are ex-
posed to increased import competition, with those that are not. Chinese import competition is
associated with a decline in industry employment if β1 is negative and significant. The empirical
model incorporates a vector of controls Xit, including the industry characteristics and industry
employment characteristics outlined in the data subsection.
The aggregate industry figures are adjusted to remove firms switching within manufacturing be-
tween the start and end of the period of interest. Switching within manufacturing margins are not
utilised in the industry level regressions as this would violate the group exogeneity assumption.
4.3.2. How did firm dynamics contribute to aggregate changes?
This subsubsections details a decomposition of the changes in industry level outcomes into different
margins of firm dynamics. Manufacturing employment in an industry could change along the
intensive margin (firms contracting/not expanding), extensive margin (firm exit or no entry) or
firms switching in or out of the industry (the decomposition using mid point growth rates follows
(Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Asquith et al., 2019), and in particular (Bloom et al., 2019)).53 The
change in the levels of outcome Yj between the start of a period t and end of a period t can be
52Weighting the regression by the initial outcome is important for assessing the impact of the increase in Chinese
import competition for explaining the aggregate change in UK industry outcomes in the partial equilibrium exercise
in a later section. That said, a weighted regression by definition applies more weight to larger industries which may
be less representative of the unweighted average industry outcome, especially if a small number of industries are
disproportionately large.
53As mentioned previously, if changes in employment arising from firms switching from one manufacturing industry
to another manufacturing industry are included, this will violate the group exogeneity assumption. Therefore the
analysis only includes firms switching out from manufacturing, or into an industry from outside manufacturing.
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decomposed as:
Yjtτ,end − Yjtτ,start = Bjt −Djt + Ejt − Cjt + SIjt − SOjt (19)
The overall changes in the growth rate of each industry outcome Yj in {employment, turnover,
number of firms} are decomposed according to the six different margins of firm dynamics: birth,
death, expansion, contraction, switching in and switching out.
yjt =





yjt = bjt − djt + ejt − cjt + sijt − sojt (21)
The decomposition of the different firm margins f ∈ {b, d, e, c, si, so} is included in the main China
shock instrumental variable regression specification to decompose the aggregate impact of import
competition:
∆fjt = β0 + β1∆IIP
UK,China
jt + εjt. (22)
4.3.3. What happens to firms when they switch industry?
The regression estimates of Chinese import competition on UK industry is estimated at the firm
level. The firm model regresses the change in firm outcomes yijt on the change in industry import
penetration ∆IIPj,t over the period 1998-2015 using a first difference approach, identified using
the industry instrument ∆IIPOj,t outlined above. The firm level intensive margin is identified
using a first difference model estimated for firms i in industries j who are active over period t, also




αkSwitchikt + β1∆IIPjt +
∑
k




jtγj + εijt (23)
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where yijt is the annual change in firm level turnover and employment. Different types of switching
behaviour are indexed by k ∈ {switch out (other), switch out (wholesale), switch out (administration),
switchwithinmanufacturing} Switching industry is more negative in industries facing greater
Chinese import competition if βk is negative and significant. The empirical model incorporates a
vector of controls, including industry Xjt and employment controls Zit, but also firm level controls
for age and foreign ownership.
4.4. Results
This subsection presents the results on the impact of Chinese import competition on firms in
the UK manufacturing sector. First, the results show the impact of increased Chinese import
competition across a range of outcomes in UK manufacturing. Second, the paper decomposes
these effects across the different margins of firm adjustment over different periods to understand
the structure and nature of transition costs associated with increased import competition. Third,
the paper explores how firms adapt to the increased import competition and which industries they
move into if they leave manufacturing. Finally, the paper explores the outcomes at the firm level
depending on the margin of adjustment to import competition.
4.4.1. Effect of import competition on industry employment
Table (17) presents results for the impact of increased Chinese import competition on UK manu-
facturing employment, turnover and number of firms for the periods 1998-2007 and 1998-2015.54
The results show that industries facing greater increases in import penetration have experienced
slower growth in employment (columns (1) and (2)), slower growth in turnover (columns (3) and
(4)) and slower growth in the number of firms (columns (5) and (6)) over both periods. The
results can be interpreted as a 1 percentage point increase in the annual growth in Chinese import
competition lowered the growth rate of employment in an industry by 4.67 percentage points over
54All of the regressions include 117 manufacturing ISIC3 industries, industry and employment controls, with
standard errors clustered at the ISIC3 Division level, with each industry regression weighted by the outcome of
interest at the aggregate industry level in 1998. The regressions are all estimated using the instrumental variable
strategy of using the change in Chinese imports to other high income countries as described in the methodology
subsection. The appendix presents the equivalent OLS results, results sequentially adding the control variables and
estimates of the first stage regressions.
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1998-2007 (column 1).
The results are significantly larger in magnitude for the growth of employment and turnover in
the 1998-2007 rather than the 1998-2015 period. This can be taken as evidence that the majority
of the decline in UK manufacturing employment and turnover resulting from increased import
competition occurred early in the period of China’s rapid rise as a global manufacturing exporter
following China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001. There is no evidence of a sig-
nificant difference in the estimated response of the number of firms in each manufacturing industry
between the shorter and longer period (although there is a reduction in statistical significance in
the longer period). The extensive margin of adjustment is therefore shown to operate throughout
the period, reflecting the time required for firms to shut down operations.
The paper provides an estimate of the economic impact of the regression estimates in a coun-
terfactual where there was no increase in Chinese import competition across all industries. This
exercise identifies the causal impact of Chinese import competition in terms of jobs lost, turnover
foregone and (net) loss of firms. The coefficients are estimated from the industry level regressions
of change in manufacturing outcomes on changes in import competition from Table (17) and the
counterfactual impact is presented in Table (18). Following (Acemoglu et al., 2016) the paper
then estimates change in employment relative to counterfactual of no increase in Chinese import
competition using the estimated regression coefficient, change in (projected) import penetration55
using the formula in equation (24) for each outcome Y ∈ {Employment, Turnover, F irms}.







The results show that the increased Chinese import penetration between 1998 and 2015 causally
cost 287,496 manufacturing jobs, reduced the number of manufacturing firms by 8,517 and reduced
manufacturing turnover by £50 billion in 2015. The paper then compares the estimated effects
55The (projected) import penetration is calculated as the actual change in import competition IPj15 − IPj98
multiplied by the explanatory power of the first stage regression of the change in UK import penetration on the
change in other high income country imports from China (ρ).
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to the total reduction in the number of manufacturing firms, employment and turnover over the
1998-2015 period and estimated the share of each outcome that the increase in Chinese import
competition accounts for. The results estimate that increased Chinese import competition accounts
for 16% of the reduction in manufacturing employment, 11% of the reduction in turnover in the
manufacturing sector and 21% of the reduction in manufacturing firms comparing 1998 with 2015.
Table 17: Impact of Chinese import competition on UK manufacturing outcomes over the period
1998-2015 (Regression coefficients)
Employment Turnover Firms
1998-2007 1998-2015 1998-2007 1998-2015 1998-2007 1998-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0467*** -0.0262*** -0.0444*** -0.0338*** -0.0110** -0.0115*
(0.00698) (0.00443) (0.0135) (0.00689) (0.00542) (0.00690)
Industry controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Employment controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Division cluster YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes - Each industry regression based on sample of 117 ISIC3 manufacturing industry observations.
Dependent variables are annualised mid point growth rates of industry outcomes. Industries are weighted
by the 1998 level of the outcome variable of interest: Number of firms in an industry for regressions,
Employment in an industry, and industry aggregate turnover (measured in 1998 prices). IV regressions
instrument the change in Chinese import penetration into the UK with a set of instruments using the
change in Chinese import competition into other high income countries (see text for more details).
Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 2 digit ISIC3 division level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 18: Impact of Chinese import competition on UK
manufacturing outcomes over the period 1998-2015 (Pre-
dicted effects)
All China China share
Employment -1,773,876 -287,496 0.16
Number of firms -40,042 -8,517 0.21
Turnover (£bn) -440.24 -50.47 0.11
Notes - Predicted changes estimated using the for-







Yj15 as described in the text.
4.4.2. Decomposition of industry employment changes
This subsection decomposes the aggregate changes in manufacturing outcomes in each industry
in response to the increase in Chinese import competition into the different margins across which
97
firms can adjust: expanding, contracting, entering, exiting, switching out of manufacturing and
switching into manufacturing. The results of the regressions for the long period 1998-2015 are
presented in Table (19) for each of the outcomes: Panel A presents the decomposition results
for employment, Panel B presents the decomposition results for turnover, Panel C presents the
decomposition results for the number of firms.56 Table (20) presents the contribution (share) of
each margin of firm adjustment to the aggregate response, and estimates of the predicted impact
of the increase in Chinese import competition as described in the previous subsubsection. In table
19 the dependent variable is always the change in the outcome variable, such as the change in
employment. A negative coefficient implies that industry employment falls when Chinese import
competition has increased. All of the coefficients are negative as each margin is on average asso-
ciated with a fall in employment (even if that fall in employment results from, for example, an
increase in deaths of firms).
Panel A shows that the negative effects of increased Chinese import competition on UK man-
ufacturing employment are driven by three main channels: (i) Firms switching their industry from
manufacturing to a non-manufacturing industry accounts for 42% of the reduction in industry
employment; (ii) Firms exiting accounts for 30% of the reduction in industry employment; and
(iii) Firms not expanding their employment relative to other industries accounts for 16% of the
reduction in industry employment. Similar contributions for industry turnover response to import
competition are found across the different margins of adjustment, with results presented in Panel
B. However, as shown in Panel C, the contribution of firms switching out of manufacturing is
significantly smaller when explaining the impact of Chinese import competition on the number
of firms in each industry (accounting for only 8% of the change in number of firms), with a far
greater role for increased firm exit (accounting for 61% of the change in number of firms) and a
reduction in firm entry (accounting for 30% of the change in number of firms).
The most interesting result in the decomposition is the importance of firms switching their in-
56Results for the shorter 1998-2007 are presented in the appendix. The results are generally similar, although
different time periods will have different decomposition estimates, with longer time periods allocating a greater
contribution to the extensive margin.
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dustry from manufacturing into non-manufacturing. This result has two interesting implications.
First, the result can explain part of the large reduction in the number of jobs in manufacturing
with over 120,000 jobs mechanically removed through firms no longer being classified in the man-
ufacturing sector.57 Second, the results imply a dynamic response of firms reorganizing activity in
response to the changing international competition. In particular, the fact that existing firms are
not shutting down or contracting as may be expected in standard theories of creative destruction
or models of international trade, but switching into non-manufacturing industries suggests that
firms may adapt within global supply chains to exploit the changing landscape of production and
sourcing opportunities, at the expense of local employment.58 The differences between the decom-
position results for employment and turnover in contrast to the number of firms in manufacturing
shows that it is the largest firms in terms of both employment and turnover that are switching into
non-manufacturing, accounting for a small number of firms, but a large proportion of employment
and turnover.
The results show a significant role for the extensive margin of adjustment, in particular firms
exiting from industries exposed to greater import competition, for explaining the decline in manu-
facturing employment and number of firms between 1998 and 2015. Therefore, for the majority of
(mainly small) UK manufacturing firms affected by the increased competition, they are not able
to respond by reallocating activity within the firm (which would be accounted for by the intensive
margin and contractions) or through reorganizing activity through changing industry.
The intensive margin accounts for a surprisingly small proportion of the response of manufac-
turing employment to the increased import competition. One explanation is that the time period
under investigation is long, which suggests that the extensive margin will account for a more pro-
nounced role. In the next subsection and in more detail in the appendix presents results of the
decomposition of the effects of increased import competition between 1998 and 2007, where the
57The paper explores in a later subsection how employment changed at these firms which switched out of manu-
facturing.
58The paper explores these possibilities in a later subsection where the paper investigates which industries these
firms are switching in to.
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results find a larger role of the intensive margin which accounts for 22% of the total manufactur-
ing employment decline due to Chinese import competition. Firms contracting accounts for 9%
and firms not expanding accounts for 13% of the total manufacturing employment decline due to
Chinese import competition in this shorter period.
Table 19: Impact of Chinese import competition on UK manufacturing outcomes across
different margins of firm adjustment over the period 1998-2015 (Regression coefficients)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Margins All Expand Contract Birth Death Switch out Switch in
Panel A: Employment
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0262*** -0.00415*** -6.65e-05 -0.00191 -0.00792*** -0.0110*** -0.00117**
(0.00443) (0.000807) (0.000930) (0.00119) (0.00224) (0.00208) (0.000571)
Panel B: Turnover
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0338*** -0.00629*** -0.00229 0.000202 -0.00813*** -0.0161*** -0.00124*
(0.00689) (0.00168) (0.00357) (0.00146) (0.00228) (0.00300) (0.000652)
Panel C: Firms
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0115* -0.00339 -0.00698** -0.000864* -0.000193
(0.00690) (0.00359) (0.00315) (0.000459) (0.000465)
Notes - Each industry regression based on sample of 117 ISIC3 manufacturing industry observa-
tions. Dependent variables are annualised mid point growth rates of industry outcomes. Industries
are weighted by the 1998 level of the outcome variable of interest: Number of firms in an industry
for regressions, Employment in an industry, and industry aggregate turnover (measured in 1998
prices). IV regressions instrument the change in Chinese import penetration into the UK with a
set of instruments using the change in Chinese import competition into other high income coun-
tries (see text for more details). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 2 digit ISIC3
division level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 20: Impact of Chinese import competition on UK manufacturing outcomes across
different margins of firm adjustment over the period 1998-2015 (Predicted effects)
Birth Death Expand Contract Switch in Switch out
Panel A: Employment
Predicted impact -20,978 -86,918 -45,579 -730 -12,889 -120,143
Share 0.07 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.04 0.42
Panel B: Turnover
Predicted impact 0.30 -12.13 -9.40 -3.42 -1.85 -23.97
Share -0.01 0.24 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.47
Panel C: Firms
Predicted impact -2,538 -5,196 -145 -639
Share 0.30 0.61 0.02 0.08







Yj15 as described in the text.
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4.4.3. Predicted effects and timing
This subsection explores how the timing of the response to the increased import competition can
reveal the mechanisms of how firms adjust to changes in international trade. This subsection re-
runs the decomposition analysis for each time period between 1998 and each year between 2001
and 2015 using the instrumental variable estimation strategy. This results show how the impacts
of increased import competition have evolved over time and the contribution of each margin over
time. The results of the predicted effects (using the methodology outlined above) are presented
graphically in Figure (15).
The results for the predicted impact of Chinese import competition on UK manufacturing em-
ployment between 1998 and each year in the period 2001-2015 are presented in Figure 5. Most
of the net employment effects occurred in the the first years after China’s accession to the WTO,
with the net employment effects levelling out after 2007. Throughout the entire period the two
main margins of adjustment are firms switching out of manufacturing and firms exiting. These
margins increase over the period in both absolute magnitude and their share of the contribution.
A surprising small contribution for the intensive margin of adjustment through firms contracting
and expanding. The relative contribution of the intensive margin declines over the period, with
firms contracting accounting for a significant share in the early period but almost no contribution
by 2015. This pattern is expected as firms initially contract in the facing if increasing competi-
tion, but then exit or switch industry once it is no longer profitable to compete. Firms expanded
less in industries facing greater increases in import competition, with the size of this effect in-
creasing throughout the period. Overall, the structure of the response of UK manufacturing to
the increased import competition suggests significant transition costs at the firm level, with little
role for internal restructuring, and a significant role for creative destruction leading to firm exit
and firms switching industries, possibly to fragment the production process in line with changing
comparative advantage.
The effects of Chinese import competition on the number of manufacturing firms, presented in
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Figure 15, differs in both magnitude and composition from the effects on employment. The net
effect of the impact of increased import competition on the number of manufacturing firms emerges
later in the period, with sharp rise from 2008 and levelling off only after 2013. In terms of the
composition across the different margins of adjustment, firm exit is the dominant margin of ad-
justment throughout the whole period, with an increase in the absolute magnitude after 2007.
The timing of the firm exits with the 2007-09 recession suggests a dynamic of creative destruction
where firms continued to survive against increased competitive pressure until another shock to
business conditions induces exit. The contribution of firm entry to the cross industry differences in
growth also increases after 2007. Interestingly, this suggests that in the initial years after China’s
accession to the WTO, firms continued to enter into more exposed industries just as much as other
industries, possibly believing that there were still opportunities to compete. However, it is only
after the significant increase in the level of competition by the later period that firms no longer
enter to try to compete in the industries with which China has comparative advantage.
The impact of Chinese import competition on manufacturing turnover has also increased over
time, accounting for an estimated £50 billion of reduced manufacturing turnover by 2015. There
is a more gradual effect of competition on turnover than employment, with a an initial decline
between 2001 and 2006 and second decline between 2011 and 2015. The extensive margin is again
the most important, with firms switching out of manufacturing providing the largest contribution
to the reduction in manufacturing turnover. Firms switching out of manufacturing drives the
increase in reduced turnover in the early period up to 2007, whilst the reduction in turnover in
the later period comes from increasing exit and firms not expanding. Overall these results again
highlight the importance of the largest manufacturing firms responding quickly to the more com-
petitive business conditions from the increase in Chinese imports, and adapting through moving
into different lines of business rather than exiting the market.
The important role of the extensive margin, and in particular firms switching out of manufac-
turing, is highlighted when comparing the impact of increased import competition across the three
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outcomes. This firm switching is dominated by largest firms, with only a small impact on the
number of firms, but accounting for a lion’s share of employment and turnover. Firm exit is also
important, with a significant contribution to the estimated impact on employment by the end of
the analysed period. The impact of this extensive margin is considerably larger for employment
than turnover, suggesting that it is less productive firms that are forced out of the market, pos-
sibly as they are not able to compete with low labour costs that determine China’s comparative
advantage in industries.
One of the most surprising results highlighted by the timing results is that the response is rapid,
with large falls in employment in the first years of increased Chinese import competition. This
rapid response is driven by the largest companies switching out of manufacturing and therefore
exploiting the changing competitive landscape rather than exiting completely. Finally, the employ-
ment effects occur more rapidly than the effects on turnover. These effects are driven by both an
immediate intensive restructuring, shown by early effects of contraction of employment but not in
turnover, and also selection with the least efficient firms in terms of labour productivity choosing
to exit.
4.4.4. Where are firms switching to?
The decision of UK manufacturing firms to switch their activities into non-manufacturing is the
most significant driver of the magnitude and timing of the response of UK industries most exposed
to increased Chinese import competition. This subsection further explores which activities these
firms switch to and the implications for the UK’s place in global value chains. The results show
that firms have switched out of manufacturing and into wholesaling and retailing, and business
activities.
This subsection decomposes the results for firms switching out of manufacturing in Table (5)
into the different industries which firms are switching to. For firms that switch between the pe-
riod 1998 and 2015, the results identify the sector that the firm switches to in 2015 into three
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options: Wholesaling and retailing (ISIC 50-52), Business administration (ISIC 70-74) and Other
non-manufacturing industries.59 The results also present the predicted effects in terms of number
of manufacturing jobs lost, reduced turnover and fewer firms, and the share of the total changes
in UK manufacturing.60
The results in Tables (21) and (22) show that the majority of firms switching out of manufacturing
in response to increased import competition switch to wholesaling and retailing, and business ac-
tivities. More firms switch out of manufacturing into wholesale and retail, over 60%, than business
administration, although the total predicted number of firms is low (with only 435 firms predicted
to have switched from manufacturing into wholesale and retail, and 196 firms switching into busi-
ness administration) as a result of the increase in Chinese import competition. There are much
larger effects for employment and turnover, in line with the previous results indicating that it is
the largest firms that switch out of manufacturing. Over 70,000 manufacturing jobs are lost from
manufacturing as a result of firms switching into wholesale and retail by 2015, accounting for over
60% of jobs lost from switching out of manufacturing, with business administration accounting for
almost all of the remainder and over 40,000 jobs lost. Wholesale and retail accounts for an even
greater share of turnover lost, at around 77%, with business administration bringing the total to
just over 100% of the total turnover lost, with other industries create a small (and insignificant)
drag.
The sectors that firms switch to when they move out of manufacturing in response to the increased
import competition illustrates a dynamic restructuring of UK manufacturing within global value
chains. Firms that switch out of the production activities of manufacturing into wholesale and
retail move downstream in their value chains. These firms probably continue to leverage their dis-
tribution network and retail brand, but outsource (more of) their production. These downstream
59Although the paper initially decompose the sector that firms switch to into all 10 non-manufacturing sectors,
only Wholesaling and retailing, Business administration contribute significantly in the decomposition so the analysis
groups all remaining sectors that firms switch to into other.
60As mentioned earlier, these jobs are mechanically lost from manufacturing by the firms switching out of man-
ufacturing, although the firms may not be reducing their employment, turnover or close down. The paper explores
the changes in firm level employment and turnover in a later subsection.
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activities are not possible to outsource as they require a physical presence which possibly explains
why they account for the majority of the firms, employment and turnover in the decomposition.
However, the downstream activities are also associated with lower skilled and lower paid jobs, with
negative implications for worker outcomes. In contrast, firms that concentrate their activities in
Business and administration move upstream in their value chains, whilst still leveraging the new
outsourcing opportunities opened up by the development of Chinese manufacturing. These busi-
ness activities include both the control processes of the global manufacturing operations, but also
the research and development.61 These activities are typically associated with more skilled and
higher paying professions and represent a shift of industries more in line with the UK’s comparative
advantage with an abundance of high skilled labour.
Table 21: Where are firms switching to? (Regression coefficients)
Any non-manufacturing Wholesale & retail Business administration Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Employment
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0110*** -0.00668*** -0.00396** -0.000304
(0.00208) (0.00118) (0.00159) (0.000584)
Panel B: Turnover
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0161*** -0.0125*** -0.00399** 0.000435
(0.00300) (0.00358) (0.00167) (0.000771)
Panel C: Firms
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.000864* -0.000588 -0.000265** -1.13e-05
(0.000459) (0.000370) (0.000112) (0.000162)
Notes - Each industry regression based on sample of 117 ISIC3 manufacturing industry observations. Dependent
variables are annualised mid point growth rates of industry outcomes. Industries are weighted by the 1998 level of
the outcome variable of interest: Number of firms in an industry for regressions, Employment in an industry, and
industry aggregate turnover (measured in 1998 prices). IV regressions instrument the change in Chinese import
penetration into the UK with a set of instruments using the change in Chinese import competition into other high
income countries (see text for more details). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 2 digit ISIC3 division
level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.4.5. What happens to firms when they switch industry?
This subsection explores how firm employment and turnover changes when firms switch out of an
industry. The analysis moves to the firm level to track individual firms over time, rather than the
61One of the most commonly cited examples in the US is Apple, which explicitly says ‘Designed by Apple
in California. Assembled in China.’ In the UK, Dyson (one of the UK’s recent manufacturing success stories)
offshored all of its production facilities in 2002 and 2003, leaving only its research and development facilities in the
UK.
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Table 22: Where are firms switching to? (Predicted effects)
Switch out Wholesale & retail Business administration Other
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Employment
Predicted impact -120143 -72960 -43251 -3320
Share 0.42 0.26 0.15 0.01
Panel B: Turnover
Predicted impact -24.0 -18.6 -5.9 0.6
Share 0.47 0.36 0.12 -0.01
Panel C: Firms
Predicted impact -639 -435 -196 -8
Share 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.00
Notes - Each industry regression based on sample of 117 ISIC3 manufacturing industry obser-
vations. Industries are weighted by the 1998 level of the outcome variable of interest: Number
of firms in an industry for regressions, Employment in an industry, and industry aggregate
turnover (measured in 1998 prices). IV regressions instrument the change in Chinese import
penetration into the UK with a set of instruments using the change in Chinese import compe-
tition into other high income countries (see text for more details). Standard errors are robust
and clustered at the 2 digit ISIC3 division level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
outcomes of manufacturing industries. A firm’s exposure to import competition is defined based
on their initial industry, but separately identify firms depending on whether they do not switch
industry, whether they switch industry but to another manufacturing industry, and whether they
switch out of manufacturing (and whether they switch into wholesaling and retailing, and business
activities).
The results of the firm level analysis are presented in Table (23) for both periods 1998-2007
and 1998-2015. Regressions are specified estimating the change in employment and turnover out-
comes on changes in industry Chinese import penetration, indicators for the switching behaviour
of firms and interactions between the switching behaviour of firms ad changes in industry import
penetration. There are two sets of coefficients of interest. First, the results on the different types
of switching behaviour show the impact that these behaviours have on firm outcomes (relative to
firms that don’t switch). Second, the coefficients on the interactions of the switching behaviour
and changes in import penetration show whether the effects of the switching behaviour are smaller
or larger for firms in industries more exposed to import competition. The results suggest that
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firms are negatively affected in terms of employment and turnover when they switch out of manu-
facturing into other, wholesale and administrative industries, but that these effects are not larger
for industries initially more exposed to import competition.
The results on the indicators of firm switching behaviour show that firms that switch out of
manufacturing into other sectors reduce their employment and turnover.62 Firms that switch into
wholesaling experience a 2.5% reduction in per annum growth of employment across both periods,
with evidence that they also experience reductions in the growth rate of turnover of 2.1% in the
1998-2007 period. Firms that switch into business and administration experience an even greater
reduction in employment and turnover, with a 5.1% reduction in per annum employment growth
and 4.7% reduction in turnover growth in the 1998-2015 period. Firms that switch into other
sectors reduce experience reductions in their turnover over both periods, with some evidence that
they may experience positive employment effects.
Firms have slower growth of employment and turnover if they are initially in industries that are
exposed to greater import competition. However, the effects of different firm switching behaviour
are larger for industries initially more exposed to import competition (as shown by the insignifi-
cant interaction terms). Although firms that switch out of manufacturing into other sectors (than
wholesaling and business administration) have significant interaction terms, the net effect with the
coefficient for all firms that switch is insignificant.
Firms switching within manufacturing do not experience significantly different growth rates in
employment or turnover than firms that do not switch, and these firms have significantly different
effects if they are in industries that are exposed to greater import competition. This result sug-
gests that excluding these firms from the main analysis would not invalidate the group exogeneity
62In industries which face little import competition, as well as in industries that do, there is a question of why firms
would switch out of manufacturing. A concurrent trend occurring at the same time as the increase in Chinese import
competition was an increase in the automation of manufacturing. This could explain why firms would switch out of
manufacturing, if their employment in manufacturing fell as a result of automation, even if the industry remained
in the UK. However, the evidence in this paper of the fall in industry and firm turnover at the same time as the fall
in employment suggests that industries and firms are becoming smaller, rather than just engaging in capital labour
substitution.
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conditions for the difference in difference regression strategy.
Table 23: What happens when firms switch out of manufacturing?
Employment Turnover
1998-2007 1998-2015 1998-2007 1998-2015
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0254*** -0.0176*** -0.00986 -0.0174*
(0.00464) (0.00372) (0.00998) (0.0124)
Switch out (other)*Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0655*** 0.0192 0.0997** 0.0779**
(0.0199) (0.0212) (0.0460) (0.0324)
Switch out (wholesale)*Annual ∆ in Chinese IP -0.0193* 0.00142 -0.0155 -0.0117
(0.0106) (0.00647) (0.0156) (0.0183)
Switch out (administration)*Annual ∆ in Chinese IP 0.00167 -0.000677 0.0725* 0.00383
(0.0225) (0.0118) (0.0422) (0.0255)
Switch within manufacturing*Annual ∆ in Chinese IP 5.43e-05 -0.00218 -0.0389* -0.0177*
(0.0114) (0.00779) (0.0219) (0.0101)
Switch out (other) 0.0379*** -0.00389 -0.103** -0.0632***
(0.0101) (0.0147) (0.0405) (0.0193)
Switch out (wholesale) -0.0246* -0.0244*** -0.0214** -0.0115
(0.0137) (0.00497) (0.0107) (0.0133)
Switch out (administration) -0.0377 -0.0507*** -0.0714 -0.0471***
(0.0234) (0.00988) (0.0514) (0.0150)
Switch within manufacturing 0.00397 0.00282 0.0152* 0.0111
(0.00773) (0.00499) (0.00820) (0.00912)
Observations 82,137 52,853 82,113 52,834
R-squared 0.087 0.128 0.125 0.061
Firm controls YES YES YES YES
Industry controls YES YES YES YES
Employment controls YES YES YES YES
Division cluster YES YES YES YES
Weight employment employment turnover turnover
Notes - Regressions are weighted by the 1998 level of the outcome variable of interest: Employment at the firm,
and turnover (measured in 1998 prices) at the firm. Dependent variables are annualised mid point growth rates
of firm outcomes. IV regressions instrument the change in Chinese import penetration into the UK with a set of
instruments using the change in Chinese import competition into other high income countries (see text for more
details). Standard errors are robust and clustered at the 2 digit ISIC3 division level. Robust standard errors in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.5. Conclusion
This paper shows that the rise in import competition from China following China’s accession to the
World Trade Organization contributed to the decline in UK manufacturing activity post 2000. A
significant proportion of this decline in manufacturing activity is driven by firms switching their in-
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dustrial activity out of manufacturing production and towards services. In particular, firms switch
into business services such as research and development and wholesale and retail. This switching
behaviour is consistent with theoretical models of offshoring and other empirical evidence that
a significant proportion of the increase in Chinese and other low wage country exports is from
foreign owned firms. This paper also shows that the speed of the transition across industries is
fast, with the majority of the employment and turnover effects occurring in the first few years.
This is primarily driven by the largest firms, as the switching effect on the number of firms is
substantially smaller.
The empirical results of this paper support the idea of a transition of manufacturing firms and the
economy from production to services in response to increased international competition from low
wage countries. The importance of the transition from production to research has been empha-
sized at the firm level by Bloom et al. (2013) and at the economy level by Rodŕıguez-Clare (2010).
The transition to increase research effort accelerates the rate of technological progress and ensures
that offshoring is welfare enhancing. From a welfare perspective, the fast rate of transition is also
essential to ensure that the long run positive welfare effects of offshoring dominate any short run
negative welfare effects.
This paper has made an initial step in understanding the transition from production to services
in response to increased international competition. This will be important looking forward for
the UK as it leaves the European Union and renegotiates its trading relationship with both the
EU, advanced nations such as the US and possibly developing nations such as China, India and
Brazil. The implications of this line of research suggests that policy should be less focussed on
helping firms to remain competitive in manufacturing production, but to help firms to transition
to productivity enhancing services such as research and development.
Future work could build on the work of this paper to further understand the transition to re-
search and development. Using more detailed firm level information on the amount of research
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and development along the lines of Bloom et al. (2016) could help address the issue of industry
classification raised in the data subsection. Further analysis at the worker level using matched
employer-employee data could illustrate the changes in worker composition when a firm switches
industry to further test whether the activity of the firm fundamentally changes, but also to under-




Tables 24 and 25 show the decomposition of number of firms and employment across different firms
by whether they entered, exited, switched, expanded or contracted in the period.
Table 24: Total numbers across firm margins (1998-2015)
firm1998 firm2015 employment1998 employment2015
Entrant 0 121,974 0 875,742
Exit 138,932 0 2,459,698 0
Switch (out of manufacturing) 12,177 12,177 531,393 323,500
Switch (into manufacturing) 9,582 9,582 112,542 259,030
Switch (within manufacturing) 9,699 9,699 360,755 378,574
Expand 23,442 23,442 422,269 863,639
Contract 13,993 13,993 894,263 467,097
Total 207,825 190,867 4,780,920 3,167,582
Table 25: Total numbers across firm margins (1998-2007)
firm1998 firm2007 employment1998 employment2007
Entrant 0 122,544 0 831,887
Exit 75,545 0 1,419,942 0
Switch (out of manufacturing) 14,414 14,414 403,721 294,686
Switch (into manufacturing) 14,517 14,517 150,263 341,286
Switch (within manufacturing) 12,323 12,323 406,427 396,040
Expand 62,769 62,769 901,250 1,508,499
Contract 33,254 33,254 1,541,661 858,750
Total 212,822 259,821 4,823,264 4,231,148
B Results
Tables 26, 27, 28 show the predicted changes illustrated graphically in the main text.
Table 26: Predicted Change in Employment
Date China Birth Death Expand Contract Switch in Switch out All China share
01 -129,989 -17,027 -35,464 -16,605 -33,799 -3,195 -23,899 -309,376 0.42
02 -104,754 -7,744 -28,867 -13,736 -20,207 1,683 -35,883 -351,406 0.30
03 -170,137 -6,713 -32,578 -18,527 -32,840 -11,571 -67,910 -671,993 0.25
04 -161,586 -18,084 -29,116 -13,121 -30,021 -8,328 -62,915 -876,810 0.18
05 -239,474 -22,783 -55,143 -24,152 -35,253 -19,578 -82,565 -1,055,560 0.23
06 -279,666 -23,677 -84,284 -25,652 -23,993 -22,141 -99,919 -1,136,160 0.25
07 -267,829 -20,461 -81,039 -35,083 -25,114 -20,354 -85,777 -1,266,745 0.21
08 -248,316 -21,661 -77,788 -32,274 -29,623 -19,027 -67,944 -1,408,266 0.18
09 -271,471 -23,410 -74,151 -37,287 -10,286 -17,549 -108,788 -1,479,909 0.18
10 -238,502 -23,031 -71,382 -31,188 -14,737 -12,889 -85,276 -1,714,467 0.14
11 -250,410 -20,512 -76,234 -35,289 -6,629 -15,188 -96,557 -1,786,655 0.14
12 -289,906 -24,255 -91,342 -38,660 -10,403 -20,835 -104,411 -1,807,255 0.16
13 -272,899 -23,223 -75,094 -35,084 -10,840 -17,405 -111,253 -1,826,036 0.15
14 -280,119 -25,440 -80,305 -38,873 -8,338 -14,789 -112,374 -1,841,821 0.15
15 -287,496 -20,978 -86,918 -45,579 -730 -12,889 -120,143 -1,773,876 0.16
Tables 29, 30, 31 show the first stage of the instrumental variable results, showing that the first
stage is strong and significant and therefore the IV strategy is valid.
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Table 27: Predicted Change in Number of Firms
Date China Birth Death Switch in Switch out All China share
01 -2,277 -276 -1,666 -201 -134 -12,241 0.19
02 -2,258 -255 -1,693 -82 -228 -14,826 0.15
03 -2,425 -61 -1,970 -87 -307 -19,109 0.13
04 -2,418 -57 -1,843 71 -589 -23,002 0.11
05 -3,382 -197 -2,786 -10 -583 -26,987 0.13
06 -4,250 -516 -3,151 53 -636 -30,166 0.14
07 -3,835 -265 -3,308 138 -401 -31,341 0.12
08 -6,291 -1,293 -4,306 -299 -393 -35,967 0.17
09 -7,923 -2,176 -5,125 -166 -440 -34,559 0.23
10 -7,685 -2,221 -4,863 -106 -495 -41,344 0.19
11 -7,556 -1,968 -4,880 -171 -537 -47,010 0.16
12 -8,733 -2,433 -5,371 -216 -713 -45,201 0.19
13 -8,948 -2,630 -5,401 -237 -683 -43,070 0.21
14 -8,821 -2,634 -5,385 -164 -638 -41,583 0.21
15 -8,550 -2,531 -5,209 -144 -645 -40,042 0.21
Table 28: Predicted Change in Turnover
Date China Birth Death Expand Contract Switch in Switch out All China share
01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -5.32e+11 0.00
02 -117,307.89 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -7.05e+11 0.00
03 -6263687680.00 -1.22 -1.65 0.41 3.71 1.31 -8.85 -1.08e+12 0.01
04 -1.79e+10 -3.28 -2.08 -4.03 -0.34 2.43 -10.63 -5.90e+11 0.03
05 -2.37e+10 -2.49 -2.66 -2.45 -5.06 0.38 -11.42 -6.65e+11 0.04
06 -3.07e+10 -1.01 -6.53 -6.25 -1.48 -0.29 -15.10 -7.94e+11 0.04
07 -3.09e+10 -1.45 -6.46 -4.90 -2.20 -1.98 -13.93 -7.71e+11 0.04
08 -2.81e+10 -0.14 -6.37 -5.07 -4.79 -0.31 -11.42 -6.60e+11 0.04
09 -3.17e+10 -1.33 -5.84 -4.03 -0.92 -0.50 -19.05 -7.05e+11 0.04
10 -2.95e+10 -0.87 -6.99 -9.21 4.08 -0.84 -15.70 -6.06e+11 0.05
11 -3.15e+10 0.89 -7.32 -7.96 0.69 -1.07 -16.75 -7.56e+11 0.04
12 -4.00e+10 -0.21 -10.51 -9.51 1.00 -2.56 -18.23 -7.65e+11 0.05
13 -3.94e+10 -1.51 -8.73 -5.71 -1.49 -1.80 -20.18 -6.86e+11 0.06
14 -4.41e+10 -0.86 -10.33 -7.88 -2.91 -1.14 -21.03 -6.53e+11 0.07
15 -5.05e+10 0.30 -12.13 -9.40 -3.42 -1.85 -23.97 -4.40e+11 0.11
Table 29: Annualised mid point growth in industry employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 9815 FS 9815 SS 9815 FS 9815 SS 9815 FS 9815 SS
imp pen inst9815 0.146*** 0.141*** 0.139***
(0.0177) (0.0140) (0.0136)
imp pen9815 -0.0267*** -0.0260*** -0.0262***
(0.00369) (0.00401) (0.00443)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.795 0.332 0.831 0.347 0.834 0.351
Industry controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Employment controls NO NO NO YES NO YES
Division cluster YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample All All All All All All
Weight employment employment employment employment employment employment
First stage F 68.80 101.0 104.9
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 30: Annualised mid point growth in industry turnover
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 9815 FS 9815 SS 9815 FS 9815 SS 9815 FS 9815 SS
imp pen inst9815 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.0133) (0.0109) (0.0111)
imp pen9815 -0.0337*** -0.0335*** -0.0338***
(0.00740) (0.00670) (0.00689)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.822 0.245 0.849 0.313 0.852 0.328
Industry controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Employment controls NO NO NO YES NO YES
Division cluster YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample All All All All All All
Weight turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover turnover
First stage F 94.21 133.4 127.2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 31: Annualised mid point growth in industry number of firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES 9815 FS 9815 SS 9815 FS 9815 SS 9815 FS 9815 SS
imp pen inst9815 0.155*** 0.142*** 0.140***
(0.0171) (0.0120) (0.0130)
imp pen9815 -0.0126** -0.0120** -0.0115*
(0.00494) (0.00611) (0.00690)
Observations 117 117 117 117 117 117
R-squared 0.771 0.120 0.841 0.150 0.844 0.170
Industry controls NO NO NO NO NO YES
Employment controls NO NO NO YES NO YES
Division cluster YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample All All All All All All
Weight firm firm firm firm firm firm
First stage F 81.70 140.5 116.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5. Do Large Depreciations Lead to Export Booms? Facts
on UK Firms in International Trade and Evidence on
Exchange Rate Elasticities from the Brexit Deprecia-
tion
5.1. Introduction
Large depreciations are expected to boost exports by making domestic goods cheaper in foreign
currencies and thus increasing their demand from abroad. As the quantity of the exported prod-
ucts rises, so does the value of total exports. This may not be the case if firms actively adjust their
prices in response to a depreciation and engage in pricing-to-market. If large firms have enough
market power they might take advantage the exchange rate depreciation to increase their margins
in their own currency (Atkeson and Burstein, 2008). Although an increasing number of studies
test these theories of pricing to market by estimating the elasticity of exports to exchange rates
over a long time series (Berman, Martin, and Mayer, 2012; Fitzgerald and Haller, 2013; Corsetti,
Crowley, Han, and Song, 2019), there is little evidence of the magnitude and heterogeneity in
exporter pricing to market in response to large depreciations.
This paper estimates the elasticity of UK exports to the large depreciation of sterling around
the Brexit Referendum and heterogeneity in this elasticity across UK exporters. The paper uses
transaction level administrative Customs data for the UK sourced from HMRC to identify how
each UK exporter changes their prices and quantities of exports of detailed products in a given
destination. The paper finds significant evidence that firms do price to market through increasing
the sterling value of their exports in response to the large depreciation, providing further evidence
towards models with variable markups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Atkeson and Burstein, 2008;
Corsetti and Dedola, 2005). The paper also explores differences in the responses of exporters and
finds results consistent with the heterogeneous pricing to market in models such as Atkeson and
Burstein (2008). This means that the largest UK exporters increase their export prices more than
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smaller exporters in response to a large depreciation. A surprising finding is that the largest UK
exporters increased both their export prices and export quantities more in response to the depre-
ciation, in contrast to the theoretical predictions of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and empirical
findings of previous work by Berman et al. (2012). One possible explanation for these different
results could be short run constraints on smaller exporters to increase their quantities and the
impact of the contemporaneous increase in trade policy uncertainty facing UK exporters (Crowley
et al., 2019).
In the immediate aftermath of the Brexit Referendum on 23rd June 2016, sterling depreciated
by around 10% against all major currencies and by the end of 2016 had depreciated by over 20%
relative to 2015. Figure 16 shows that the value of UK goods exports increased in the period
following the Brexit Referendum. The value of UK quarterly exports in levels was on average
over 20% higher in 2017 and 2018 relative to their 2015 levels. Using exchange rate pass through
estimates of the effect of the change in bilateral exchange rates on firm-product-destination level
export values, this paper shows that this rise in exports was driven by the large depreciation of
the (trade-weighted) exchange rate in the run up to and following the Brexit referendum.
This paper finds that the 20% increase in the value of UK goods exports following the Brexit
Referendum was driven primarily by higher sterling prices, rather than by larger quantities sold.
Decomposing the firm-product-destination level response into price versus quantity channels, this
paper finds that the response was mainly driven by increases in the price (unit values) of exports
in the initial period, followed by a smaller increase in the quantity of exports in later 2017. Across
all export destinations, a 10% depreciation results in a 5.4% increase in export prices and just a
1.2% increase in export quantities. These estimates are considerably larger for the price elasticity
of exports compared to Berman et al. (2012) and Amiti, Itskhoki, and Konings (2014), but also
significantly smaller for the quantity elasticity.
The largest exporters were most responsive to the depreciation, increasing both quantities and
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prices more than smaller exporters. Since large exporters account for the lions share of the value
of exports, their responses to exchange rate movements will drive the aggregate response. Impor-
tantly, this effect is not just driven by differences in the elasticity of exports to the exchange rate
across industries, as the results are robust to ranking exporters within an industry. The finding
that larger exporters have greater export price elasticities is consistent with the theoretical predic-
tions of Atkeson and Burstein (2008). However, the degree of heterogeneity is much smaller than
predicted by Atkeson and Burstein (2008) or found in Berman et al. (2012).
In order to better understand the sources of heterogeneity in responses across British firms, this
chapter opens by developing a rich and detailed picture of the role of firms engaged in international
trade in the UK economy. The chapter develops a new database linking the universe of British
firms from UK Business Register (Office for National Statistics, 2017) and the universe of inter-
national trade transactions from the customs data (HMRC, 2018). The resulting dataset covers
almost all international trade, employment and turnover in the UK economy.
The chapter utilises this new dataset to document the importance of UK firms in international
trade as a share of economic activity. Trade in goods is concentrated in a small number of firms
that account for the lion’s share of exports and imports. As a result the response of the largest
firms determines the aggregate response to trade shocks. Only 3% of UK firms are engaged in in-
ternational trade in goods yet these firms account for over 30% of employment and over 50% of UK
turnover. The top 1% of goods exporters are pivotal in shaping UK export patterns, accounting
for 70% of exports, 5% of employment, and 12% of turnover.
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5.2. Data and Facts on UK Firms in International Trade
Before turning to an analysis of the Brexit depreciation, the chapter documents in rich detail facts
about firms directly engaged in international trade in goods as well as their key characteristics.
This paper capitalises on a newly constructed dataset to shed light on the UK trade and economic
landscape. The descriptive evidence also highlights the heterogeneity across firms which can then
help to explain why the response to economic shocks of the largest firms may differ to smaller firms.
UK firms that are directly engaged in international trade in goods are important for the UK
economy and are different from non-importing and non-exporting firms across several dimensions.
While they make up only 3% of all UK firms, they account for just under a third of UK employment
and more than half of UK total turnover across the economy as a whole.63 Among these firms, a
small fraction account for the lions share of trade in goods and a significant proportion of economic
activity. The top 1% of exporters (just over 600 firms) make up 70% of total UK exports, 5% of
UK employment, and 12% of UK turnover. Of these firms, 108 export to both EU and non-EU
countries, accounting for 42% of UK exports and 53 import from both EU and non-EU countries,
accounting for 25% of UK imports.
The next subsection describes firms which trade in goods in detail, highlighting stylized facts
in terms of their sector composition, importance for the UK economy, and engagement as twoway
traders (firms that are importers and exporters at the same time).
5.2.1. New linked firm-trade data
It is a well-established fact for developed and developing economies that firms engaged in in-
ternational trade are the largest, most productive, and drive aggregate trends (Bernard, Jensen,
Redding, and Schott, 2018c). With the exception of Wales, Black, Dolby, and Awano (2018),
evidence on this for the UK has been missing due to hurdles linking detailed firm customs data
63Statistics on the importance of firms in international trade are often only reported for the manufacturing sector.
This section also reports figures for the manufacturing sector, however it is also pertinent to highlight the importance
of trading firms across the UK as a whole.
119
with corresponding business registry information. This paper constructs a new dataset which
links business registry information on the universe of UK firms sourced from the ONS with their
customs transactions sourced from HMRC. This dataset builds on existing work in three ways.
First, this paper incorporates new firm level information into the trade in goods data. Second, the
paper constructs data at the firm level using the ONS definition of an enterprise. Third, the paper
assigns the value of UK trade in goods to UK SIC industries. The linked dataset contains infor-
mation on every firm in the UK economy with complete information at the firm level on turnover,
employment, foreign ownership, and foreign subsidiaries to complement that of firm level export
and import activities.
The new linked dataset is constructed using the HMRC overseas Trade Statistics (OTS) with
provides the firm, product, destination, time level import and export data. The HMRC overseas
trade statistics are sourced from the customs declarations for import and export data with non-EU
countries which provides data for each daily transaction and firm Intrastat declarations for EU im-
port and export data for each month. The ONS intra-departmental business registry (IDBR) data
provides the firm and time level data for employment, turnover, industry and ownership status.
This is a constructed dataset from administrative HMRC data. HMRC data provides information
on firm industry and turnover. HMRC PAYE data provides employment data. Companies House
provides firm ownership data. The firm identifiers in each of the OTS and IDBR are specified
differently due to their different administrative data sources, reflecting the different levels at which
taxes are collected in the UK tax system. The firm identifiers in the OTS are the traderid (trader
ID), which are the tax numbers used by trading firms on their customs forms. The firm identifiers
in the IDBR are the entref (enterprise reference number), which are generated by the ONS. These
are both anonymised to researchers, but provide a one to one mapping to their true identifiers.
The key to linking the two datasets are the VAT numbers of firms. All trader IDs can be mapped
to a unique VAT tax code (which are also reported on a customs declaration), and as the VAT
data is one of the origin datasets for the IDBR, there exists a mapping from each VAT code to each
enterprise reference number. The concordance here was conducted using lookups provided by the
ONS and HMRC. The concordance has an a very high success rate, a small number of traderids
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(and small share of trade values) do not match to VAT codes due to either incorrect VAT codes
provided on customs forms, or firms that are not registered for VAT purposes in the UK (because
they may be registered for VAT purposes in the EU).
5.2.2. How important are firms that trade goods in the UK?
The new linked firm-trade data documents the importance of importing and exporting firms in the
UK economy. There are three main results presented in Table 32:
1. Very few firms are engaged in international trade. In the linked dataset,64 just under 100,000
UK firms import, export or are twoway traders, accounting for just 3% of all firms in the
economy. This is true even within the different sectors of the economy, which is explored
in the next subsection. These results are in line with the theoretical predictions of Melitz
(2003) style models, where only the most productive firms can profitably pay the sunk cost
of exporting.
2. Firms that trade are disproportionately important for economic activity. The small number of
importing and exporting firms make up 31% of total employment and 51% of total turnover.
Following Melitz (2003) these results are unsurprising as only the most productive firms
trade. The productivity advantage of firms which trade also ensures that these firms are
largest in terms of employment and turnover. The facts on the importance of firms that
trade goods in the UK is similar (although slightly smaller) to other advanced countries.65
3. Twoway traders undertake the lion’s share of trade: 96% of exports and 92% of imports.
They also account for the majority of employment and turnover in importing and exporting
firms. Two important implications of the important role of twoway traders is first that the
trade balance will be less affected if the largest exporters leave, as they are also the largest
64One limitation of the HMRC Customs Data is that exports (dispatches) and imports (arrivals) from the EU
are only reported if a firm trades above a threshold. This excludes approximately 100,000 firms that trade small
values with the EU, but these firms account for less than 3% of exports and import value to the EU.
65Bernard et al. (2018c) show that 35% of firms in US manufacturing export. Biscourp and Kramarz (2007)
show that importing and exporting firms account for 25% of French manufacturing firms, but 89% of sales. This
contrasts to 12% of UK firms in manufacturing exporting and 15% UK manufacturing firms accounting for 76%
sales engaged in importing or exporting as shown in section 5.2.3.
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importers. However, this does not mean there will be no effect on GDP, as these firms also
have a large domestic reach and high levels of employment. Second, recognizing the role of
twoway traders is important for predicting the response to future trade shocks, such as large
exchange rate movements or bilateral trade (de-)liberalisation. For example, a depreciation
of sterling would act both as a positive competitiveness shock on the export side, but also a
negative cost shock on the import side. Therefore a depreciation could have a muted boost
to exports through the imported inputs channel Amiti et al. (2014).
Table 32: Importance of importing and exporting firms in UK economy (2017)
Firms Employment (million) Turnover (£billion) Export (£billion) Import (£billion)
Non-trader 3,090,254 (97%) 22.5 (69%) 2,626.0 (49%) - -
Exporter 21,427 (1%) 0.6 (2%) 184.3 (3%) 12.5 (4%) -
Importer 36,116 (1%) 2.0 (6%) 293.1 (5%) - 32.2 (8%)
Twoway trader 40,100 (1%) 7.6 (23%) 2,273.5 (43%) 274.4 (96%) 377.6 (92%)
Total 3,187,897 32.7 (100%) 5,376.8 (100%) 287.0 (100%) 409.8 (100%)
5.2.3. Which sectors trade goods?
Table 33 presents the distribution of economic activity and trade across different sectors of the
economy. The ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Wholesale and Retail’ sectors account for the majority of
trade (80% of both exports and imports), but a much smaller share of economic activity. Analysis
is limited to the sectors which are normally associated with trade in goods.
The ‘Manufacturing’ sector accounts for the majority (56%) of UK exports and 32% of UK im-
ports. This is disproportionate relative to the total activity that ‘Manufacturing’ accounts for,
with only 5% of firms; 8% of employment; and 10% of turnover (Table 2). The ‘Wholesale and
Retail’ sector is the most dominant importing sector. It is responsible for 48% of imports and 27%
of exports, yet accounts for a small proportion of activity with 14% of firms; 15% of employment;
and 22% of turnover.
122
Table 33: Trade in goods is concentrated in manufacturing and wholesale and retail sectors (2017)
ONS SIC Sector Sector description Share of Firms Share of Employment Share of Turnover Share of Exports Share of Imports
A AGRICULTURE 6.4% 1.8% 0.9% 0.3% 0.2%
B MINING AND QUARRYING 0.1% 0.2% 0.6% 2.1% 0.3%
C MANUFACTURING 4.7% 7.8% 9.8% 55.6% 31.7%
G WHOLESALE AND RETAIL 13.6% 15.4% 22% 27.3% 48.1%
H TRANSPORTATION 3.9% 4.3% 3.9% 1.7% 3%
D-F, I-R OTHER 71.3% 70.5% 62.8% 13% 16.7%
Importing and exporting firms account for a disproportionate share of economic activity in
every sector, including those which do not account for much trade. Figure 17 zooms in on Man-
ufacturing and Wholesale and retail, as these are the most important sectors for trade in goods.
In Manufacturing, only 15% of firms trade goods, with 12% of firms exporting and 11% of firms
importing. These importing and exporting firms account for 63% of manufacturing employment
and 76% of manufacturing turnover. The ‘Wholesale and Retail’ shows similar patterns, with
11% of firms engaged in international trade which account for 60% of sectoral employment and
66% of sectoral turnover. Figure 17 also illustrates the importance of twoway traders relative to
only exporters or only importers in terms of their contribution to employment and turnover in the
trading sectors.
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5.2.4. Are firms that trade larger and more productive?
Firms engaged in international trade are fundamentally different to other firms in the economy,
even within narrowly defined sectors. Importing and exporting firms are, on average, signif-
icantly larger than non-importing and non-exporting firms in terms of turnover, employment,
and productivity (where due to data limitations productivity is defined as labour productivity
productivity = turnover/employment). This effect is driven by an entire shift of the firm size
distribution, as shown in Figures 2, 3 and 4, which plot the density of firms by exporting type
across the firm size and productivity distribution66 using an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth
of 1. These figures show that the distribution of firms that only import or only export is shifted to
the right of that of non-traders. Further, the distribution of twoway traders is shifted even further
to the right, with both a significantly higher average size of firms, as well as greater density of very
large firms in the top of the distribution.67
66Figures trim the top and bottom 1% of the distribution for disclosure purposes.
67In the figure for productivity in Figure 18, the lines for importers and exporters perfectly overlap.
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Fig. 18. Importing and exporting firms are larger and more productive than non-importing and







































The firm size and productivity premiums are estimated by regression. The regression specifi-
cation is:
lnXij = βXExporteri + βIImporteri + βTTwowayi + FEj + εij (25)
for firm i in sector j, X ∈ (employment, output, productivity) . Exporter, Importer and Twoway
are equal to 1 for the relevant firm type and 0 otherwise. Non-traders are the base category. The
magnitude and significance of the trading premia is relatively unaffected by the inclusion of more
detailed fixed effects beyond the SIC Sector.
Table 34: Exporter, importer and twoway trader size and productivity premia (2017)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Fixed effects SIC Sector SIC 2 digit SIC 3 digit SIC 4 digit SIC 5 digit
Panel A: Employment
Exporter 0.997*** 1.003*** 1.016*** 1.029*** 1.033***
(0.00676) (0.00668) (0.00651) (0.00646) (0.00643)
Importer 0.886*** 0.903*** 0.942*** 0.949*** 0.949***
(0.00529) (0.00525) (0.00512) (0.00508) (0.00506)
Twoway 2.011*** 2.033*** 2.039*** 2.047*** 2.048***
(0.00502) (0.00503) (0.00493) (0.0049) (0.00488)
Observations 3,102,629 3,102,629 3,102,627 3,102,623 3,102,623
R(squared 0.146 0.173 0.218 0.234 0.241
Panel B: Turnover
Exporter 1.632*** 1.589*** 1.591*** 1.593*** 1.596***
(0.00932) (0.00928) (0.00912) (0.00905) (0.00902)
Importer 1.444*** 1.415*** 1.467*** 1.476*** 1.474***
(0.0073) (0.00729) (0.00717) (0.00712) (0.00709)
Twoway 3.000*** 2.950*** 2.966*** 2.967*** 2.965***
(0.00692) (0.00699) (0.00691) (0.00688) (0.00685)
Observations 3,095,842 3,095,842 3,095,840 3,095,836 3,095,835
R(squared 0.122 0.137 0.171 0.187 0.194
Panel C: Productivity
Exporter 0.636*** 0.587*** 0.576*** 0.565*** 0.564***
(0.0065) (0.00642) (0.00634) (0.00629) (0.00627)
Importer 0.558*** 0.513*** 0.525*** 0.527*** 0.526***
(0.0051) (0.00505) (0.00498) (0.00495) (0.00493)
Twoway 0.990*** 0.918*** 0.927*** 0.920*** 0.918***
(0.00483) (0.00484) (0.0048) (0.00478) (0.00476)
Observations 3,095,277 3,095,277 3,095,275 3,095,271 3,095,270
R(squared 0.1 0.13 0.158 0.173 0.18
Panel D: Productivity (controlling for size)
Exporter 0.649*** 0.585*** 0.569*** 0.558*** 0.556***
(0.00653) (0.00645) (0.00636) (0.00632) (0.0063)
Importer 0.569*** 0.511*** 0.519*** 0.521*** 0.519***
(0.00512) (0.00507) (0.00501) (0.00498) (0.00496)
Twoway 1.016*** 0.913*** 0.914*** 0.906*** 0.903***
(0.00496) (0.00497) (0.00493) (0.00491) (0.0049)
log(employment) (0.0126*** 0.00271*** 0.00644*** 0.00708*** 0.00714***
(0.000547) (0.000547) (0.000553) (0.000554) (0.000554)
Observations 3,095,277 3,095,277 3,095,275 3,095,271 3,095,270
R(squared 0.101 0.13 0.158 0.173 0.18
Importing and exporting firms are economically and statistically larger and more productive
than non-importing and non-exporting firms as shown in Table 34. Within sectors, exporting
only firms are 100% larger than non-importing and non-exporting firms in terms of employment,
160% bigger in terms of turnover and have 63% higher productivity than non-importing and non-
exporting firms in 2017. Similar, although slightly smaller, estimates are found for firms that
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only import. Twoway traders have the greatest size and productivity premium relative to non-
importing and non-exporting firms. These firms are over 200% larger in terms of employment
and almost 300% larger in terms of turnover than non-importing and non-exporting firms. They
therefore have over double the export size premium of firms that only either export or import and
their productivity premium is almost 100%. Controlling for firm size, the productivity premium
increases (although the magnitude difference is economically small) across all types of importing
and exporting firms. Thus, not only are importing and exporting firms significantly larger than
non-importing and non-exporting firms, they also have an additional productivity premium. The
estimated premia are similar, although slightly larger, than found for the US in Bernard et al.
(2018c) which find an exporter premium of 111% for employment, 135% for turnover and 19% for
productivity (value added over employment).
5.2.5. How concentrated is UK trade in goods?
UK goods exports are concentrated amongst the largest exporters. The top 10% of exporters (6,000
firms) account for 93% of UK exports, of which the top 1% of exporters (600 firms) account for
71%. Using the linked firm-trade data, the contribution of these top traders to economic activity
shows that the top 10% of exporters are responsible for 10% of UK employment and 20% of UK
turnover. These results indicate that UK goods exported are even more concentrated in the top
firms than found in developing countries where the top 1% exporters account for on average 53%
of exports and the top 10% exporters account for 90% of exports (Freund and Pierola, 2015). The
concentration of economic activity in a small number of firms is of high policy relevance looking
forward to Brexit, as the response of these granular firms to trade shocks will have aggregate
implications for the UK economy more broadly speaking.
At the other end of the export distribution, the export contribution of the 1st to the 90th per-
centiles of exporters is relatively small, accounting for only 6% of UK exports. However, these
smaller exporters still account for over 15% of all UK employment and 26% of UK turnover. There-
fore, although the individual actions of these firms may not have aggregate impacts, changes that
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affect exporters and importing and exporting firms more generally will have significant implications
for the UK economy, even if they account for a relatively small proportion of all UK firms.
5.2.6. Who owns the most important importing and exporting firms?
Firms that import and export directly will be hit by increases in trade barriers in any Brexit
scenario (tariff, non-tariff such as customs and regulatory procedures, and changes in the level
and volatility of the exchange rate). The characteristics of these important traders are indicative
of how they might respond to potential trade shocks. One natural angle is to ask whether they
are foreign owned and/or have foreign affiliates. Table 35 shows that top exporters and importers
have both a high incidence of foreign ownership and frequently have affiliates abroad. Firms which
fall into both categories are among the most important in terms of employment and turnover, and
these small number of firms account for a significant proportion of economic activity.
Table 35: Foreign ownership and affiliates (2017)
Top 10% of exporters and Top 1% of exporters and
Top 10% of importers Top 1% of importers
Share foreign owned 43% 57%
Share with subsidiaries 38% 57%
Share foreign owned & subsidiaries 19% 35%
5.3. Empirical strategy
Having established the importance of trade in goods across firms in the UK economy, this chapter
now turns to the main question of estimating the export elasticity to the depreciation of sterling
in 2016. This section estimates the elasticity of UK exports to the large depreciation of sterling
around the Brexit Referendum and heterogeneity across UK exporters.
5.3.1. Was the rise in exports mostly driven by prices rather than quantities?
First an event study methodology decomposes the quarterly value change of UK exports between
2015 and 2017 into quantity and price (unit value) channels. The paper plots the coefficients from
the regression:
log(Yfidt) = αfid +
∑
t
αtDt + εfidt (26)
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where Yfidt ∈ {price, quantity, value} are firm f, product i, destination d in time t (quarters) level
outcome variables with Q2 2016 as the base time period.
5.3.2. Was the rise in UK exports driven by bilateral exchange rates?
Second, the paper estimates bilateral exchange rate pass-through to identify the extent to which
the depreciation drove the boost to UK exports. The regression estimated is:
log(Yfidt) = αfid + βeExchangeRatedt + εfidt (27)
where Yfidt ∈ {price, quantity, value} are firm f, product i, destination d in time t level outcome
variables and Exchange ratedt is the log of the bilateral exchange rate between sterling and the
currency of destination d in time t in quarters.
5.3.3. Which firms had the largest response to the exchange rate?
Finally, the paper explores whether there is heterogeneity in the elasticity to the exchange rate
across firms of different sizes and hence which firms drove the increase in value following the 2016
depreciation. The regression specification:






βessizef ∗ ExchangeRatedt + εfidt (28)
where Yfidt ∈ {price, quantity, value} are firm f, product i, destination d in time t (quarters) level
outcome variables and s indicates exporter size deciles.68 Firms are allocated to their size decile
based upon their annual export values69 and a regression is estimated including a full set of decile
fixed effects and interactions between size deciles and the exchange rate to estimate heterogeneity
in export elasticities.
68For each firm, the size decile is defined according to the firm’s average size in each calendar year. A separate
term with just the exchange rate is not needed as the 10 deciles include all of the firms and hence one decile
interaction would need to be dropped.




This subsection presents the results of the analysis detailed in the empirical strategy subsection.
5.4.1. The rise in exports was mostly driven prices rather than quantities
The rise in UK goods exports following the Brexit Referendum was mostly driven by an increase
in export prices rather than an increase in export quantities. The response of individual transac-
tions at the firm-product-destination level from equation 26 is plotted using UK customs data from
HMRC. This granular level identifies the quantity of goods traded and unit values (value/quantity)
as an approximation of prices. Figure 19 plots the event study of the evolution of values, quantities
and prices to decompose the disaggregate goods export values response into the different margins
of response. The point estimates are plotted using the regression coefficients and SE denotes the
95% confidence intervals.
Figure 19 shows that most of the initial value response of UK exports following the Brexit Ref-
erendum was driven by price effects. The micro level data in Figure 6 shows a faster response of
export values than the aggregate data in Figure 1, with quarterly firm-product-destination level
exports rising by over 10% by 2016 Q4, and rising to over 17% by 2017 Q4 relative to the 2016
Q2 level. Prices increased more quickly than quantities, rising by over 7% by the end of 2016,
and by almost 10% by the end of 2017. Quantities by contrast had only increased by 5% by the
end of 2016, and the most significant increase only occurred in the final quarter of 2017 by where
quantities had risen by 8% relative to their pre-referendum level. The appendix shows that UK
exports to both EU and non-EU markets show similar trends in Figures 21 and 22, although there
is a larger price response in EU markets.
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2015q1 2015q3 2016q1 2016q3 2017q1 2017q3
date
Coefficient on value SE on value
Coefficient on quantity SE on quantity
Coefficient on price SE on price
5.4.2. The rise in UK exports was driven by bilateral exchange rates
The increase in UK export values was driven by movements in bilateral exchange rates, with greater
price elasticities than quantity elasticities with respect to the exchange rate. The rise in UK exports
was driven by the depreciation of sterling shown by the elasticity of firm-product-destination level
exports to bilateral exchange rates. Table 5 shows that over the 2015-2017 period, a 10% deprecia-
tion of the bilateral exchange rate between the UK and a given destination increased export values
by 6.55%. Over this period, this increase was primarily driven by changes in the sterling price of the
transaction, accounting for over 80% of the total value response of UK exports to the movement in
the bilateral exchange rate. Quantities did also respond to movements in the exchange rate, with
a 1.15% increase in quantities in response to a 10% depreciation. Table 36 also shows that there
was a larger elasticity of export values to the exchange rate in EU markets than in non-EU markets.
The results in this paper provide supportive evidence towards models of variable markups and
highlight the importance of pricing to market for understanding the impact of fluctuations in the
exchange rates on exports. The estimates in this paper over the Brexit Referendum period differ
to some of the central estimates in the literature. On the price elasticity side, the results of an
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elasticity of 0.54 are significantly larger than those in Berman et al. (2012) which find that French
exports have a price elasticity of 0.08, and to Amiti et al. (2014) who find that Belgian exports
had a price elasticity of 0.2. One possible difference is that this paper uses data at the quarterly
frequency, whereas these other papers use annual frequency, however this would not alone explain
the differences. Further, this paper finds significantly smaller responses on the quantity side with
an elasticity of 0.12 than Berman et al. (2012) who find a quantity elasticity of 0.4.
Fontagné, Martin, and Orefice (2018) stress that to estimate the pure trade cost elasticity for
the change in quantity of exports to a change in the exchange rate then the impact on export
prices must be accounted for. In their paper they are able to use a firm specific cost shock in
the form of firm specific electricity prices to instrument for export prices when estimating the
elasticity of firm export quantities to the exchange rate this thesis does not have access to such an
instrument. Therefore the results presented here should be cautiously interpreted as descriptive
elasticities with respect to the exchange rate shock in question, rather than the underlying trade
cost elasticities.
Table 36: Regression coefficient estimates of export elasticity to exchange rate (2015-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Value Quantity Price
Panel A: All exports
Exchange rate 0.655*** 0.115*** 0.540***
(0.00426) (0.00425) (0.00295)
Observations 12,293,201 12,293,201 12,293,201
R-squared 0.877 0.895 0.876
Sample All All All
FE firm-product-destination firm-product-destination firm-product-destination
Panel B: EU exports
Exchange rate 0.765*** 0.159*** 0.606***
(0.00505) (0.00479) (0.00339)
Observations 9,592,626 9,592,626 9,592,626
R-squared 0.862 0.892 0.854
Sample EU EU EU
FE firm-product-destination firm-product-destination firm-product-destination
Panel C: Non-EU exports
Exchange rate 0.311*** -0.0225** 0.333***
(0.00762) (0.00915) (0.00596)
Observations 2,700,575 2,700,575 2,700,575
R-squared 0.784 0.879 0.911
Sample Non-EU Non-EU Non-EU
FE firm-product-destination firm-product-destination firm-product-destination
Notes: An increase in the exchange rate is a depreciation. All variables are in logarithms. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis. ***significant at 1% level Source: HMRC Trade in Goods, Bank calculations.
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5.4.3. The response of large firms is greatest to movements in the exchange rate
The largest firms were the most responsive to movements in exchange rates around the Brexit
Referendum, with monotonic increases in export elasticities moving up through the export size
deciles. Figure 20 plots the regression coefficient results for the value, quantity and price elas-
ticities (regression table in appendix). The largest exporters, measured by either export value or
turnover, have statistically larger export elasticities,70 with the top decile increasing exports by
6.8% in response to a 10% depreciation, and the bottom decile only increasing exports by 5.7%.
The heterogeneous elasticity is driven by responses in both unit values and quantities, with larger
differences across the deciles for quantity elasticities. In particular, the price elasticity accounts
for 95% of the smallest firms’ total value elasticity and 80% of the largest firms’ value elasticity.
The heterogeneous elasticities across exporters of different sizes is not entirely driven by a se-
lection effect across industries. Some industries may be dominated by large exporters (e.g. cars),
whereas others may have many small exporters (e.g. agriculture). If these industries also have
different responsiveness to relative prices then this could drive the heterogeneous size effect. Size
percentiles are recalculated within 2 digit SIC industries and the analysis repeated (results in ap-
pendix). A similar pattern is found in the results, with very little change to the elasticities in the
top deciles, although there is a lower gradient of elasticities across all the deciles. This suggests
small evidence of selection effects, where the industries with small exporters have lower export
elasticities to the exchange rate.
The result that the largest exporters respond relatively more on quantities than prices relative
to small exporters is surprising (Berman et al. (2012); Atkeson and Burstein (2008)). These pa-
pers find that the largest exporters with the most market power increase markups in response to
a depreciation and hence see a smaller quantity response for these firms. There are two possi-
ble explanations for why the results around the Brexit referendum could differ. First, this paper
looks at a short time period where capacity constraints may bind more for the smallest exporters,
70The analysis formally tested for the differences in statistical significance of the result, and finds that the
elasticities across all of the deciles are statistically significant.
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whereas large exporters are able to increase production to respond to the increased competitive-
ness. Second, large exporters (which are presumably more profitable) may be more willing to pay
sunk cost investments to expand supply in a period of high uncertainty as these would make less
of a dent in their overall profit-loss statements.






























This paper shows that the depreciation of sterling following the Brexit referendum announcement
in 2016 stimulated an increase in UK exports. This was primarily caused by an increase in prices,
which account for 80% of the increase in export values at the firm-product-destination level. This
suggests that firms do price to market through actively changing the sterling value of their exports
in response to the large depreciation. Export quantities also increased following the Referendum,
with some evidence of a more significant increase towards the end of 2017. However, the deprecia-
tion of sterling between 2015 and 2016 has a significantly lower impact on export quantities than
typically found in the literature (Berman et al., 2012). Finally, the largest exporters increased
exports the most in response to movements in the bilateral exchange rate around the Brexit refer-
endum, with more elastic price and especially quantity responses. The evidence of greater pricing
to market of the largest exporters is consistent with models of heterogeneous pricing to market
such as Atkeson and Burstein (2008), however the quantity response is unexpected.
In the event of a no-deal or hard Brexit scenario, it is likely that sterling will further depreciate.
The analysis in this paper has several implications for this scenario. First, a large depreciation
will increase the value of UK exports, but predominantly through prices rather than quantities.
Second, the largest exporters will benefit most from the depreciation, increasing values, quanti-
ties and prices by more than smaller exporters. Third, since the largest firms are not only most
responsive to changes in economic competitiveness but also more likely to be foreign owned, have
foreign subsidiaries and be embedded in global value chains, they may be the most likely to exit
from the UK in response to increased trade barriers facing UK exporters to foreign markets. If this
were to happen, the aggregate elasticity of UK exports to future movements in the exchange rate
could be different (the results of this paper suggest that the elasticity would probably be lower).
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5.6. Appendix
A EU and non-EU export response (2015-2017)
The following figures present the event study decomposition for separate EU and non-EU samples,
where again the point estimate is plotted and SE represents the 95% confidence interval.
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B The response of large firms is greatest to movements in the exchange rate
Table 37: Regression coefficient estimates of export elasticity to exchange rate split by exporter
size decile (2015-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Value Quantity Price
Decile 2 0.486*** 0.332*** 0.154***
(0.0345) (0.0385) (0.0313)
Decile 3 0.724*** 0.525*** 0.198***
(0.0371) (0.04) (0.0323)
Decile 4 0.992*** 0.754*** 0.239***
(0.0393) (0.0415) (0.0331)
Decile 5 1.241*** 0.947*** 0.293***
(0.0409) (0.0427) (0.034)
Decile 6 1.504*** 1.172*** 0.332***
(0.042) (0.0437) (0.0345)
Decile 7 1.798*** 1.451*** 0.348***
(0.0428) (0.0442) (0.0348)
Decile 8 2.062*** 1.691*** 0.371***
(0.043) (0.0444) (0.0349)
Decile 9 2.318*** 1.896*** 0.422***
(0.0432) (0.0446) (0.0349)
Decile 10 2.557*** 2.076*** 0.481***
(0.0433) (0.0447) (0.035)
Exchange rate*Decile 1 0.532*** 0.0274* 0.504***
(0.0144) (-0.0163) (0.0129)
Exchange rate*Decile 2 0.554*** 0.0416*** 0.512***
0.00974 (0.0115) (0.00847)
Exchange rate*Decile 3 0.564*** 0.0511*** 0.513***
(0.00821) (0.00927) (0.00723)
Exchange rate*Decile 4 0.574*** 0.0605*** 0.514***
(0.00725) (0.00806) (0.00572)
Exchange rate*Decile 5 0.576*** 0.0608*** 0.515***
(0.00642) (0.00695) (0.00482)
Exchange rate*Decile 6 0.590*** 0.0692*** 0.521***
(0.0057) (0.00604) (0.00414)
Exchange rate*Decile 7 0.609*** 0.0875*** 0.522***
(0.00512) (0.0053) (0.00363)
Exchange rate*Decile 8 0.637*** 0.112*** 0.525***
(0.00471) (0.0048) (0.0033)
Exchange rate*Decile 9 0.659*** 0.122*** 0.537***
(0.00444) (0.00447) (0.00309)
Exchange rate*Decile 10 0.679*** 0.134*** 0.545***
(0.0043) (0.00429) (0.00298)
Observations 12,293,201 12,293,201 12,293,201
R-squared 0.877 0.895 0.877
Sample All All All
FE fpd fpd fpd
Notes: An increase in the exchange rate is a depreciation. Size deciles
calculated as annual export values at the firm level across all industries.
All variables are in logarithms. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
***significant at 1% level Source: HMRC Trade in Goods, Bank calcu-
lations.
137
Table 38: Regression coefficient estimates of export elasticity to exchange rate split by exporter
size decile (2015-2017)
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Value Quantity Price
Decile 2 0.402*** 0.304*** 0.0978***
(0.0328) (0.0359) (0.0274)
Decile 3 0.692*** 0.531*** 0.161***
(0.036) (0.0381) (0.0288)
Decile 4 0.925*** 0.727*** 0.198***
(0.0378) (0.0394) (0.0295)
Decile 5 1.172*** 0.964*** 0.209***
(0.039) (0.0405) (0.0302)
Decile 6 1.355*** 1.126*** 0.229***
(0.0395) (0.0409) (0.0304)
Decile 7 1.549*** 1.308*** 0.241***
(0.0399) (0.0411) (0.0306)
Decile 8 1.722*** 1.452*** 0.270***
(0.0401) (0.0413) (0.0307)
Decile 9 1.886*** 1.589*** 0.297***
(0.0402) (0.0414) (0.0307)
Decile 10 2.106*** 1.762*** 0.344***
(0.0404) (0.0415) (0.0308)
Exchange rate*Decile 1 0.574*** 0.0498*** 0.524***
(0.0135) (0.0156) (0.0115)
Exchange rate*Decile 2 0.575*** 0.0510*** 0.524***
(0.00888) (0.0101) (0.00736)
Exchange rate*Decile 3 0.594*** 0.0717*** 0.522***
(0.00763) (0.00853) (0.00604)
Exchange rate*Decile 4 0.595*** 0.0687*** 0.526***
(0.00658) (0.00725) (0.00501)
Exchange rate*Decile 5 0.609*** 0.0850*** 0.524***
(0.00589) (0.00635) (0.00432)
Exchange rate*Decile 6 0.610*** 0.0833*** 0.527***
(0.00527) (0.00554) (0.00375)
Exchange rate*Decile 7 0.623*** 0.0947*** 0.529***
(0.00487) (0.00503) (0.00341)
Exchange rate*Decile 8 0.641*** 0.112*** 0.529***
(0.0046) (0.00468) (0.00321)
Exchange rate*Decile 9 0.653*** 0.116*** 0.537***
(0.00441) (0.00445) (0.00307)
Exchange rate*Decile 10 0.679*** 0.134*** 0.546***
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.00298)
Observations 12,293,201 12,293,201 12,293,201
R-squared 0.877 0.895 0.877
Sample All All All
FE fpd fpd fpd
Notes: An increase in the exchange rate is a depreciation. Size deciles
calculated as annual export values at the firm level across 2 digit SIC
industries. All variables are in logarithms. Robust standard errors in
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